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Whenever  the  Bank  identifies shortcomings  in  institutional
capability, technical assistance is automatically assumed to be
the appropriate response.  But technical assistance has, and will
continue to have limitations - and there are alternatives.
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. 1clvii.  id a  sLisce (A),  inhI.'Iding proje  t-related  identified, TA is automiiatically  assunmed  to be the appropri-
training. is tihe prinipal  instruriient the Bank uses to  ate response.  But excessive reliance on TA to solve ID
)roiiOLe  istitutional  deselopmtent (ID).  problenis raises false expectations.  TA has and will
Hushk review's trends in ID-related TA for FY1982-88  continue to have its limitations.
and examines ws  hy there is little evidence of improvement  In countries where there is still a genuine demand  for
in its use, despite the recommen(dations  in many past studies  Bank-financed ID-rclated TA. several things can be done to
and reviews.  Shc identifies the minimum requirements for  improve Lhc  Bank's performance.  Buyck argues that it is
successfUl  ID-related TA, and gauges Vwtiliei-  the Bank is  unrcalistic to expect a change in the Bank's lending policics
equipped to taikc  on the challenge of improv  ing it. or should  and practicics, and a substantial increased resource
consider other ways to promotc ID.  allocation for TA.  In the absence of such changes, thcsc are
Sihe comnen(s tihat the Bank  labors  under  serious  built-  somc  of the actions  shie suggests:
in handic  aps as a supplier of ID-related TA.  These include:  Country-wide ID strategies should be developed.
*  Thc neglect of in-depth country knowledge and a poor  *  Projects should be designed in a participatory manner
instittitional  meniory,  bohl  aLttributable  to the frequent  rcsponding to genuine needs and capacity of the bxrrower.
rotaLion of sLaff.  *  Institutional analysis of lhe  recipient  agency  is needed,
*  A high  degree  of centrali/ation  in the control  of  including  counLry commitment.
operations  from  Washirigton  *  Projects  should  be designed  for flexible  implemenLa-
T  6ic  ,riortitv  thie BLn'lk  altaches  to capital lending and to  tion,  ilh clear objectives.  A series of verifiable perfor-
;coj  l  i  ii,; mof  projecLs  rather  thLanr  their  supers isiun.  milnce  indicators  should  be defined.
!  T.-,  cost  of Bi3inik  TA  to  some  borro%k  ers.  *1ore  thought  shoiuld be given  to tie  packaging  and
k  oni:  n.d  A itO TA  c Xten!dd  hyV 1i1oTV  bilateral  donors  orn  a  (deliverx of  ID-related  TA  - for cxample,  by  integrating
rAn  - A, -i  -~  - short-lermi consulItants  and  :ong-term  technical  assisLanLs.
* 'T  ho  i  ,,Bnk  s  6  tNepri  nt  aplproach  to  pr1iject ceisigrt  andl  *  ()per ation  al staff  should  systematically  compile  and
in: tkn:itt;  tn-u  cxchaige  information  on con;ulItants  used  for ID-related
I Oe  h...nce of  t  \  tCNt1tliC,  e Xp:iCi  atICntion  to the  TA,  including  fraink evaluations  of their performance.
is uc  ots - rtctincit com itiuontit  in Baink w  ork,  a prerCqui-  P'ractical  guidelines  and project  imnplementation
site f  r sutccessill  11)  relate.d TA  t  maluals  should  be  pTepared  for  Bank  staff  working  on  these
.'i,:  also argues  diat  compared  A ith traditional  Bank  areas.
p  'rcje  t;  and cc  nornic  aund  sector  work,  iI)  is a relatively  M oIrC  use shoLild be made of the Bank's  field  offices.
nrew  and  l partic ularly  complex  area  of Bank  work.  As  a  For example,  to list local consultans,  monitor  the perfor-
result,  tlh  N) dv of know ledge  is still quite  limited,  and there  mance  and progress  of ongoing  projecLs, and c x)rdinate  TA
are few  best  prlacti  oners.  financed  by the  Bank  with  that provided  by bilateral  donors.
Shc  SLteceSts  itat  the Z3.mk  be more discriiimiating  in  Cross-fertilization  and7  dissemination  of best practicC
its use of  Il)  related  TA.  limiting  it to cases  where the  are needed  for  staff  working  on  hiese areas,
gOVerinlle nits comitmiuenIt  is clearly  demonstrated  and  *  T he conceptual  and methodological  base  for ID-related
w here  thlre  is  an institutional  base  on  1hich  to build.  TA needls to be expanded.
But  the Bank  should  also consider  alterniative  routes  to
11). Wioen shortcomings  in institutional  capability  are
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SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
1.  Technical  Assistance  (TA),  defIned  here  to  Include  project-
related  tralning, Is the  principal Instrument  used  by  the  Bank  to
promote  Institutional  Developme.,t  (ID)  In Its borrowing  member
countries.  While  TA as  a proportion  of Bank  lending has  been  declining
(from around  9%  In FYs  82  and  83  to 6%  In FYs  87  and  88), the
proportlon  of  TA directed  towards  ID has  been  Increasing, with  the
result  that  ID-related  TA  has  remained  falrly constant  through  the
1980s  at 4-5  percent  of  Bank  lending.
2.  The  Asla  Region  has  been  In absolute  terms  the  largest
user  of  ID-related  TA.  However,  the  relative  Importance  of  ID-related
TA as  a component  of Bank  operations  has  been  greatest  In Sub-
Saharan  Africa  where  it accounts  for over  10 percent  of  lending, as
compared  wlth  4 percent  In Asia  and  2-3  percent  In the  other  reglons
of  the Bank,  Latin  America  and  the Caribbean  (LAC),  and  Europe,  the
Middle East  and  North  Africa (EMENA).
3.  Among  the  sectors,  agriculture  and  rural development  has
absorbed  the  largest  amount  of  ID-related  TA,  but  the  relative
Importance  of  ID-related  TA  has  been  greatest  In  Education  and
Populatlon,  Health  and  Nutritlon  (PHN).  ID-related  TA  has  also  been
central  to  the  Bank's efforts  to help strengthen  national  economic
management.  Durlng  the  1980s, for the  first time, freestanding  TA  for
Public Sector  Management  (PSM) has  become  a significant  feature  of  the
Bank's operations  In Africa, and  to a  lesser  extent  In LAC.  It has
been  used  only  rarely  In  the cther  two  regions  (e.g.,  In Bangladesh,
China  and  most  recently  in  Morocco  and  Algeria).
4.  Various  internal  reviews  carrled  out  In  recent  years,  mainly
by the Operations  and  Evaluatlon  Department  (OED) and  the  Africa
Region, have  pointed  to  serlous  weaknesses  In the way  In  which  TA, and
parti-,ular!y ID-related  TA, Is managed  by  the  Bank.  The  frequently
hasty  and  poor  design  of TA  projects,  In part  attrlbutable  to
inadequate  diagnosis  of TA  needs,  tends  to  be compounded  by defects
In Implementatlon  such  as  recruitment  delays  and  difficulties  In finding
sultable  consultants  (particularly  for  tralning),  problems  assoclated
with  the  employment  of  long-term  expatriate  advisers,  lack of adequate
counterparts,  lax supervislon  by  the Bank, poor  coordination  with
other  donors  and  the  Inadequate  administrative  capacity  of the
borrower.  These  are  especially  serlous  problems  In Africa, as well as
In a few  least  developed  countries  elsewhere  (e.g.,  Bangladesh);  It Is In
these  parts  of the  world  that  the  phenomenon  of "supply-driven  TA"  Is
most  commonly  encountered.  However,  the  governments  of most  of the
more  advanced  countries  outside  Africa  are  by  now  able  to define  their
own  TA  needs,  have  considerable  local expertise  to draw  on, make
relatively  little use  of  long-term  expatrlates  and  are  reasonably
competent  at managing  the  TA which  the  Bank  fInances.
5.  Where  Bank  TA has  proved  to be  Ineffective,  th.  explanation
Is  usually  to be  found  In lack of  serious  commitment  on  the  part  ofv ;
the borrow-r, the g' erally low priority  accorded  to TA In  the Bank
kiesulting  ,  an  Inadequate allocation  of staff resources  to the TA
components  of  projects),  the  poor  choice  of  Instruments  for the
delivery of TA or a combination of these factors.  Some  Improvements
appear to have been made  In  recent years  In  the design and delivery
of TA In response  to the criticisms  and recommendatlons  contalned  In
past reviews.  For example, terms of reference and work programs  now
tend to be more  clearly defined,  greater use  Is being made  of local
consultants, more  Innovative  modes  of delivery are being experlmented
with (e.g.,  twinning),  and  a  larger  role  In  the  design  and  implementatlon
of  TA has been accorded  to some cf the Bank's  overseas  resident
missions.  Nevertheless, a review of ID-related TA projects and
components  which have gone to tne Board  In  the past two years  and
Intervlews wlth staff Involved  suggest that the Bank's  performance  In
this fle!d  still  leaves much to be desired.
6.  It Is a contentlon of this paper that the Bank labors under
serlous bullt-in  handlcaps as a supplier  of ID-related TA.  These
Include: the absence of systematic, explicit  attention to the Issue of
government  commitment  In  Bank work, a prerequlsite for successful ID-
related TA; neglect of In-depth country knowledge and a poor
Institutional  memory, both attributable In  part to the frequent
rotatlon  of  staff;  a  high  degree  of  centralIzation  In  the  control  of
operations  from Washington; the priority naturally attached  to capital
lending,  and to the preparation of projects, rather than their
supervislon;  the high cost of Bank TA to some borrowers, as compared
with TA extended  by many  bilateral  donors on  a  grant basis--all of
these are  factors  which  help  to  explaln  the  Bank's  irr!ted  success  In
tne use of TA to promote  ID. Also,  compared  to traditlonal  BanK
proJects and economic and sector work, ID is a  relatively  new  an'd
particularly  complex area of Bank work.  As a result,  the  body  of
knowledge  Is  still  quite limited,  and there are few best practitloners.
7.  A possible concluslon could be that the Bank should be more
discrlminating  In its  use of ID-related TA, limiting  It  to cases  where
there Is a clearly demonstrated  government  commitment  and a minimal
pre-existing Institutional  base upon which to build. Alternative routes
to institutlonal  development  should always be considered.  When
Institutional  capacity shortcomings are  identifled,  there appears  at
present to be an automatic assumptlon  that technical assistance  Is
the approprlate response.  Excessive reliance  on TA to solve ID
problems, however, raises false expectations.  TA has, and will
continue to have, its limitations.
8.  In  countries where  there  Is  still  a genuine demand  for Bank-
financed ID-related TA a number of things  might be done to Improve the
Bank's  performance  In  what  Is  unquestionably a complex area of Its
operatlons.  Most  important of all,  a conscious effort could be made  to
assign more  staff resources  to the preparation and appraisal,  and
more  particularly  to the supervislon,  of both project-related  and
freestanding TA--a  move which could be backed by Improved staff
tralning.vii
9.  However,  this paper  contends  that  it Is unrealistic  to
expect  changes  in the  Bank's resource  allocation  and  Its lending
policies and  practices.  In tVe  absence  of such  changes,  these  are
some  of the  actions  that  tcai  be  taken  to  Improve  the  Bank's
performance:
(a)  Country-wide  institutlonal  strategles  could  be developed.
(b)  TA design  shou;d  be preceded  by a careful  analysis  of the
Institutlonal  factors  Involved,  including  an assessment of
the government/borrower's  comnitment. Design  should  be as
simple  as possible  and should  be carried  out In  a
participatory  fashion  wlth  the government/borrower  taking
tne lead  in  defining  priority  needs and  objectives,  terms of
reference  and  work programs. To the extent  practicable,
provislon  should  be  made for  veriflable  indlcators  of
performance.
(C)  More thought  could  be put Into  the packaging  of ID-TA
delivery  modes,  for  example  by integrating  short-term
consultants  and long-term  technical  assistants  with
natlonal  staff,  and  making  use of less  traditional  methods
such  as  twinning.
(d)  Operational  staff  should  systematically  compile--and
exchange--informatlon  on consultants  used for ID-related
TA,  Including  frank  evaluatlons  of their  performance. A
proven  track  record  should  normally  be required  as a
condition  of  Bank  recommendatlon.
(e)  Guidelines  on  TA  could  be  prepared  fe/r  Bank  staff,
Incorporating lessons of  experlence  r  '1  providing  a
checklist  of the steps to be taken  a. _,l  stages  of the
project  cycle.
(f)  Greater use could  be made of the  Bank's  fle,d  offices  In  the
design  and supervision  of 1D-related  TA projects. Some
additional  local  staff  may need to be recruited  for  this
purpose. Approprlate  tasks for the fleld  office  could  be to
compile  a register  of local  consultants,  to monitor
consultants'  performance  and project  progress,  and to help
coordinate  Bank-financed  TA  with TA provided  by bilateral
donors.
(g)  The conceptual  and  methodological  base for 1D-related  TA
needs to be expanded.
(h)  Cross-fertilization  and disseminatior  activities  of best
practice  should  be organized  for staff  working  on these
areas.CHAPTER  ONE
INSTITUTIONAL  DEVELOPMENT  AND  TECHNICAL  ASSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
1.  InstItutional  development  (ID),  In one  form  or  another,  has
been  part  of the  World  Bank's operatlons  almost  since  Its Inceptlon.
In recent  years,  the development  community  has  become  Increasingly
aware  of the  Importance  of strong  institutions  for  sustained  economic
development.  This  Is because  In a  large number  of unsatisfactory
operatlons,  the  principal determinants  of underperformance  were
Inrtitutlonal.2 Technical  assistance  (TA) Is the  instrument  most
frequently  used  by  the  Bank  to  promote  Institutional  development.
However,  too  often  TA  has  been  unsatisfactory.  Many  country,
sectoral,  and  reglonal  revlews,  varlous  papers,  and  case  studies,  have
highlighted  the  major  shortcomings,  and  proposed  recommendations  'or
Improvement. 3 The  generally  accepted  reasons  for the  lack of success
are  well known:
3  At  the design  stage:  Insufficlent  Involvement  and
commitment  of the  recipient  (supply-driven  TA);  too  many
complex  components;  Insufficient preparation  time (TA as  an
"afterthought");  Inadequate  assessment  of  the borrower's
needs  and  the  soclopolltIcal climate  In  which  TA  Is to work;
loosely  drawn  terms  of reference  or, In extreme  cases,  no
terms  of  reference  ("slush  funds");  targetirig  that  Is  overly
ambitious  In  timing  or  scope;  Immeasurable  outputs;
Inadequate  or  Inappropriate  Instruments  (excessive  reliance
on  long-term  expatrlate  TA,  Insufficient  provision  for
training,  etc.).
*  At  the  ;mplementatlon  stage:  unsatisfactory  performance  of
consultants;  lnadequaLe  supporting  arrangements  within  the
country;  unavallability  of  appropriate  government
counterparts;  procurement  problems;  less  than  optimal
supervision  and  quality control  by the  Bank; weak
management  of the  program  by the  reciplent  government.
1  See  A. Israel, Institutional Development  Incefntives to
Performance,  JHU, 1987, p. 1,  et al.
2  1988  Annual  Review  of  Performance  Evaluation  of  the  Bank's
Operatlons  Evaluation  Department  (OED),  p.  vi.
3  See  Annex  1  for  a  list  of  these  studies  and  a  comprehensive
review  of  their  analyses  and  recommendatlors.2.  Because  TA  has  been  so extensively  used,  and  Its effects
so often  examined,  general  agreement  exists  '-hat  the  following
elements  are  necessary  for  successful  TA:
*  Improved  national  plannlng  and  management  of  TA  (government
recognitlon  of  the  need  for  t'  project  and  commitment  to
It;  appropriate  structures  within  the  government  to  design
TA,  manage  Its  Implementation,  and  use  the  output).
O  Sound  cesign  (more  modest  goals,  simpler  organization  and
Inputs, clearer  alms  leading to  concrete  measurable  outputs,
and  clear  definitlon  of  the  responsibllties  of TA  personnel
and  staff  of the  reciplent  agency).
*  Improved  delivery  of  TA (increased  use  of  less traditlonal
forms  of  TA  such  as  twinning 4 and  use  of  Non-Governmental
Organizatlons  (NGOs);  development  of  local training
Institutions; encouraging  the  use  of  local  consultants;
better  selection  cf  TA personnel,  regarding  their  technical
qualifications,  experience,  and  personal  suitabillity;
adequate  support  from  the  reciplent  agency  and, where
aopropriate,  from  the  consultants'  headquarters).
*  Improved  Bank  management  of  TA  (more  and  strengthened
supervislon,  making  better  use  of  resident  missions  for
supervislon,  tightened  reporting  requirements,  etc.).
*  Better  coordinatlon  among  donors.
3.  Although  these  recommendations  are  well  esta.iIlshed,  and  TA
related  to  Institutlonal  development  has  been  given  added  emphasis
with  the  rapid  expansion  of  policy-based  lending,  there  seems  to  be
little  evidence  of  major  Improvement  In the  design  and  delivery  of such
TA.  "Slush  funds"  still  crop  up  frequently;  TA  components  of  project
and  sector  loans  often  continue  to  be  hastily  and  Inadequately  put
together;  recipient  governments  per  stently  fall to create  or  sustain
4  Twinning  Involves  the establishment  of  an  institutional
relationship  between  an organizational  entity  In  a  developing  country
(the "reciplent") and  a similar but more  mature  entity  In another
country  (the "supplier").  Twinning  Is mainly  aimed  at, and  best  suited
for, the  transfer  of managerial,  financial and  technical  skills and
systems  which  Involve many  or all of  the numerous  functional  asDects
of  the  recipient  entity.  "Transfer"  of skills Is to be distingulshed
from  the  "development"  of skills In the  sense  that  the  prlmary  reason
for selecting  twinning as  a mode  of TA  delivery  Is to bring  to the
reciplent  proven  and  successful  ways  of Improving  organizational
efficlency  and  effectiveness  through  the  selection  of a supplier  of
similar structure.  In short,  twinning  is about  tr-ansferrlng directly
relevant  operational  knowledge  between  two  institutlons  as  similar in
functlon  and  structure  as  possible.- 3 -
effective  machinery  for  the management  of  TA;  little  progress  has  been
made,  elther  centrally  or  In the  regions,  In  bullding  up  a  relabie
lIventory  of best  practitloners;  most  worrying,  the performance  of
consultants  Is rarely  systematically  evaluated  by  the  Bank; and  little
attentlon  Is given  to  TA  in  Bank-sponsored  aid groups.
4.  This paper  revlews  the  trends  In TA related  to  Inst'tutional
development  (ID)  over  the  FY82-88  period,  'nd  examines  why  there  Is so
little evidence  of  Improvement  In Its use,  in spite  of the
recommendations  of the  many  past  studles  and  reviews.  It Identifles
the minimum  requirements  for successful  ir-related  TA, and  gauges
whether  the  Bank  is equipped  to take  on the  challenge  or  whether
alternative  means  should  be considered  to  promote  ID.
Recommendations  for  future  actlons  are  also proposed.
5.  It needs  to be  emF,-.sIzed at  the outset  that, as  with
previous  revlew3,  the  main  focus  of this study,  and  of recommendations
for future  actlons,  Is on  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  a few  of the  least-
developed  countrles  in  other  parts  of the world.  These  are  the
countries  where  the  Bank  encounters  the most  serious  problems  In the
delivery  of  TA.
SCOPE  OF  THIS  REVIEW
6.  5This  review  covers  a  six-year  perloa,  from  July  1981 through
June  1988.4  It  encompasses  both  tech.nical  assistance  components  of
project  and  sector  lending, called  proJe_t-related  TA; and
freestanding  TA projects.  Project-related  TA alms  mainly  at
providing  support  for  project  Implementing  agencies.  Freestanding  TA
usually  consists  of projects  In  which  the  primary  objective  Is
institutlonal  support  and  capacity-bullding  not  directly  linked to any
particular  physlcal  Investment.  The  paper  also covers  project-related
training, which  the  Bank  treats  as an  element  of TA.  All  TA,  under
active  preparation  and  uinder supervision,  during  the  FY82-88  perlod  Is
taken  Into account.
7.  Excluded  from  the  scope  of this study  are: TA  projects
financed  by  the  United  Natlons  Development  Program  (UNDP) and  other
donors,  and  executed  by  the  World  Bank; TA  financed  through  the  Bank's
administrative  budget,  such  as Country  Economic  Sector  Work,  the
activitles  of  the  Economic  Development  Institute  (EDI),  the  secondment
program  of  the  International  Develk  lent  Assoclation  (IDA),  arid  Informal
TA  provided  during  country  dialogue  and  vla the  Bank's  resi-lent
misslons.  Although  these  forms  cf  TA  have  a significant  Impact  on  10,
through  the  continuous  Ir,terchange  of ldeas  and  the  dissemination  of
developing  countries'  practices  and  experience,  project-related  and
freestanding  TA  remain  the  Bank's  principal  Instruments  to  p.-vmote  ID,
accounting  for  95  percent  of  total  Bank  TA expenditure.
5  World  Bank  fiscal years  1982 through  1S88 (FY82-8d).-4-
SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
8.  Data  on  project-related  TA  were  provlided  by  the  Central
Operations  Department,  Operations  Policy  Unit  (CODOP), which  maintalns
a  comorehensive  data  base  covering  expenditures  on  project-related  TA
from  FY82  to  the  present.  For  FY82-88,  this  comprIses  ,392  projects.
CODOP derives  expenditures  on  project-related  TA  from  Staff  Appraisal
Reports  and  President's  Reports  for  projects  approved  by  the  Board
since  June  1981.  To  the  extent  possible,  the  following  Bank-financed
elements  related  to  the  provislon  of  TA  arc  excluded:  (1)  Investments  In
Infrastructure  or  civil  works  (other  than  detailed  engineering);  and
(2)  equipment  or  vehicles.  Operating  costs,  salarles  of  local  staff
working  on  the  project,  minor  equlpment,  such  as  personal  computers,
and  minor  office  improvements  usually  are  considerecd  to  be  a  part  of
technical  assistance  expenditures.
9.  Identification  of  freestanding  TA projects  was  based
primarily  upon  the  Bank's  Management  Informatlon  Sgstem  (MIS)
classl'lcatlon  of  operations  by  lending  instrument.  Whenever
possiblie,  projects  from  any  other  MIS classification  were  Inctluded,  as
long  as  more  than  50  oercent  of  Bank-fInanced  costs  were  for  TA,
regardless  of  whether  the  MIS classifies  them  an  Investment  projects.
Thus,  the  data  base  for  freestandin,  TA  !,cludes  a  total  of  164 such
projects  for  the  period.  A  desk  review  of  Staff  Appralsal  Reports  and
President's  Peports  was  conducted.  To  preserve  consistency,  the
methodology  applied  for  measuring  freestanding  TA  Is  identlcal  to  that
applied  oy CODOP  for  measuring  project-related  TA.  Annex  2  contains
the  full  list  of  freestanding  TA projects.
10.  Regional  comparisons  of  tending  for  project-related  and
freestanding  TA have  been  adjusted  to  reflec:t  the  changes  In  the
Bank's  1987  reorganization.  The  Internal  Bank  studies  and  reviews  of
TA mentloned  In  para  1 above  have  been  supplemented  by  Intervlews  7
witit  staff.  Annex  1 contairs  the  complete  list  of  background  material.
6  The  MIS Is  the  Bank's  computerized  data  processing  and
recording  system.
7  The  studles  Include:  (1) CODOP's  Annual  Technical  Assistance
Reports;  (2)  PHREE's  Annual  Review  of  Educatlon  and  Tralning;  k.s) Bank-
Financed  Technical  Assistance  Activities  In  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  AFTPS,
1989; (4)  Report  on  a  Revlew  of  Technical  Assistance  Activities  In
Pakistan,  IAD, 1989;  (5)  Report  on  a  Review  of  Technical  Assistance
Activitles  In  the  Asia  Region;  (6)  A  Review  of  Bank-Assisted
Freestanding  Technical  Assistance  Credits  In  Indonesla,  OED, 1988;
(7)  Technical  Assistance  and  rraining:  Proposals  for  Increased
Effectiveness,  WAN, 1986;  (8)  Institutional  Development  In  Education  and
Training  In  Sub-Saharan  Africani  Countries,  WB Discussion  Paper,  AFTED,
1985; (9)  Current  Developments  In  Technical  Assistance:  A  Synthesis  of
Recent  World  Bank  Experience,  1985;  (10)  Managing  Project-Related
Technical  Assistance:  Tho  Lessons  of  Success,  WB Staff  Working  Paper
No.  586,  1983.-5-
DEFINING  THE  UNIVERSE
InstItutIonal  Development 8
11.  Institutional  development  is the  creation  or  relnforcement
of the capacity  of an organization  to generate,  allocare  and  use  human
and  financial resources  effectively  to  attain  development  objectives,
public or  private.  It Includes not  only the  buliding and  strengthening
of Instltutlon3, but  a;so  their retrenchment  o,  Ilquldatlon In the
pursuit  of  institutional, sectoral,  or government-wide  rationalizatlon
of expenditure.  ID Is typically  almed  at  Improving  and  strengthening:
*  Internal organizatlonal  structures;
*  m,.nagement  systems,  Including monitoring  and  evaluation;
*  financIal  management  (budgeting,  &ccounting,  auditing
procedures)  and  planning  systems;
e  personnel  management,  staff  development,  and  training;
e  Inter-institutional  relatlonships;
e  institutional  structures  of  subsectors  or  sectors;
- legal  framework;  and
_  government  regulations  and  procedures.
12.  From  Its earliest  days  the  Bank  has  Included  components  to
strengthen  Individual project  management  Institutions.  More  recently,
the  emphasis  has  been  on management  of the  different  sectors  of the
borrowers'  economles.  The  economic  crlsis of the  eighties  underscored
the  fact  that  institutlons  charged  with  formulating  policles  and
managing  public resources  are  III-equipped for the  task.  Thus,  the
Bank  moved  into pollcy-based  lencling,  with the  scope  of  Its ID work
broadening  accordingly  from  project  and  sector  to the  economy-wide
level  and  from  narrow  project-related  is3ues  to more  comprehensive
systemic  reforms.  These  latter  Include  management  Improvements  for
core  central  govern,nent  institutions,  systemic  changes  In  public
administration  and  civil service  management,  parastatal  agency  reform,
privatization,  etc.  The  focus  of the  Bank's recent  ID  work,  Its
prlorities, and  the  Instruments  to promote  It  - Including  TA  - varles
considerably  among  regions,  countries,  and  sectors.  This  Is due  to  the
8  For  a complete  discussion  of  definitional  Issues,  see  the  CECPS
Policy Brief  for the  Pollcy  Paper  on  Institutional  Development,  Apr.
1989.- 6  -
differlng  severity  of  institutional constralnts  and  the
country/sector's  readiness  to address  these  Issues.
Technical  Assistance  for  Institutional  Development
13.  TA  has  long  been  Important  In  the  Bank's  operatlons  as  a
complement  to  financial  resources  for  Investment.  Generally,  TA  refers
to a range  of activities  that  enhance  and/or  complement  human  and
Institutional capabilltles  througr  the development,  transfer,  adopticn,
and  use  of skills and  technologv  from  sources  external  to  the
government/recipient  agency.
14.  The  main  objectives  of  TA  are  (I)  Institutional  development
and  (11)  direct  operational  support.  The  first  Is  directed  toward
Improving  the  planning  and  decision-making  capacity  of the  reciplent
agency.  To  the extent  that  It Is successful,  It  will reduce,  if not
ellminate, the  need  for  further  TA.  The  second  subsumes  all activitles
designed  to supplement  the capacity  of  the agency  to achieve  specific
purposes  - usually  the  preparation  or  Implementation  of a single
project  --  e.g.,  project  Identificatlon  and  preparatlon,  project
construction  and  supervislon,  project  Implementation,  and  general
operatlonal  and management  support.  Such  assistance,  Instead  of
supplementing  capacity,  often  substitutes  for  It.
15.  In Its definitlon of TA  activitles, the  Bank  distingulshes
between  "hard"  and  "soft"  TA:  According  to the  Bank's Operational
Manual  (OMS),  'TA  consists  of  two  types  of  services;  (a)  engineerlng-
related  TA  (also  called  "hard"  TA)  such  as  feasibillty  studles  and
engineering  design,  and  assistance  for the  Implementation  of  the
physical  aspects  of prolects;  and  (b)  institutlon-related  TA  (also
called "soft" TA) such  as  assistance  for: (l)  Institutlonal  developmnent
through  Improved  management,  organization  and  training; and  (11)
macroeconomic,  sectoral  and  sub-sectoral  pollcy advice".9
,8.  Sometimes  TA activitles  are  further  broken  down  In  four
functional  categories:
(a)  engineering/implementatlon  when  TA  Is  for  supervision  of
project  construction  or  assistance  with detailed
engineerlng  and drawing  up bidding documents  (Includes highly
skilled expertise  such  as engineerlng  and  architecture);
(b)  technical/feasibillty  studies  cover  both  feasibility  studies
of  future  potential  bankable  projects,  and  a large
assortment  of technical  studies  ranging  from  a trucking
Industry  study  In connection  with  a highway  maintenance
project  to a study  of the extension  of a drug  distribution
system  In a health  project;
9  Revised  OMS  4.0, Sept. 1984.- 7 -
(c)  tralning  as  a specific purpose  of  TA  activity,  Including  on-
the-Job  training, fellowships, and  assistance  In the design
and/or  management  of  training  programs;
(d)  experts/consultants,  Including  managerlal  and  financial
advisory  services  (for  example,  computer  systems,  economic
and  financial  policy  aralysis,  sectoral  and  other  studies,
surveys,  research,  statistics) or  to  help meet  a partlculatr
peak  In a workload  that  Is not  expected  to  be  repeated. 11
The  first two  categorles  are  defined  as  engineering-related  ("hard")  TA
and  the  last  two  as  institutlon-related  ("soft")  TA.
.7.  The  distinctlon  between  "hard"  and  "soft"  TA  and  the  four
functlonal  categories  can  be  contested  on  several  grounds.  First, the
distinctlon  between  "technical/feasibllty  studies"  and
"experts/consultants"  Is  somewhat  dubious,  since  studies  are  generally
carried  out  by  consultants.  Second,  on the  basis  of the  Information
provided  In the  President's  Reports  and  Staff  Appralsal  Reports,  It Is
often  very  difficuit  to  differentiate  between  "hard"  and  "soft"  TA  and
break  down  TA  activitles  accurately  In the  four  functior.al  categories
TA  projects  and  components  often  have  mixed  objectives,  financing a
range  of activities  from  pollcy studies,  Investment-related  studles,  to
advisers  for project  Implementatlon  or  Institutional  development.  it
also  proves  very  difficult In practice  to distinguish,  for example,
between  studies  primarily  undertaken  for operational  purposes  (e.g.,
tariff studies  of particular  Industries) and  studies  bearing  more
directly  on  ID  (e.g.,  design  of  management  information  systems,
preparation  of  operations  and  maintenance  manuals,  management
studies),  because  Staff  Appraisal  Reports  and  the  President's  Reports
lump  both  under  "studies".  Llkewise,  it  is  quite  difficult  to  draw  the
llne between  consultants  pr-oducing technical  studies  and  consultants
providing  advice.
18.  There  are  also  grounds  for  questioning  the  validity  of the
equatlon  linking  "soft" TA with  Institutlonal  development  and  "hard" TA
with  operational  support.  First,  not  al' "soft" TA, Including tralning,
Is directed  prlima  toward  Institut,onal development,  and  the
distinctlon  between operatlonal surport and ID-related activitles Is
often blurred.  For example,  pubilc  sector management  adviser's  engaged
to strengthen  the  institutional  capacity of a ministry of finance
inevitably  become  absorbed  In  day-to-day  operatlonal tasks.
Conversely, not all ID-related TA Is "soft";  "hard"  TA can sometimes
make a significant  contribution to ID.
19.  Nevertheless, while It Is  recognized that the ONMS  and CODOP
methodology  of equating "soft"  TA with ID-related  TA may  not provide
an exact basis for measuring Bank-financed ID  activities,  It  has been
adopted  In this paper  for want of a better alternative:  Bank
10  See  World Bank Technical  Assistance Activities  ano  Issues
(FY82-88),  CODOP, Sept. 1987.documents  do  not  differentiate  between  those  projects  and components
that  have  Institutional development  as  their primary  objective  and
those  with other  purposes  such  as operational  support.  For  purposes
of this paper,  ID-related  TA  thus consists  of two  elements:
experts/consultants'  services  and  training.- 9  -
CHAPTER TWO
TRENDS  IN  TA  LENDING:  FY82-88
THE  TREND OF  TA  COMMITMENTS 11
20.  Over  the  past  six  years,  there  has  been  a  relative
decline  In  Bank  lending  for  TA.  FIgure  1  illustrates  TA  as  a  percentage
of  total  lendIng  falling  from  nine  percent  In  FY82  to  sIx  percent  In
FY88.
Flgure  1
TOTAL TA AND ID-RELATED  TA
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11  Figures  are  on  a  commitment  basis.  Whlle  desegregated
disbursement  data  have  not  been  compiled  for  the  perlod  under  review,
evidence  exists  ,hat  a  substantlal  proportion  of  TA  funds  Is  not
disbursed,  belng  either  cancelled  or  simply  diverted  to  other  project
components  as  the  case  may  be.  A  study  conducted  In  the  EMENA reglon
a  few  years  ago,  for  example,  revealed  that  at  least  40  percent  of
the  studles  were  not  undertaken  durlng  the  life  of  the  projects.  The
data  reveal  significant  variatlons  between  years,  countrles  and
sectors.  Detailed  statistics  of  TA comnttments  are  set  out  In
Annex  3.- 10  -
The  decrease  In the  weight  of TA  Is the  result  of  at  least three
factors.  First, there  Is a growing  capacity  among  selected  borrowers
to undertake  assistance  on their  own.  Second,  the  share  of
adjustment  operations  In total  Bank  lending has  Increased  from
9 percent  In FY82  to 27  percent  in FY88.  This  type of  lending
normally  requires  a proportlonately  smaller  amount  of  TA than
Investment  operatlons.  And  third, there  Is a reluctance  on  the  part
of governments  to borrow  for  TA  If  prospects  are  favorable  for
securing  TA on  grant  terms.12 In absolute  terms,  the volume  of Bank
lending for  TA  has  remained  falrly constant,  averaging  US$1.2 billion
per  annum.
21.  WIthin  total  TA  lending, the proportion  that  Is  related  to
Institutional  development  has  Increased  sharply,  starting  at around  52
percent  In  FY82  and  reaching  72  percent  In  FY88  (see  Table  1).13  The
average  for  the  perlod  was  57  percent.  This  amounts  to US$685  mililon
annually  or  4.3  percent  of  total  Bank  lending.  The  growing  Importance
of ID-related  TA  Is consistent  with  the changes  In Bank  operatlons
over  the  period.  The  Introduction  of policy-based  adjustment  lending
at the  macro  level In the  early  ,!;',ties  led to  an  Increasing
awareness  of the  need  for management  Improvements,  economic  and
financlal analysis,  overall  Institutional  strengthening,  and  capacity
buIlIding. The  growth  In ID-related  TA may  also  reflect  the  Increasing
focus  on  social  sectors  and  rehabilitation  activitles  which  call for
less  engineerlng  and  sophisticated  design  work.
Table  1
TOTAL  ID-RELATED  TA ACTIVITIES
AS A PERCEWTAGE  OF TOTAL  TA LEWOING,  FYU-U8
(in  USS miLtions)
.............................................................................................
FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  TOTAL
I-Rtated  TA  611.9  568.5  638.5  686.5  808.9  614.5  864.5  4793.3
Total  TA  1175.4  1315.5  1153.0  1216.7  1224.2  1070.2  1198.3  8353.3
.............................................................................................
Perceft  52.1X  43.2X  55.4%  56.4X  66.1%  57.4X  72.1X  57.4X
12  The  World  Bank  1989  Annual  Report,  p.  44.
13  There  was  a  sharp  drop  In  FY87  from  66  percent  to  57
percent;  but  this  could  be  explained  by  the  Increase  that  year  In  TA
lending  for  transportatlon  and water,  where  detailed  engineering  and
feasibillty  studies  tend  to  predominate  and  where  ID  tends  to  be  a
much  smaller  percentage  of  TA.- /I  -
22.  As  shown  in Table  2, Asia  accounts  for the  largest  share  of
ID-related  TA  (39%)  over  the  FY82-88  period,  followed  by  Africa  (32%).
LAC  (18%)  and  EMENA  (12%).  However,  the  relative  Importance  of  ID-
related  TA  as  a  component  of  Bank  operatlons  has  been  greatest  In
Sub-Saharan  Africa  where  It  accounts  for over  10 percent  of  lending,
as  compared  wlth  about  4  percent  In  Asia  and  2-3  percent  In  LAC  and
EMENA  (see  Figure  2).  This  Is  because  of  the  relative  severity  of
institutional constralnts  that  the countrles  In the African  region  are
facing, and  the  region's awareness  of the  need  to  address  these
Issues.
Table  2
TA AAO I0-RELATED  TA  RE$YIO
FY82-88  (in  usJ  mItl  irIs)
.........................................................................................  ...................  ..  ................................................................................  ....... I.....  ...........................
FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY8F  Average  per  wvpa
TA  o  TA  ID  TA  to  TA  10  TA  ID  TA  ID  TA  ID  TA  ID
frece  301.7  183.2  332.6  190.3  376.3  245.2  308.0  194.2  293.5  209.0  316.7  209.9  388.7  290.9  331.1  217.6
Agia  S.49.3 220.5  674.2  219.9  490.8  238.4  594.5  317.3  525.6  364.1  303.9  179.4  459.0  338.2  4.99.6 268.2
EMEWA  155.8  71.4  143.3  52.7  149.9  U.8  124.9  61.5  123.4  82.0  214.7  92.8  172.3  108.9  154.9  79.2
LAC  268.8  136.8  165.4  105.6  136.1  70.1  189.5  113.5  281.7  153.  234.9  132.5  178.3  126.4  207.8  119.8
.....................................................  .....................................................................................
Figure  2
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23.  Among  the sectors,  agriculture has  absorbed  the largest
amount  of TA (Flgure 3),  but the relative Importance of ID-related TA
has been greatest  In  education, and  In  population, health and nutrition
(Figure 4).  ID-related TA has also been a very  Important  feature  of
Bank  lending In support  of pubilc sector management.  During the 1980s,
for the first time, freestanding  TA for pubiic sector management  has
become  a significant  component  of the Bank's operations  In  Africa, and
to a lesser extent  in  LAC; It  has been  used only rarely  In  the other
two reglons (e.g.,  In  Bangladesh, China, and most  recently Morocco  and
AlgerIa).
Figure  3  Figure  4
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24.  The  Increasing  attention  given  by  the  Bank  to  public  sect'  r
management  In  Africa  helps  to  explaln  why  Africa  atls  .. 'bs  more  than
half  of  all  the  Bank's  freestanding  TA  (Flgure  5),  bu.  less  than  one-
quarter  of  Its project-related  TA  (Figure  6).  Freestanding  TA  Is  not
In fact  very  Important  outside  Africa  and  at  an  average  of  US$128
millon  per  year  accounts  for  only  about  11 percent  of  all TA
coa.,ltments  during  the  FY82-88  perlod.
Flgure  5
REGIONAL  DISTRIBUTION




LAC 14  2%
ASLA 21 4%  EMENA  8  3%
Sac_  CECPS COOP  MS
Figure  6
REGIONAL  DISTRIBUTION
OF  TOTAL  PROJECT-RELATED  TA
FYS2-68  AVERAGE  )
AFRICA 24 6°o
,/
ASLA  43 7%,
. S  ~/  I  ',/
_  LAC 17  9%
EMENA  13.7%
Sourc  CECPS  COO-XIP  MG- 14  -
CONTENT  OF  ID-RELATED  TA:  CHANGES  IN  SCOPE
25.  As  a  result  of  the  movement  toward  pollcy-based  lending  In
the  eightles,  the main  development  at  the  sector  level has  been  a
redirectlon  of  Institutional ccncerns  and  of project  and  program
design.  The  shift has  been  from  reliance  on  project  entitles  to the
strengthening  of  Institutional structures  of the  sectors  or  subsectors
and  to core  sectoral  and  subsectoral  agencies  that manage  policies,
I.e.  a  movement  from  a project  to a  sector  perspective  and  a  shift
from  short-to  medliun-term  results.  Pollcy-based  lending  has  alsc
given  Impetus  to Bank  support  for strengthening  national-level
government  Institutlons  as well.  This broadening  of  ID activities  well
beyond  Investment  (project-related)  Interventions  Is especially  evident
In  Africa, where  the general  weakness  of  Institutions  mitigates  agalnst
the  chances  for  success  with  Isolated  operations,  and  a rapid  rlse  In
freestanding  TA  projects  for  pubilc  sector  management  has  taken  place,
especlally  In support  of structural  adjustment  lending programs.
Bankwide,  as  of June  1988  the  institutional components  of 59
structural  adjustment  loans  have  been  supported  by  42  "companion"
freestanding  public sector  management  TA  projects,  50  percent  of which
were  approved  during  FY82-88.  In terms  of numbers  of projects  and
dJollars  spent,  however,  freestanding  TA  projects  have  not  become  the
main  focus  of  Bank  operatlons  in  support  of  Institutional  development;
project-related  TA  and  tralning  *emaln  the  main  ID  vehicles.
26.  The  scope  of  public sector  management  projects  has
broadened  since  the early  1980s, away  from  ad  hoc  Institutlonal
support  almed  at facilitating Bank-borrower  policy dialogue.  By
furnishing  the  bc-rower  with the  analytical  support  needed  for
diagnosing  and  p  !parlng new  policies, the  scope  of public sector
management  proje%.ts has  Instead moved  towar-d comprehensive  systemic
reforms  to overcome  the more  fundamental  deficlencies  In  public sector
management.  in  the  Africa  region,  the  policy  reform  would  not  be
sustained  wlthout  public sector  reforms.
27.  Much  of  the  activity  during  FY82-88  was  concentrated  on
support  for core  economic  functlons  and  agencies  --  for  example,  to
strengthen  economic  planning and  public  Investment  programming;  to
Improve  budgeting  systems  and  streamline  linkag_s between  recurrent
expenditure  control  and  public Investment  decislons;  to  strengthen  ald
coordinatlon  mechanisms  wlthin government;  and  to  improve  debt
management.  Additlonal  attention  also  Is being  paid  to overall
government  structures  and  organizations,  basic  administrative
functions,  and  personnel  management  as  a  way  of  tackling  the  problems
of  Inefficient civll services.  Support  Is also  provided  to assist
governments  In  setting  up  the  appropriate  Institutlonal  mechanisms  for
monitoring  the  execution  of their  structural  adjustment  programs.
28.  Parastatal  reform  Is another  orominent  natlonal-level
endeavor.  Throughout  its history  of project  work,  the Bank  has  dealt
with  hundreds  of  public  enterprises  In  various  countries,  focusing  on
them  Individually  or  In  small  groups,  and  helping  to design  programs  to
Improve  their  performance  and  reduce  losses.  It has  become- 15  -
Increasingly  evident,  however,  that  those  managing  public enterprises
often  controi  only  some  of the  factors  determining  the  performance  of
the  enterprlse.  Too  much  control  Is vested  In central  agencies  that
deflne  the  Institutional  framework  under  which  enterprlses  operate.
Therefore,  the  Bank  has  been  emphasizing  refor:n of government/state
enterprise  relations.  Public enterprise  reform  Is a component  of many
SALs  and  Is further  supported  through  freestanding  TA  projects  and
pubilc enterprise  reform  loans  often  with  substantlal  TA components.
PROJECT-RELATED  TRAINING  (PRT)
29.  Projected-related  tralning accounts  for 25  percent  of  total
TA  --  almost  half  of  all  ID-related  TA  --  averaging  around  IJSS300
millon  a  year  during  the  FY82-88  (equlvalent  to  2  percent  of total
Bank  lending).  Regionally,  the  percentage  of  total  TA  resources
devoted  to  tralnIng  actIvItIes  Is  consistently  higher  In  Asia,  averaging
about  30  percent  for FY82-88  (Figure 7).  EMENA  follows  with  an
average  of  26  percent,  then  LAC  wlth  about  23 percent,  and  finally
Africa,  where  tralning  accounts  for  only  19  percent  of  total  TA  on
average.  This  Is  surprising,  given  the  generally  more  Intense  state  of
Institutlonal  disarray  and  tne widely  recognized  lack of skilled
personnel  In  Africa.  The  proportion  of  TA  resources  devoted  to
training  Is noticeably  Increasing,  however.  In Africa, traIning  as  a
share  of total  TA  has  Increased  from  12 percent  In FY82  to 21 percent
In FY88;  In Asia, from  16 percent  to 41 percent;  In LAC, one  has  seen  a
more  gradual  Increase,  from  19 percent  to  32 percent;  and  EMENA
wltnessed  wide  fluctuations.
FIgure  7
TRAINING  AS A PROPORTION  OF REGIONAL  TA
FY82488  AVERAGE  (%)
ASIA 30 6%
AFRICA 19 4%o
EMENA 26  5%-  23  5%
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30.  While  the agriculture  and  transportation  sectors  continue
to allocate  the  larges1,  volumes  of  lending resources  to project-
related  training, urban  development  wltnessed  the  strongest  growth  In
project-related  training  lending.  Freestanding  TA projects  devote
less of  their  TA  resources  to training  than  their  project-related
counterparts.  Reglonally,  the average  proportion  of project-related
TA  resources  devoted  to training are:  Asia (31%),  EMENA  (27%),  LAC
(25%),  and  Africa  (20%).  Under  freestanding  TA,  the  percentages  break
down  as  follows:  14  percent  In Asia, 13 percent  In Africa, 8 percent  In
EMENA,  and  6  percent  in  LAC.
Type  of  Training
31.  While  overseas  tralnlng  and  fellowships  remain  predominant,
during  FY82-88  thelr  Importance  gradually  decreased.  Instead,  more
emphasis  was  placed  on  In-country  tralning  Investment,  which  rose  to  a
record  high  In  FY88  --  37  percent  of  Bank  lending  for  training.  A
review  of  FY87/88  TA  projects  In  the  Africa  region  illustrates  this
development:  total  funding  for  training  In local and  reglonal
institutlons  exceeded  total  allocatlons  for  overseas  fellowships  by
more  than  50  percent.  Most  of  the  local  training  In  Afr!ca  Is  In  the
context  of  agriculture,  population,  and  multl-purpose  technical
assistance/public  sector  management  projects. 4
Quality  of  Design  of Training  Components
32.  This  has  been  a  lorg-standing  concern  of  Bank  management.
The  Annual  Operatlonal  Review  of  Education  and  Tralning  Issued  by  the
Bank's  Population  and  Human  Resources  Education  and  Employment
Divislon  (PHREE)  rates  project-related  training  components  uniformly
against  the  following  design  and  preparation  crIteria  established  In
FY82:  (1)  clarity  of  training  obJtctives;  (2)  Identity  of  target
audiences;  (3)  descriptlon  of  trairing  strategy  of  plan;  (4)  compositlon
of  proposed  tralning  program;  (5)  relevance  of  tralning  program  to
tralning  dlagnoses;  and  (6)  specif -;ty of  the  training  financing  plan.
33.  PHREE's  most  recent  findings  are  that  the  quality  of  the
preparation  and  design  cf  PRT  components  Improved  slightly  In  FY87
over  the  previous  three  years  but  declined  sharply  In  FY88.  From
FY87  to FY88,  the  number  of  training  components  that  ranked  "good"
declined  from  33  percent  to  25  percent,  while  those  that  were  Judged
to be  less  satisfactory  Increased  from  26 percent  to  33 percent  of
all components. 15 This  development  Is not  encouraging,  especially  In
light of  the  overali  Irmportance  of  human  resource  development  and
tralning  for ('nstitutional) development.  The  design  of training
14  Bank-financed  TA  In  sub-Saharan  Africa,  May  1989, Africa
Region,  Technical  Department,  Public  Sector  Management  Dlvislon,  paras.
44  and  45.
15  FY88  Annual  Operational  Review  of  Education  aid  Technic&l
Assistance,  PHREE,  Dara.  32.- 17  -
components  Is  marginally  better  for  freestanding  proJects.  This  may
be  due  to  the  revised  Bank  Procedures  for  Processing  Technical
Assistance  Loans  and  Credits. 16 The  CECPS  review  of  FY82-88
freestanding  TA  found,  however,  that  In  many  cases  the  design  of
tralning  programs  was  to  be  completed  during  projec2t  Irnplementation.
Rellance  was  often  placed  on  provislons  for  carrying  out  needs
assessmen's  and  designing  training  programs  at  a  later  stage.
METHODS OF  TA  DELIVERY
Long-Term  and  Short-Term  Consultants
34.  Systematic  Informatlon  on  the  use  of  long-term  versus
short-term  consultants  Is  not  avallable.  Most  President/Staff
Appraisal  Reports  do  not  specify  the  nature  of  the  assignment  (In  Asia
as  many  as  75  percent  fall  to  do  so).  Of  all  reg!ons,  Africa  continues
to rely  most  heavily  on  long-term  advisors  (due  to  pervas!ve
Institutlonal  weaknesses).  For  exampie,  under  Guinea  Bissau  Credit
1935,  73  percent  of  the  total  TA  allocation  Is  for  long-term  e.perts,
all  of  whom will  be  expatriates,  due  to  the  poorly  developed  capacity
of the  country.  Long-term  advisors,  frequently  fllllng  line  positlons,
were  judged  necessary  as  the  country  begins  adjustment  of  Its
macroeconomic  policy  framework.  On  the  other  hand,  Asla  and  EMENA
make  greater  use  of  short-term  consultants.  Th!s  can  probably  be
ascrlbed  to  the  resistance  that  several  Asian  countrles  (e.g.,  China)
show  toward  long-term  advisers  and  to  the  decreasing  need  for  a  long-
term  external  presence  In  countries  with  an  already  strong
Institutional  base  (e.g.,  EMENA  countries).
Other  Modes  of  TA  DelIvery
35.  The  Bank  Is  increasingly  expanding  with  other  modes  of  TA
delivery  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.  These  Include  perlodIc  return  visits  by
consultants,  a  comrbinatIon  of  long-term  operational  assistance  with
short-term  consultancies  for  systems  development  or  trouble-shootlng,
programs  to  repatrlate  quallfied  nationals,  or  use  of  NGOs  for  project
supervision.
36.  The  Africa  Technical  Public  Sector  Management  Division
(AFTPS)  review  of  TA  activities  In  sub-Saharan  Africa  found  that  no
less  than  fIve  of  the  fifteen  freestanding  TA  projects  approved  In
FY87  and  FY88  Incorporated  alternative  delivery  modes,  such  as
twinning,  perlodlc  short-term  visits,  and  programs  to  repatriate
quallfied  nationals.  For  example,  the  Senegal  Development  Management
Project  Credit  1910  and  Rwanda  Credit  1796  Include  no  long-term
positions.  The  IDA  credit  i3  financing  sector  and  pre-feasibility
16  Circular  OP  87/03,  Annex  E.
17  Bank-financed  TA  In  sub-Saharan  Africa,  Africa  Region,
Technical  Department,  Public  Sector  Management  Division,  May  1989,
para.  48.18 -
studies  and  related  training.  In  tree  case  of  Ghana  Credit  1847  In
support  of  state-owned  enterprlse  reforms,  two  long-term  positions
were  foreseen  at  appraisal,  but  only  one  resident  expert  will  be  placed
In  the  countr  y,  wlth  the  remalrilig  assIstearce  to  be  provided  through
intermittent  visits  and  speclalized  short-term  consultancies.
37.  Twinning,  which  Involves  the  estabilshment  of  an
Institutlonail  relationship  between  an  organizatlonal  entity  In  a
developing  country  and  a  simllar  but  more  mature  entity  in  another
country,  has  galned  prominence  As  a  delivery  mechanism.  In  FY87  and
FY88  such  arrangements  were  being  pursued  In  at  least  12  projects  In
Africa. 18 Arn assessment  of  the,  esults  of  these  Innovative  forms  of
TA  delIvery  wili  be  Importarnt  In  deterinining  what  modes  are  successful
and  to  what  extent  they  prove  more  effective  than  traditlonal  TA
delivery.  Annex  4  considers  the  potertial  for  making  greater  use  of
twinning  In  Bank-financed  pro'ects-
QUALITY/SPECIFICITY  OF  DESIGN
38.  The  CECPS desk  review  of  all  freestanding  TA  projects
approved  durlng  the  FY82-88  showvs  that  these  projects  are  becoming
larger  and  more  complex  and  that  there  Is  a  trend  toward  rnore
specificity  In  thelr  design,  especlally  In  Africa.  Toward  the  end  of
the  perlod,  a  greater  number  of  projects  Included  terms  of  reference
and  more  detblled  descriptions  of  objectives  and  assignments.  This
was  confirmed  by  the  FY87/88  AFTPS  review,  which  found  that  distinct
attempts  are  belng  made  to  target  TA  Interventions  and  tailor  delivery
mechanisms.  Much  Improvement  Is  still  needed,  however.  Only  four
projects  of  the  CECPS  review  incluiled  detailed  matrixes  specifying
project  activitles,  timetables,  acri  anticipated  outputs,  as  requ!red  by
the  1987  Bank  Procedures  for  Pr ocessing  1/A  operations. 19 In  most
cases  no  mnention  was  m1ade of  Institutional  diagnoses.  In  short,  a
great  many  TA  projects  still  suffer  from  a  lack  of  appropriate  design.
39.  Intervlews  with  task  marnager s  and  other  relevant  staff
confIrm  that  project-related  TA c:miponents,  the  Bank's  principal
avenue  for  provlding  Institutional  support,  continue  to  be  treated  as
an  afterthought  during  pr-oject  appralsal.  So  as  not  to  delay  approval
of  the  project,  they  are  riot  given  the  time  needed  for  thorough
preparatIon.  For  example,  according  to  a  recent  survey  conducted  by
Africa  Technical  Education  Dlvislon  of  80  projects  In  the  Occidental
and  Central  Africa  Country  Operations  Department,  no  less  than  73
percent  of  task  managers  Indicapt-:1  that  project-related  training  and
TA  components  are  often  pooriv  reu,ared,  and  more  time  and  effort
should  be  allocated  to  the  desigr  i-,2  ,)reparation  of  these
components.20
8  Op.  cit.  paras.  48  +  'O.
19  OF7Q/03.
-n  se  rrr',  PioJect.  [-tnI>+¢4  *lr  i'^-.7  "lurvey,  1989,  para.  4.- 19  -
RESOURCE  ALLOCATION
40.  Given  the  shifts  In  compositlon  of TA  activities  away  from
technical  and  anglneerlng  studles  and  toward  management  and  tralning
activities,  and given  the  Increasing  complexity  of freestanding  TA, a
commensurate  Increase  might  be  exoected  In  the  effort  the  Bank  puts
Into TA  projects  and  components,  as demonstrated  by  the  amount  of
resources  devoted  to  the preparation  and  supervision  of  these
activitles.  Although  precise  data  are  not  available, scattered
evidence  based  on  Interviews  with  task managers  and  other  relevant
staff  suggests  that  this  Is not  the case.
41.  A review  of the  staff  resources  devoted  to project
appralsal  for freestanding  TA  In Africa  shows  a great  deal  of
variability  from  one  year  to  the next  and  by country.  The  data
Indlcate  that  the  staff  resources  devoted  to freestanding  TA  are  less
than  half of the  reglonal  average  and  In some  cases  are  very  low--
accounting  for  no more  than  a few weeks  of staff  time.  For  project-
related  TA, several  task  managers  estimated  the  level of effort  In the
formulation  of these  components  as  typically no more  than  2-4  staff
weeks  or  about  3-5  percent  of the  total  staff  resources  per
Investment  project.  Yet  the  share  of TA components  In total  iending
excluding  adjustment  operations  remains  at  about  19  percent. 2 1
According  to task  managers  In other  reglons, an  equally  low level of
staff  resources  Is devoted  to preparatlon  and  supervislon  of  TA
components.  The  Implicatlons  of  these  minimal  Inputs  will  be  discussed
In  the  following  chapter.
21  Op.  cit, paras.  50,  51,  58.- 20  -
CHAPTER  THREE
WHY  IS OUR  RECORD  SO  POOR?
42.  The  review  of trends  described  In the  previous  paragraphs
points  to certain  Improvements  In the  design  and  delivery  of  ID-
related  TA:  Increased  use  of  local consultants;  more  Innovative  and
creative  delivery  modes;  successful  use  of resident  missions  In
supervislon;  more  clearly  defined  terms  of  reference  and  work
programs.  This  revlew  does  not, however,  Itad to a definite conclusion
about  the  effectiveness  and  ultimate  Impacr of these  TA  programs.
For  one  thing, many  of the  projects  of the  period  undJer review  have
not  yet  been  completed,  and  it Is too  early  to  judge  the  Immediate
project  results  or  the  ultimate  benefits  to be achieved  from  using  the
output.  For  another,  the  effectiveness  and  especially  the  Impact  of
ID-related  TA are  difficult to measure.  The  nature  of  institutlonal
development  makes  It difficult to spec!fy  measurable  outputs  and  to
quantify  achlevement  Indlcators.  This  Is especially  true  for  relatively
new  areas,  such  as  public sector  management,  for which  the conceptual
and  methodological  bases  have  not  yet  been  agreed  upon.
43.  Nevertheless,  It  Is  difficult  to  escape  the  conclusion  that
the basic  problems  remain.  Judging  from  the persistent  weaknesses  In
the  Institutlons  and  sectors  supported  by  Bank-financed  TA,  the
improvements  In the  design  and delivery  of TA  and  training, along with
their effectiveness  and  Impact appear  to be  far from  sufficlent.
Those  who  design  and  supervise  TA  and  other  relevant  Bank  staff  have
ceen  extremely  frustrated  when  they  have  attempted  to  Identify Bank
orojects  or components  considered  to be  sound  and  successful.
44.  The  negative  view  about  TA  and  Its accomplishments  Is
shared  by  a  growing  number  of  people  In  the  donor  community  and
reciplent  countrles  alike.  Meanwhile,  the  body  of knowledge  of the
determinants  of successful  10-related  TA  Is growing.  This chapter
explores  the  reasons  for the  Bank's apparent  lack of  success  In
improving  the  record.
BUILT-IN  HANDICAPS
45.  The  Bank  labors  under  serious  built-In handicaps  as  a
supplier of  ID-related  TA.  These  handicaps  stem  from  the  following
causes:
Blueprint  Approach  to Project  Design  and  Implementation
46.  The  Bank  tends  to  favor  a  blueprInt  approach  to  project
design  and  Implementation.  Experience  shows  that  projects  with
significant  iD  components  tend  to  evolve  In  unforeseen  and
unpredictable  wdy!.  and  that  institutional  reforms  and  capacity- 21  -
bullding are  better  served  by what  has  come  to be known  as  an
adaptive  or  process  approach  to  Implementatlon.  The  greater  tne
degree  of  complexity  and  change  a  loan  seeks  to  Implement,  and  the
more  uncertainty  or  hostillty  in  the  enviro,iment,  the  more
Implementation  will require  an  adaptive  or  process  approach,  flexible
structures  and  processes,  and  staff capable  of solving  problems
through  thelr own  initlative. 22
47.  Pragmatism  and  adaptability,  however,  are  not  strong  Bank
features  because  It Is Incumbent  upon  the  organization  to specify  In
advance  both  the problem  and  the  precise  nature  of the  proposed
solutlon.  Furthermore,  an  adaptive  approach  toward  project  design
requires  close  monitorlng  of  the evolutlon  of the  project  as well as
Intensive  Involvement  of Bank  staff  In the  continuous  process  of
discusslons  and  decisions  on  the  allocatlon  of  project  funds  and
targets  to be  achleved.  For  an  Institution  like  the  Bank,  where
traditionally  twice or  three  times  as much  time  Is devoted  to
appraisal  as  to  supervislon,  this  Is a vexing  Issue.
Hlgh Staff  Turnover
48.  Institutional  memory  and  staff  continuity  play an  Important
role  In ID-related  TA  delIvery.  In the  Bank  the  turnover  of  staff
working  on  these  projects  Is often  too  quick to build up solid
relatlonships  with  the  borrower,  gain In-depth  country  knowledge,  grasp
a sense  of the  local culture, or  gain sector  knowledge.  The  Bank's
reorganization  In FY87  compounded  this problem.
49.  For  example,  In the fIrst three  years  of  Implementation  of
the Argentina  Public Sector  Management  TA  project,  one  of the  largest
and most  complex  pubiic sector  management  projects  processed  by  the
Bank, the  task managers  changed  fIve times.  The OED  analysls  of fIve
freestanding  TA  projects  In  Kenya  substantiates  the  polnt  on  the
Importance  of staff  continuity  and political and  economic  understanding
of the  sectoral  context.  These  elements  were  only  evident  in  one  out
of the  fIve projects,  with  the  notable  exception  of  the  Agriculture
22  See  D. Steedman,  op. cit.,  for further  explanations  and
bibliographical  references  on  the  process  approach,  and  especially
Derrick  Ward,  David  Brinkerhoff,  Richard  L. Hopkins,  Institutional
Dlmenslons  of Education  Sector  Lending: Guidelines  for Management  and
Sustainabillty  Assessment,  paper  prepared  for the World  Bank,
Populations  and  Human  Resources  Department,  Mar.  1989.
23  For  a detalled  analysis  of the  correlatlon  between  staff
characteristics  and  the  quality of  ID work, see  another  background
paper  for the  CECPS  ID policy paper,  Institutional  Development  Work  in
the  Bank: A Review  of 84  Bank  Projects,  C. Gray,  et al.,  DECVP,  Oct.
1989.- 22  -
Technical  Assistance  Project,  Credit  1277-KE,  the  only  pro 4ect  that
succeeded  In developing  sustalnable  natlonal  Institutions.
Conflict  between  Investment  Project  Efficiency  and  ID Goals
50.  What  Is required  to  ensure  efficlent  Investment  project
Implementation  Is not  always  comDatible  with  satisfying  ID goals. Two
prlme  examples  are  salary  supplements  and  project  management  units.
Often  deemed  necessary  to facilitate project  Implementatlon,  they  can
have  detrImental  Impacts  on  ID (see Boxes  A & B).  Another  example  Is
TA prov!ded  to  ensure  successful  project  execution.  Not  geared  to
transferring  know-how  to  local personnel,  TA  qulckly becomes  a costly
substitute  for  local skills,  leaving the  institution at  the  end  of the
project  period  wlth personnel  who  are  not better  qualified to perform
project-related  tasks  In the  future.
Self  Contalrnment  of  Projects
51.  ID  Is  necessarily  a  long-term  process.  When  the
institutional capacity  Is  weak,  or  target  institutions  have
deterlorated,  It Is almost  always  Impossible  to  Implement  the degree  of
change  needed  within a single project  span.  Thus, a more  strategic
approach  Is required  through  which  Institutional  goals  are  set  out  as
part  of a  ;ong-term  effort  and  executed  through  a sequentlal  series  of
projects.  With this approach,  follow-up  projects  are  conceived  as
buliding b!ocks  In the  iD strategy  and  are  adapted  as  necessary  In
light of the  accomplIshments  of the  preceding  projects.25  In the Bank,
however,  projects  tend  to be  self contained.  Follow-up  projects  are
usually concelved  as  thelr  predecessors  are  almost  completed,  mainly
because  the  goals  of the  first projects  were  overly  ambitious  or not
achievable  for other  reasons.  ID sector  work  Involving comprehensive
ID assessment  Is rarely  undertaken.
24  Evaluation  Study  of Free-standing  Technical  Assistance  In
Support  of Pubilc Sector  Management  In Sub-Saharan  Africa,  Kenya,  OED,
Mar. 1989.
25  See  also  D. Steedman,  op. cit.,  p. 3 and  para. 51 of this paper.Box  A
Irreconcilable  Objectives:  t"I  :  ,  .-  Speclal Project  Linits
Project  ManagemerB-  e  ',A;)  are  a  popular  feature  In
all  regions.  They  are  esrec'.il'  v.lln',r  in  freestanding  TA
projects,  which  Involve  several  -,o-,orents,  Implementing  agencles,
or  ministrles,  and  thus  require  muw;h coordination.  Also,  the
weaker  the  institutional  capacity oi the  greater  the  deterloration
of the target  Institutlons,  thre  greater the difficulty  of ensurlng
success for Immedlate project objectives.  In  such an environment,
or In  the case of a government  with almost Insurmountable
bureaucratic procedural requirements or salary restrictlons,  there
Is  great  temptation to set up a project management  unit to ensure
successful proJect Implementatlon.
Created  from "scratch,"  project management  units tend to
be costly.  In  the words  of one staff member:  "If  you want to
spend money  and leave behind bricks,  mortar, and equlpment, have a
project  management  unit.  If  you want  ID,  try another approach."
Project  management  units,  by  definition,  cannot  be  sustalnable:
they are ad hoc Institutlons  for securlng the Implementatlon of
certain time-defined project activitles,  unless they evolve Into
permanent  government  institutions,  as sometimes  happens.
The creation of project management  units may  have a
detrimental and demoralizing  effect on existing institutions. By
bypassing the very institutions  that need to be strengthened,
they perpetuate  the nerd for TA.  Similarly,  by drawing  away  the
most  talented  government  staff,  they weaken  the existing
ir,stitutlonal  framework.- 24  -
BOX  B
Irreconcilable  Objectives:  Salary  Premiums  and  ID
The  lack  of  appropriate  Incentives,  particularly  wages,  In
the  pubilc  sector  has  become  a  major  Issue  facing  project  design,
especlally  In  Afr  Ica  and  LAC.  One  way  of  overcoming  the  wage
problem,  at  least  In the  short  term, has  been  to  Include salary
supplements  In  project  design.  Bank  staff  frequently  feel this  Is
the only way  to  get  local project  staff  to devote  full  energy  to
project  activities.  Yet  this approach  can  perversely  affect  staff
motivation,  promote  donor  competitlon,  and  create  Intra-  and
Inter-organizatlonal  resentment.  Relying on  salary  premiums
Ignores  the  larger  i1 .ue of the  overall  unfavorable  working
environment  that  threatens  sustainability.  Long-term  institutlon
bullding requires  a more  comprehensive  strategy  for  Imprcvement
of the overall  workirg  environment,  Including salary  adjustments,
career  development  opportunities,  and  internal communicatlons  to
provide  feedback  from  staff, and  acknowledgment  of their
contributlons.
The  Africa  Technical  Department,  Public Sector  Management
Divislon  review 2 6 includes two  examples  of projects  that  appear  to
have  a more  far-sightea  approach.  Although  the  Structural
Adjustment  Support  project  in  Ghana  Incorporates  salary  premiums,
it also  incorporates  several  measures  aimed  at  long-term
Improvements  to strengthen  trhe  civil service  management  system:
(1)  review  of staff  numbers,  functions,  and  deployment,  aiming at
ultimate  reductions,  redeployment  and  retraining; (2)  studies  and
surveys  as  a basis  for  reforming  the  salary  policy overall; and  (3)
a skills  mobilizatlon  scheme  to persuade  qualified Ghanaians  living
abroad  to  return  to  work  in  Gnana.  The  Development  Management
Project  In  Senegal  Includes  similar  features.  Both  cases  could
provide  a model  for shaning  a more  coherent  policy on  the  problem
of  Inadequate  salaries.
26  AFTPS,  op.cit ,  para  52.- 25  -
The  Bank's  Incentive  Structure
52.  ID  work  Is complex  and  takes  time to prepare  and  supervise
for reasons  explained  elsewhere  In this paper.  The  priority  naturally
given  to capital  lending and  the  Increasing  pressures  of getting
projects  to the  Board  work  agalnst  allocating  sufficlent  staff  time  to
the  preparation  of  ID-related  projects.  The  Bank's  Incentive  structure
Is not  oriented  toward  continulty  a I balance  of  supervision  Inputs:
It Is generally  recognized  in the Bank  that  less priority  Is attached
to suDervislon  durlng  Implementation  than  to earlier  stages  In the
project  cycle.
Insufficient Attentlon  to Borrower  Commitment
53.  Perhaps  the most  Important  prerequisite  for successful  ID-
related  TA  Is serious  commitment  on  the part  of the  borrower.
Wlthout  government  participation  from  the  early  stages  (project
identification), the  project  Is unilkely to  reflect  the  priorities  of the
government  and  may  go  beyond  Its ad-r'-  rative  and  managerlal
capacity.  At  the  Implementatlon  Lage  the  program  will be  resented
and  rendered  Ineffective,  rpr.,c,dless  of  the quality  of  Its design,
delivery, or  supervislon.  For  ID-related  TA projects  !n particular,
demand-driven  change  or  reform  Is crItIcal. Althcugh  statements  such
as  "the government  Is committed  to...'  are  standard  Bank  language  In
the  Staff  Appraisal  Reports  and other  project  documents,  assessments
or proposed  strategies  for  Influencing such commitment  are  notorlously
absent  fro,m  those  documents,  as  are  yardsticks  to measure  commitment,
such  as  solid conditions  for negotiations,  boara  presentatlon,
effectiveness  and  disbursement.
54.  Several  factors  tend  to discourage  systematic,  explicit
attentlon  to the  Issue of government  commitment  in Bank  work.  First,
pressures  to  lend  discourage  analys's  of  intangibies  that  may  threaten
a  project's  clean  bill  of  health  at  appralsal.  Second.  analyzing
convnitment  l3  conceptually  difficult  and  necessarily  sub 4ective:  the
Bank  has  no  reliable  means  of  measuring  or  builoing  It,2  and  Bank
staff  with  technical  training  may  feel  uncomfortabie  in an  area  that
essentially  requires  political understanding  and  second  guessing  of a
borrower's  agents  and  motives.
27  Reasonably  systematic  approaches  for assessing  and
influencing commitment  for use  by Bank  staff  In  the context  of  routine
operations  do  exist  and  are  documented  in  A,  Israel/R. Heaver's  paper,
"Country  Commrnitment  to  Development  projects,  World  Bank  Discussion
Paper  No.  4, 1986.  This  finding  has  also  been  confirmed  in  the
Interviews  conducted  by  C. Gray,  et  al.  for  their  study  of the  factors
affecting  the  quality  of  ID  work  In  the  Bank,  on.  cit.,  p.  25.- 26  -
Centralized  Bank  Management
55.  The  Bank  runs  Its operatlons  on a centralIzed  basis.  Bank
projects  are  supervised  from Washington.  For  ID-related  TA, which
requires  close  and  continuous  attention,  this Is a  llabillty.
Profile and  Cost  of Bank-financed  Experts
56.  Experts,  especlally  In freestanding  projects,  are  often  seen
as  the  Bank's experts  and  do  little  to make  people  think otherwise.
Bank-financed  TA  Is expensive  and  usually carries  a high profile.  In
areas  such  as  Institutional development,  where  the cost  and  benefits
are  not  Immedlately  evident  (as, say,  In  engineering  TA), and  where  the
very  existence  of technical  assistance  personnel  Is a delicate
political Issue, these  elements  are  particularly  resented  by  the
reciplent  governments  and  militate against  the  success  of  ID-related
TA programs.
THE  NATURE  OF  ID
57.  Under  the  best  of  circLmnstances,  ID-related  TA  Is  much  more
difficult  to  design  and  deliver  than  Investment-related  TA  because  of
the  nature  of  institutlonal  development.  In  the  words  of  one
colleague:  "The  ID process  Is long, iterative, complex,  non-linear,
sensitive,  and  unpredictable  and  requires  behavioral  changes." 2 8
58.  As  a result:
*  The  need  for  !D-related  TA  may  be  less clearly  perceived  by
governments,  and  more  easily  resented,  In  view  of the
requirement  for behavioral  changes  and  the  long lead time
before  results  may  become  evident.
*  Efficlent delIvery  of ID-related  TA does  not  guarantee
long-lasting  Impact.  Elements  such  as  borrower  commitment,
leadership,  and  the  polltical, social and  bureaucratic
environment  have  a much  greater  Influence on  the
effectiveness  and  Impact of  ID-related  TA  than  Is the case
wlth  Investment-related  TA.  Unfortunately,  all of these
elements  are  volatile  and outside  the control  of  the Bank
and  Bank-fInanced  TA  personnel.  As  borne  out  by
experlence,  an  ID-related  project  that  Is well on  track
today  toward  achleving  Its objectives  may  be  totally
paralyzed  tomorrow  by  the change  of key  government  staff.
INEXPERIENCE  WITH  ID
59.  Compared  to  traditional  Bank  projects  and  economic  and
sector  work,  ID Is a relatively  new  area.  Thus:
28  D. Steedman,  AFlCO.- 27  -
Shortage  of  Qualified  Experts
60.  There  are few  best  practitioners.  Findlng  tne  ;-Ight  person
Is  a  challenging  assigrnment.  For  ID  and  capacity  buIldin  g  td,  hIcaI
substantive  knowledge  Is  not  sufficient.  A  proven  ability  to  coach,
work  In  a  team,  good  knowledge  of  the  local  environment  aiid  culture,
adaptability,  and  a  track  record  of  demonstrated  successful  experience
are  also  required.  There  are  not  many  people  on  the  market  who  meet
these  demands.
Limited  Body  of  Knowledge
61.  The  state-of-the-art  and  the  lessons  of  exper  ei,ce  are
only  slowly  emerging,  especially  In  areas  like  public  sector  management
which  are  Inherently  less  concrete  and  for  which  TA  Is  therefore
especlally  difficult  to  design  and  deliver.  Much  more  work  Is  also
needed  to  quantify  achlevement  Indicators  and  tools  to  measure
per formance.
Unfamiliarity  with  Institutional  Analysis
62.  -his  also  applies to  methods  for  institutional  analysis.
Often  as  a  result  of  the  absence  of  thorough  institutlonal  analysis
many  TA  projects  are  "overdesigned,"  suggesting  an  Inadequate
assessment  of  borrowers'  needs  and  unrealistic  expectations  as  to
their "carrying"  capacity.  Others  are  "underdesigned"  (so-called  'slush
funds")  wlthout  sufficient  specificatlon  of  objectives,  expected
outputs,  and  Inputs,  and  It  Is  therefore  difficult  to  assess  their
effectiveness  or  failure.  Many  problems  that  ID-related  TA  encounters
could  be  avoIded  If  sufficiently  sound  InstItutional  diagnostic  work
were  conducted  upfront.
63.  The  CECPS  review  of  Staff  Appraisal  Reports/President
Reports  of  freestanding  TA  found  that  institutional  analysis  was  the
exception,  not  the  rule.  This  finding  is  confirmed  by  audit  reports,
sectoral  revlews  and  other  reports.9  One  of  these  (BrInkerhoff)
analyzed  a  sample  of  8C  Staff  Appraisal  Reports  In  six  key  sectors
from  FY83  onwards  and  concluded  that  overall,  as  an  input  to  project
preparatlon  and  appraisal,  the  role  of  institutional  analysis  of  any
type  is  quite  restricted  relative  to  the  preponderance  of  economic  and
technical  analyses.  One  of  the  main  reasons  for  the  lack  of
institutional  analysis  Is  that  the  Bank  has  not  yet  diffused  a
particular  methodology  for  this  purpose.  While  remarkable  consistency
permeates  the  Bank's  economic  analysis,  a  phenomenon  attributable  to
29  See  for  example,  A  Review  of  Institutional  Development
Analysis  In  LAC  Documentation  for  Projects  Presented  to  the  Board
Between  July  1987  and  December  1988.  LATHR  PS,  1989;  Institutlonal
Aspects  of  Sectoral  Adjustments  Operatlons:  Summary  of  Findings,  S.
Paul,  CECPS.  Aug.  1988;  and  Institutional  Analysis  and  Institutlonal
Development:  A  Survey  of  World  Bank  Experlence,  D.  Brlnkerhoff,  IDMC
for  CECPS,  Oct.  1989- 28  -
the  nature  of  the  fleld  and  the  similarity  In  staff  tralning,  a  similar
coherence  and consistency  does  not  yet  characterize  institutlonal
analysis.
.0- 29  -
CHAPTER  FOUR
HOW  TO  IMPROVE  THE  RECOPD:  SUGGESTIONS  FOR  FUTURE  ACTIONS
64.  The  analysis  presentea  In this paper  should  not  lead to  the
concluslon  that  the  Bank  cannot  make  a contributlon  to the
InstitutUonal capacitles  of the  countries  using  TA.  To  the  contrary,
the  Bank  can  take  specific steps  at various  levels  to overcome  Its
handicaps  and  Improve  Its performance  record.  The  suggested  actions
are  not  new.30 While much  Is said and wrItten  about  the  need  for  new
approaches  to delIver  ID-related  TA  and  "breaking  new  ground",  this
paper  argues  that the  determinants  of  successful  ID-related  TA  are
sufficlently well known  and  that  the  Issue  Is much  more  one  of applying
the  lessons  of  experIence.
65.  The  fundamental  question  for  the  Bank  Is  one  of  resources:
ID-related  TA  Is  a  costly  endeavor,  and  Improving  Its  performance
requires  the  allocation  of more  resources,  either  by  Increasing  total
available  resources  or  by cutting  back  somewhere  else.  This  paper
assumes  that  the  Bank's  incentive  structure,  Its lending polIcies and
practices,  Its  organizational  structure,  and  overall  resource
allocatlon  will  not  undergo  significant  changes  In  the  foreseeable
future.  Therefore,  this  chapter  concentrates  on  Improvements  that
can  be  enacted  with  a relatively  modest  Increase  In resources  for  ID-
related  matters.  A marginal  shift  In the overall  allocation  of Bank
resources  can  make  a substantlal  change  In  the  design  and  delivery  of
ID-related  TA, provided  that  there  Is  managerlal  commltment  and
support,  as  reflected  In  staff  time  allocations,  work  prioritles,  Bank
strategy  In  borrowing  countrles,  choice  of  staff  to  fill  each  Job, Job
title and  Job content.
A STRATEGIC  APPROACH  TO  ID31
66.  How  can  the  Bank  resolve  countrywide  institutlonal
weaknesses?  Experience  shows  that  tackling  institutional weaknesses
with an  agency-by-agency  approach,  or  trying  to  Isolate  a few
development  activitles  by creating  Institutional  enclaves,  may  not  be
sufficient  In  the  context  of  pervasive  country-wide  Institutional
weaknesses.  What  are  required  are  strategies  that  address  key
30  See  also  the  recommendations  made  In  other  background
studles  for  the  ID  policy  paper,  Including  C.  Gray,  et  al.,  op.  cit.;  D.
Steedman,  op.  cit.;  S.  Paul,  Institutlonal  Development  at  the  Sectoral
Level,  1989.
31  Country-wide  ID  strategles  for  public  sector  management  are
advocated  by  AFTPS  In  the  Public  Sector  Management  Strategy  Paper
for  the  Africa  Region,  Feb.  89,  paras.  103,  et  al.- 30  -
problems  of  a country's  or  sector's  institutional  structure  and  that
are  targeted  to achieve  effective  institutlonal change. 3 2 These
strategles  can  be developed  on  the basis  of  systematic  country/sector
Institutlonal development  assessments  of Issues  that  are  common  to
all  development  projects,  such  as  the  reliability  of  government
contributlons  to  projects,  connected  with  general  resource  constraints
and  with  management  capacities  In  central  government;  the  quality  and
avallabillty of  local  staff;  and  the  attitude  of  government  officlals to
technical  assistance  personnel,  particularly  expatrlates.  For
Instance,  In  Bangladesh  (where  foreign  aid accounts  for  45 percent  of
total  government  resources,  55  percent  of  Import payments,  65  percent
of  total  Investments,  and  90  percent  of  the government's  annual
development  expenditure),  the  low  disbursement  rate  of  project
assistance,  at  17  percent  of  the  commynitments  available  at  the
beginning  of  the year,  Is an  institutlonal constraint  on  all donor
projects.  Another  constraint  Is  that  the  TA  project  approval  process
entails  no  fewer  than  29  steps  In  the bureaucracy.
67.  Bank  country  strategy  work  should  also pay  greater
attention  to  human  resource  development  on  a  natlonwide  basis.
Although  education  Is usually  given  sufficient consideration  In  country
reports,  linkage with the  labor market  Is usually  weak, while  the  Issues
of  workforce  development  and  their  Interface  with  overall  economic
objectives  Is seldom  treated  with  the  same  Importance  and depth  of
review  that  are  accorded  to other  economic  factors  In Bank  studles
and  reports.
PROJECT  DEVELOPMENT
68.  Investments  In  project  design  pay  off durlng  I;Oementation
The  challenge  Is  to  design  a  project  that  (1)  responds  to  genuine  needs
of  the  recipient;  (2)  is  adaptable  to  the  recipient's  absorptive
capacity:  and  (3)  Is  designed  for  flexible,  effective  Implementatlon.
69.  First, thorough  Institutlonal analysis  is necessary,
Including an  assessment  of country  commitment.  This will set  the  stage
for the  identificatlon of priority  objectives  and  reallstically
achlevable  project  results  wlthin  the  life  of  the project.
70.  Second,  to  generate  government  commitment  and  put  It to
the  test, the  design  process  must  be conducted  In a participatory
fashion, wlth  the  government  taking  the  lead In defining priority  needs,
objectives,  terms  of reference  and work  programs.  Experience  In Asla
and  EMENA  clearly  demonstrates  that  government  Involvement  from  the
earliest  stages  of project  development  Is essential  for the  program's
success.  A serles  of  specific  steps  for  the government  to  take
before  TA project  implementation  should  be  Identifled and  Insisted upon
as concrete  pr-oof  of commitment.  This may  not  be a pleasant  task
32  See,  for  example,  Indonesia  Power  Sector  Institutional
DeveloIment  Revlew,  Sept.  1989,  AS5!E.- 31  -
during  program  design,  but  It  Is  certainly  one  that  will  help  avoid
hurdles  later  during  implementatlon.
71.  Further,  to  make  Implementation  manageable  both  for  the
Bank  and  the  recipient, tIe  project  shouid  be  simple, wlth  clearly
defIned  goals,  few components,  and  as  few  Implementing  agencies  as
possible  to avoid  intricate  coordinating  arrangements  (Eoxes  C and  D).
The choice  of  Inputs  should  be carefully  adapted  to  local needs  and
capabilltles,  and a  serles  of veriflable  performance  Indicators  should
be defined  (Box E).32  -
Box  C
Project  Design:  Complexity  versus  Slmpilcity
Many  projects  and  components  ar-e  overly  ambitlous
because  of the  tendency  of project  designers  to assume  that  all
technIcal  and  InstitutIonal deficiencIes  IdentIfIed can  be dealt
wlth by  TA.  As  noted,  project  designers  often  fall to consider
the absorptive  capacity  of the  recipient  organizatlon  and  the
formidable  constraints  and  challenges  of  reforming  administrative
or  technical  functions  as  well as  the  requirements  for Bank
supervision.  The  design  of freestanding  TA  projects  especially
tends  toward  the  incluslon of multiple components,  Implementing
agencles,  and  Intricate  coordinating  and management  arrangements,
which  require  substantial  management  capacitles.  Coordinas  j
programs  through  several  line  ministrles  and  local governinent
bodles  Is an  extremely  demanding  task, especially  in  countrles  with
a weak  Institutlonal  base: when  the  given  Institutional  setup  Is
Inefficlent and  Ineffective, deploying  government  staff  on
coordination  committees  may  be  a waste  of scarce  human
resources.  Also  the more  complex  the project/component,  the
more  frequent  and  Intensive  supervislon  requirements  will be.
For  example,  the  Argentina  Public Sector  Management
Technical  Assistance  Project,  Loan  2712-AR,  has  17 components  and
Implementing  agencies.  Curing  appraisal  it was  estimated  that  no
fewer  than  800  incividual  local  consultants  - over  4,000
workmonths  of consulting  services  - were  to be hired  over  the  life
of the  project.  To  facilitate project  administratlon  and overcome
cumbersome  gover-nment  procedures,  UNOP  was  contracted  as
procurement  agent,  and  a coordinating  unit  financed  from  loan
proceeds  was  establIshed,  wlth a professional  staff  of  four.  At
least 30  stdffweeks  were  spent  on  supervislon  during  year  one  of
project's  Implementation.  At  the end  of that  year,  the
Implementation  of  virtually  all  tne  project's  components  was  behind
schedule.
Experience  has  shown  that  straight.forward  and  simple  ID-
related  TA  projects  are  more  likely  to  succeed.  A  study
conducted  by  the  Industry  Development  Division  In  the  Bank's
Policy,  Research  and  External  Affairs  Complex  (PRE)  of  70  small  and
mediuLm  Industry  projects  over  the  last  15  years  cor,firms  that
finding:  successful  TA  components  have  tended  to  be  small  wlth
modest  and  clearly  defined  goals.  The  major  question  facing  this
approach  however,  Is  whether  borrowers  and  the  Bank  are  willing
to scale  down  projects  to  match  cur  respective  carrying
capactiles.- 33  -
Box  D
Project  Design:  Specificity  versus  Flexibillty
How  specific  should  the design  be?  Should  terms  of
reference,  tralning  Interventions,  and  work  programs  be  defined
before  approval  of  the  projects?  How  detalled  should  objectives,
Inouts, and  expected  results  be?
The  Issue of specificity  versus  flexibility  of project
design  Is a vexing one, as  each  presents  advantages  and
disadvantages.  On  the one  hand  Institutional reforms  and  capacity
bullding are  better  served  by what  has  come  to be known  as an
adaptive  or  process  approach  to  Implementation.  Flexibillty In
design  allows  all parties  Involved  to be particularly  responsive  to
changing  requirements  In a changing  environment,  as well as  to
redesign  non-performing  components  during  Implementation  wlthout
amendments  to  the  legal agreements  ard covenants.  The
disadvantage  of  this approach,  however,  lies in the  heavy  demands
It tends  to place  on  tie Bank  during  implementation.  Wlthout  doubt,
flexibillty  for  the purpose  of masking  imprecision  and  uncertainty
as  to what  Is to be done,  or as  a result  of hurried  design  will,
Inevitably  lead to poor  performance.
The  Operatlons  Evaluatlon  Department  analysis  of five
freestanding  projects  In I,idonesia  showed  that  the  excessive
flexibillty  w!th whlch  credits  could be  used  tended  to engender
inefficlencies, such  as  a  lack of  focus  and  Inherent  processing
delays,  which  outweighed  the advantages  of f!exibility  and  could
have  been  re;.,edled  by  an  Insistence  or more  pre-identification  of
end-uses  of project  furds.  The  Industry  Development  Divislon  In
the  Industry  & Energy  Department's  ana!ysis  of  70 small and  medium
enterprise  projects  also  found  that  tne  least  successful  approach
has  been  to design  loosely  formulated  rrcgrams  with  few
mechanisms  for monltorlng  or  evaluatIrg  results.  M.axlmizing
success  with weak  Institutions  has  beer,  achleved  through  the  use
of highly specific  terms  of reference,  cuantlfled  and  time-bound
outputs,  and constant  supervislon.
Certaln  elements  of TA  Inplementation  should  probably  not
be  left until the  Implementation  stage.  Thney includL training
needs  assessments  and  the design  of the  training  strCLegy.  Also,
a series  of veriflable  Indicators  for the measurement  of
performance  and  output  achievement  sM.cLdla  be designed  upfront  to
avoid  disappointment  with  the outcome.  Long-term  ID-related
objectives  should  be clearly  specified  and  separated  from  the
shorter-term,  more  operationally  oriented  objectives,  to avold
neglect  of the  former.- 34  -
Box  E
TA  Inputs  for  ID:  What  Works
Much  has  been  written  about  the  need  for  Innovative
approaches  to deliver  ID-related  TA.  There  Is no such  thing as  a
"cookle cutter"  approach,  whereby  programs  are  simply copied
wlthout  assessment  of  local needs  and  capabilities; what  works  In
one  country,  sector,  or  institution does  not necessarily  apply  to
another.  The maln  tools of  ID-related  TA are  well known;  It Is
essentially  a matter  of creative  packaging  of existing methods
made  suitable  to  the given  context.  For  each  project,  a balance
must  be  sought  among  advisory  services  of a long-  or short-term
nature  and  the  type  of  training required.  Countries  with  a very
minimal  Institutlonal base  must  depend  more  on  long-term  advisers
required  in llne  positlons  to perform  tasks  for which  qualifled and
experlenced  locals are  not  yet  avallable.  Short-term  consultants
are more  approprlate  In relatively well-functloning  administrations
or  project  components,  and  for highly specialized  tasks,  such  as
systems  development
Regrettably,the  most  widely practiced  ID  method  Is the
one  proven  to be a disappointment  to all parties  concerned:  long-
term  adviser  cum  counterpart  tralning on  the  job.  The
disappointment  stems  from  two  factors:  national  staff  may  have
problems  of motivations  and  Incentives, and  experts  rarely  can
successfully  combine  the  assignment  of  "Implementing/doing"  wlth
tralning,  since  both  tasks  requires  different  skills  and
dispositlons.  (In  the  words  of  one  staff  member:  "FlndIng  that
person  Is  like  looklng  for  a  sneep  with  five  feet.")
More  promising  for  successful  delivery  of  ID  TA  Is  the
Integratlon  of  short-term  consultants  and  long-term  technical
assistants  with  natlonal  agency  staff.  Long-term  advisers  have  a
comparative  advantage  In  the  management,  coordinatlon,  and
training  aspects  of  Institutional  development.  The  advantage  of
short-term  advisers  lies In  specialized  technology  transfer  and
trouble-shooting  and  In  Identification  and  Introduction  of possible
Institutlonal  Innovations,  Including  systems  development.  Together,
they  constitute  a team  for carrying  forward  the  ID effort.  The
long-term  advisers  provide  backup  support  for  Implementation  of  1D
Improvements,  and  the  short-term  consultants  conceive  and  develop
the methodological  Inputs.  In this framework,  much  more  emphasis
Is placed  on the  "behavioral  skills"  of thie  long-term  experts  than
on thelr  substantive  technical  knowledge.  The  Guinea  Economic
Management  Support  Project  and  the Ct.ntral African  Republic
Economic  Management  Project,  for example,  have  put  Into practice
this  Integrated  team  approach.
Another  suggestlon  that merits  consideration  Is to plan
from  the outset  for the  out-phasing  of  the  TA  In connection  with
staff  developmer.t  programs,  possibly  by making  provision  for the
return  of  long-term  staff  for periodlc  visits.- 35  -
72.  The  TA  and  tralning packages  should  be  placed  within  the
context  of  a human  resource  development  and  manpower  use  strategy.
No amount  of training  and  TA, no matter  how well designed  and
delivered,  will have  an  Impact on  an  institutlon unless  It Is  conducted
within the  context  of a human  resource  development  strategy,  Including
manpower  planning  and  effective  management  of the civil service.  For
those  sectors/countrles  In wilch substantial  ID-related  TA  Is financed
by  the  Bank  and  In  which  an appropriate  human  resource  development
strategy  Is not  In existence,  the government  should  connit  Itself to a
serles  of concrete  measures  before  approval  of  the  project.  Release
of  project  funds  should  be  tied  to  those  measures:  e.g.,  by  not
approving  the  next  tranche,  or  project  phase,  If  local  counterparts
have  not  been  provided  to work  wlth  TA, or  If  employee  discipline  and
Incentive  schemes,  personnel  pollcles,  and  procedures  have  not  been
Implemented.
73.  On  a  broader  level,  If  the  TA  Is  to  achleve  institutlonal
reforms,  It Is  Important  to  ensure  that  reforms  and  adjustments  are
actually  made,  and  adequate  protection  must  be  bullt Into the
conditlonality.
SUPERVISION  OF  ID-RELATED  TA PROJECTS.
74.  The  nature  of  staff  supervision  and  consultant  advice  on
ID-related  components  is  qulte  different  from  that  required  In  an
engineering  TA  project  or  a traditlonal  Investment  project  with  their
well-defined  steps.  Experience  shows  that  ID-related  TA  projects
actually  required  project  management,  as  opposed  to supervision,  on
the part  of Bank  staff, ana  that  successful  Implementatlon  depends
heavily on  Intensive  Involvement  of Bank  staff  In the  implementation
process.  The  Kenya  Agriculture  Technical  Assistance  Project33  for
example  required  no fewer  than  22  supervislon  missions  over  the  life
of  tthe  project.
75.  How  can  more  resources  be  mobilized  for  these  projects
that  need  much  more  supervision  than  traditional  investment  projects,
especlally  at  a  time  when  It  Is  unrealistic  to  expect  Increased
resource  allocations?  There  are  several  ways:
Selectivity  In  Project  Processing
76.  Process  only  those  TA  projects  for which  there  Is
demonstrated  government  commitment.  Ample  evidence  from  Asia  and
EMENA  proves  that  where  there  is a real demand  for  TA, countrles  wlil
promote  and  manage  the  process.  Bank  management  could  encourage
more  systematic  treatment  of commitment  Issues  by  requiring  project
officers  to assess  borrower  commitment  and  the  steps  to build and
maintaln  It,  In  project  briefs,  economic  sector  work  proposals,  Staff
Appraisal  Reports,  supervislon  reports,  back-to-offIce  reports,  and
project  completion  reports.  In  worst-case  scenarios,  the  decision  not
33  OED  Case  Study  on Kenya,  P. 29,  Para. 3.09.- 36  -
to proceed  with  the  project,  or  the decision  to cancel  undisbursed
amounts  on  the  grounds  of  Inadequate  borrower  commitment,  should  not
automatically  be  Interpreted  as  a failure on  the  part  of  the  Bank.  In
certain  circumstances,  wlthdrawing  support  from  a borrower  Institutlon
may  be  the  most  positive  means  for  securing  reforms,  as  well  as
freeing  Bank  resources  (Including  staff  time) 3 4 for  use  elsewhere.
Make  More  Use  of  Field  Offices
77.  Fleld  offices  could  become  more  Involved  In  the  management
of  TA  proJects.  Belng  In  the  field,  they  can  reduce  considerably  the
time currently  needed  to approve  disbursement,  consultants'  requests,
etc.;  they  also  have  a better  understanding  of the  political and
bureaucratic  constraints  and  play a crucial  role  In donor  coordinatlon.
78.  The  review  of  Institutional components  of recent  Bank
projects  which  was  conducted  by  the Office  of the  Vlce  President,
Development  Economics  and  Chief  Economist  (DECVP)  In the  Policy,
Research  and  External  Affairs  Complex  of the  Bank, confirmed  that  In
several  projects  resident  missions'  staff  made  valuable  contributions
to  the  high  quallty  of  institutional  design  because  their  day-to-day
presence  In  the  borrowing  country  led  to  more  thorough  country
knowledge,  experience,  and  continulty  than  would  have  been  possible
through  mission  work  alone; and  Institutional work  could  be enhanced  If
the resident  missions  played  a  larger  role  In  project  design  and
supervislon  than  they  now  do.35 This was  also  confirmed  by  Interviews
with task  managers,  by audits,  and  by other  reports. 3 6
"In  those  countries  where  there  are  resident  misslons,  the
situation  created  by  the underfunding  of TA  supervision  was
not  as critical, as we  were  able  to call upon  for support.
It Is felt, though,  that  resident  missions  could  play  an even
greater  role  In supervision  of  TA operatlons,  namely  In
proJect  components  which  are  particularly  time  consuming,
such  as  monitorlng  of project  disbursemer,ts  In relatlon  to
appraisal  forecasts.  The  contractual  framework  devised  to
pass  on more  of  the  supervision  responsibility  to  resident
misslons  has  not  yet  yielded  convincing  results.  More
attention  should  be pald to  this.  Locally  recruited
resident  mission  staff  should  be called upon  more
systematically  to  provide  supervislon  assistance  and  should
not  limit  themselves  to  Intervene  only  when  asked  to by
Headquarters.  To  avoid  duplicatlon, clear-cut  understanding
34  A, Israel and  R. Heaver,  op. cit.
35  Op. cit.,  p.  20  and  p. 22.
36  See  for example  Report  on  a Review  of  Technical  Assistance
Activities  In the  Asia  Region,  internal Audit  Department,  Sept. 1989; A
Revlew  of Bank-Assisted  Free-standing  Technical  Assistance  Credits  in
Indonesia," OED,  MVr.  1988.- 37  -
as  to  resident  missions'  responsibilltles  ought  to be
established.  .37
79.  While  It Is true  that  In  many  cases  this would  require  an
additlon  of at  least one  hlgher-level  staff  person  to the  resident
mission,  these  persons  could  be recruited  localiy.  In  addition,  for
certain  countries  the appointment  of one  "roving"  ID-speclaiist  wlth
responsibillty  for several  countries  merits  consideration  (for example,
a person  placed  In Dakar  wlth responsibillty  for Sahellan  countries,  or
Cote  d'lvolre for occidental  African  countries).  Resident  misslons  also
should  bulld a roster  of  local consultants.
Careful  Selection  of Consultants  and  Experts
80.  The  problem  of ensurlng  high quality  In the  use  of
consultants  Is persistent  and  enduring  and more  time  needs  to be
Invested  In Identifying good  consultants  and  TA personnel.  An
Inventory  of "best  practitioners,"  based  upon  a critical evaluation  of
their performance,  would  be valuable  to operations  departments  and
divislons.  In particular, much  greater  care  Is needed  In the  selection
of  long-term  TA  staff.  Because  of  thelr continued  presence  In the
field,  they  are  a determining  factor  In project  success.
Make  Use  of  Project  Implementatlon  Manuals
81.  Often,  valuable  time  Is wasted  on  procedural  questions.  If,
for complex  projects  and  components,  country  operations  and/or  sector
divisions  were  to develop  project  Implementation  manuals  and  TA
management  systems,  more  time  could  be  applied  to  substantive  project
Implementation.  The  Country  Operations  Division  In  the  Occidental  and
Central  Africa  Department  (AFlCO) Is  currently  developing  TA
management  systems.  As  noted  In  the  Divislon's FY89  Annual  Review  of
ImpIeme-ntatlon  and  Supervislon  Report  (ARIS): 3 8
"Faced  with  limited resources,  our  own  capacity  to monitor
accurately  the  utilization of funds  In the  TA portfolio  has
been  llmited,  developed  largely as  an ad  hoc  response  to
the particular  circumstances  of each  case.  It Is essentlal
that we  assist  borrowers  in their management  of these
operations  through  the development  of  a management  system
that  Is sufficiently comprehensive  to cover  all the
Information  and  reportirig requirements  for sound  monitoring,
while being  sufficlently  flexible to respond  'o the
particular  circumstances  and  llmitatlons of  Individual
projects.  Such  management  systems  are  being developed  by
our  Dlvision.  They  are  Intended  to be  Integrated  both  Into
the preparation  package  for  new  TA  operations  and  Into
37  AFICO  ARIS  Report  FY89,  para. 24.
38  AFICO  FY80  ARIS Report,  para. 23.- 36  -
strengthening  managemert  performance  of  existing  proje.-ts.
To  be  effective,  the  system  should  be  complemented  by  a
more  systematic  approach  to  assessing  project  costs  and
Inputs by  component  and  Intended  beneficiary,  thus
facilltating the  task  of monitoring  Implementatlon  iri
relation  to  appraisal  forecasts.  The  end  result  of  the
system  will  be  saving  time and  resources  In the  supomrvislon
of TA  projects  and  better  supervislon."
Cross-fertlIzatIon  and  Dissemination  of Best  Practice
82.  A review  done  by  the Africa  Public Sector  Management
Dlvision  last year  revealed  that  especially  among  staff  Involved  In
sector-specific  TA, task  managers'  awareness  of the  Issues  and  past
reconmrv'endatlons  for TA  In general  Is not  great,  and  that  only  33
percent  of past  recommendatlons  had  been  Incorporated  In the design
of TA  projects  and components  In FY87  and  FY88.  Major
cross-fertilizatlon  and  dissemination  activitles  are  needed  to heighten
the awareness  of task managers  of the  Intricacies  of  ID work  and  best
practice  (see  the  following section: Areas  for Training  and  Research).
ARFAS  FOR RESEARCH/ELABORATION OF  GUIDELINES
e3.  Bank  staff  need  better  a understanding  of the  available
institutlonal  analysis  approaches  and  of  the  methodologles  for
designing  and  delivering  TA  and  training.  A conceptual  and
methodological  base  for  ID-related  TA,  Including identificatlon of
veriflable  performance  Indicators  and outputs,  needs  to be  developed.
84.  More  conceptual  and  emplrical work  Is required  on methods
of evaluating  the  effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  ID-related  TA
efforts,  as well as  Impact  studies  that  systematically  compare
different  approaches.
85.  It Is evident  that  project-related  TA will  remaln  the  main
vehicle  to promote  ID.  Much  more  work  Is needed  to document  sectoral
approaches  and  best  practice  In each  sector.
86.  A short  "guidelines paper"  to help staff  Identify and  manage
the  institutlonal aspects  of projects  would  be  valuable  to operational
staff.
87.  Further  research  Is  needed  to  Identify  the  varlables  most
predictive  of  ID-related  TA  project  success  (e.g.,  leadership,  etc.).
STAFF  TRAINING
88.  It Is Important  to disseminate  to current  Bank  staff
responsible  for  ID-related  TA project  design  and  Implementation  the
many  lessons  learned  from  experience,  conventionally  accepted  best
practice  and  the  results  of  research  efforts  and  studies.  CECPS  and
regional  public sector  management  units could organize  tralning
sesslons  on  thes-  subjects  and organize  workshops  that  provide  cross-- 39  -
fertilization  of  project  experlence  In  different  sectors  and  countries.
The  existing  data  base  on  "what  works"  and  "what  does  not"  among sta.,f
Is  substantlal,  yet  few  opportunities  are  afforded  staff  for  sharlng  of
experlences  In  sectors,  countries,  and  regions  other  than  those  of
their  specific  task  responsibilltles.- 40  -
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INTRODUCTION
1.  Several  problems  and  Issues  characterize  the  Bank's
technical  assistance  (TA) activitles.  This  annex  Identifles  the  lessons
and  recommendatlons  that  have  emerged  from  these  problems.  It  was
complied  from  studies  and  reviews  of  Bank-fInanced  TA prcoects  and
components  from  different  regions,  countrles  and  sectors,  although
exDerlences  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa  predominate  due  to  the  extensive
documentatlon  of  TA activities  In  that  region.
2.  Sectlon  I  reviews  design  and  planning-related  Issues,  and
Section  11 deals  with  implementation-related  Issues.  Each  Issue  is
followed  by  a  list  of  lessons  from  the  revlews  and  recommendatlons  for
ImprovIng  Bank-financed  TA actIvitIes.
I. DESIGN AND PLANNING-RELATED  ISSUES
3.  Problems  attributable  to  poor  project  design  and
preparation  are  perhaps  the  most  prevalent  In  the  Bank's  TA
activities.  This  Is  prlmarily  due  to  the  often  cursory  and  cosmetic
manner  In  which  TA components  and  projects  are  prepared  (TA as  an
"afterthought").  In  many  Instances,  TA Is  seen  less  as  a means  of
achleving  Institutional  development  (ID)  goals  and  more  as  a  stop-gap
solution  to  human resource  constraints;  this  vlew  seems  to  be
partIcularly  prevalent  In  AfrIca.
4.  An OED review  of  past  Project  Performance  Audit  Reports
for  African  projects  found  that  design  factors  were  cited  more
frequently  than  any  others  (70% of  projects)  as  having  had  an
Influence  on  the  effectiveness  of  ID work  [OED, May  1984).  This  same
review  Identified  the  following  weaknesses  In  Bank  planning  for  the%
reglon's  support  work:  (1) no  long-term  program  (agreed  with  the
borrower)  for  strengthening  the  capacity  of  target  institutlons
(suggesting  that  the  time  frame  for  Africa  may  be  as  long  as  20
years);  and  (2)  a  lImited  capacity  to  address  wlder  policy  and
Institutional  constraints  that  cannot  be  easily  tackled  at  the  project
level.  This  suggests  that  regional  program  development  staff  are  not
sufficlently  Involved  In  analyzing  the  broader  Institutlonal
environment,  In  formulating  tV^  country  and  sector  ID assistance
programs,  or  in  reviewing  projects.  While  the  OED review  focussed  on
Africa  alone,  It  would  not  be  too  adventuresome  to  speculate  that
these  weaknesses  are  present  In  all  four  reglons  of  the  Bank.
5.  Design  and  planning-related  problems  include:  supply-driven
TA;  low  levels  of  borrower  or  recipient  commitment;  overambitlous  scope
and  timing  of  TA;  Inadequate  dlagnosis  of  needs;  poor  design  of
tralning  activitles;  vague  and  Imprecise  terms  of  reference;- 44-  ANNEX  1
unmeasurable  obJectives  and  outputs  and  conflicting  objectives;  and
excessive  reliance  on  expatriates.
Supply-DrIven  TA
6.  It  has  been  argued  that  Bank-fInanced  TA  Is  "supply--
driven;"  that  Is,  the  perception  of  need  for  TA originates  more  often
wlthin  the  Bank  than  on  the  part  of  the  borrower  and  is  Imposed  upon
the  borrower  as  a  condition  for  financing.  (Whether  pervasive  or  not,
this  is  a  view  that  seems  to  be  shared  by  many borrowers  [Storrar,
1982;  Lethem  and  Cooper,  1983].)  TA  Is  less  likely  to  be  supply-driven
when assoclated  with  enrlneering-related  projects  because  the
Borrower  Is  more  likely  to  recognize  an  obvious  need  for  TA  services,
especalaly  In  "high  technology"  areas.  But,  because  freestanding  TA  Is
prlmarily  aimed  at  strength3ning  macro-economic  planning  and  policy
formulation  (often  In  support  of  structural  and  sector  adjustment
loans),  !t  Is  cast  In  a  polltical  shadow where  It  Is  often  perceived  by
borrowers  as  unnecessary  and  unwanted--but  conditionally  required.  A
report  on  TA  In  Sub-Saharan  Africa  noted  that  "most  borrowers  feel
that  Technical  Assistance  Is  too  often  Induced  by  the  donors  and  that
they  are  obliged  to  agree  In  order  not  to  lose  the financial  aid  for
development  which  they  need  or  want"  [Storrar,  Aug.  1982,  para.  7.3).
This  perceptlon  seems  to  be  especlally  common among recipients  of  IDA-
financed  TA [OED, Dec.  1982].
7.  Indeed,  It  appears  that-  the  Bank  has  taken  the  Initiative  In
Identifying  and  defining  a  need  for  TA more  often  than  borrowers,
especially  with  regard  to  freestanding  TA [OED: (Indonesia)  Mar.  1988;
(Bangladesh)  Dec.  1982].  A  rev;ew  of  Bank  TA to  Banglaaesh  found  that
out  of  85  TA components  from  38  projects,  the  Bank  generally  played  a
dominant  role  in  the  selection  and  deslgn  of  TA [OED, Dec.  1982].  The
need  for  TA was  usually  first  lpntifled  by  the  Bank,  In  most  cases,
during  the  project  preparatlon  and  anpralsal  stages  and  elaborated
upon  In  the  Staff  Appraisal  Report.  The  Staff  Appraisal  Report
Included  draft  terms  of  reference  for  TA consultants  which  were
usually  accepted  verbatim  by  the  borrower.  When the  relevant  agency
drafted  Its  own  terms  of  reference,  the  Bank often  suggested  changes
which  may  have  resulted  In  a  lower  level  of  recIplent  commitment  than
If  the  Bank  had  allowed  the  recipient  to  take  the  lead.  Furthermore,
such  passive  roles  on  thie  part  of  the  borrower  often  create  problems
during  Implementation  because  Bank  staff  &re not  always  aware  of  the
constraints  Imposed  by  local  conditions  that  might  limit  a  consultant's
assignment.
8.  Lethem  and  Cooper  [1983]  observed  that  supply-drIven  TA
will  usually  be  resisted  because  the  borrower  may  not  be  willing  to
borrow  for  TA, may  believe  local  capacities  are  adequate,  may consider
the  proposed  TA to  be  only  Indirectly  related  to  an  Investment,  may
suspect  TA serves  only  as  a  "watchdog"  over  the  use  of  loan  funds.  or
may  object  to  the  high  costs  of  TA. Ultimately,  even  If  supply-driven
TA  Is  accepted  by  policymakers  due  to  the  perception  of  conditionality,
It  runs  the  i  ditional  rlsk  of  being  rejected  by  those  at  the
operational  ltvel  where  the  TA Is  applied.-45  - ANNEX  1
9.  Supply-drIven  TA can  produce  a plethora  of problems.  When
the borrower  does  not  feel a need  for TA, It will  be  less  inclined to
contribute  to  the design  and  preparation  of  TA.  And  when  TA  Is
Implemented,  the borrower  will be  less  Inclined to provide  the
resource~_  that  the  project  requires  to be  successful  (see  the
following section  on borrower  commitment).
10.  Recommmendat..n.  The  borrower  should  participate  In all
phases  of design:  identification  of needs,  specification  of  TA delivery
models,  drafting  of  terms  of  reference,  etc. EAFTPS,  1989, p. 18].
Borrower  and  Recipient  Commitment
11.  Low  levels  of  borrower  commitment  to  TA  are  more  likely  to
occur  In  supply-driven  environments  where  the  borrower  has  not  been
actively  Involved  In  the  identificatlon  of  need,  design,  and  preparatlon
of  TA.  Lack  of  commitment  may  also  arise  out  of  a  failure  to  analyze
Institutlonal  structures  and  their  Inter-relationships  or because  of
resistance  by  Interest  groups  affected  by the  assistance.  One  TA
project  In  West  Africa  aimed  at  developing  regional  offIces  had  to  be
modifled  due  to  central  office  resl.tance  and  the perceived  threat  to
headquarter's  authority  [Robinson,  1984).
12,  A  number  of  other  factors  may  contribute  to a  lack of
commitment.  One  Zamblan  case  study  [R.B.  Sunshine  Assoclates,  1985,
para.  ,.09] offered  the  following  explanations  for  low levels  of
borrower  commitment:
(I)  underestirnat  on  of  the  complexity  of  certain  development
undertakings  and  the  managerlal/technical  skills  required  of
these  urndertaknigs;
(II)  a  tendency  to  believe  that  unqualIfied  manpower  can
substitute  for  skilled  manpower,  and  that  capital
investments  can  substitLte  for both;
(iil)  a  tendency  to  underrate  the  value  of  TA  not  connected  to
Investment  In  capital  goods;
(iv)  a/ersion  to  politically  sensitive  studies;  and
(v)  averslon  to  the  use  of  borrowed  funds  for  expatrlate
manpower.
13.  The  relationship  between  high  recipient  commitment  and
successful  Implementation  and  achlevement  of  TA  objectives  Is
certalnly  borne  out  by  the  reviews.  One  review  of  a  TA  project  In
Argentina  found  that  Imolementation  of those  components  of  the
project  where  borrower  commitment  was  high were  advancing  on  schedule
and  successfully,  while  those  where  commitment  was  lower where
performing  less  than  optimally  (Buyck, 1987).  A revlew  of  freestanding
TA  In  Botswana  noted  that  a high level of government  commitment  and- 46  - ANNEX 1
recognition  of  need  has  resulted  In  a  uniquely  successful  record  of  TA
in  that  country  [RaphaelI,  et  al.,  1984].  Many  rev!ews  furthermore
cited  a  positive  relationship  between  borrower  involvement  In  design
and  preparatlon  of  TA  and  high  borrower  conmmitment.  For  example,  a
survey  of  TA  to  Jamalca  observed  that  commitment  was  strongest  when
the  borrower  Identifled  Its  own  TA  needs  and  formulated  a  plan  Itself
[R.B.  Sunshine  Assoc.,  1985).  Whlie  these  IInkages  may  seem  obvious,  the
evidence  suggests  that  the  Bank  has,  of  yet,  falled  to  appreciate
their  Importance  to  achleving  TA  objectives.
14.  Lessons
a.  The  results  achieved  with  IDA-suoplied  technical  assist-.nce
reveal  that  the  Impact  of  TA  on  policy  formulatlon  capacity
and  ID  depends  primarily  on  the  government's  commitment  to
use  the  TA  effectively  for  its  designated  objectives
EKJelIstromn  and  d'Almelda,  19871.
b.  Lack  of  assessment  of  potential  support  of  Institutlons
concerned  with  a  TA  project  during  the  design  and
preparation  stages  often  leads  to  delays  in  Implementation
[Makharita,  1983).
c.  It  Is  Irmportant  for  the  success  of  TA  that  the  receiving
environment  be  receptive  to  what  TA  has  to  offer.
Receptivity  transcends  the  attitudes  of  Individuals  In  the
recelving  country.  It  depends  In  a  more  fundamental  sense
on  the  structure  and  operating  habits  of  the  administration
In  tne  recelving  country  Llbid.],
15.  Recornmendatlon.  Commitment  must  emanate  from  TA
consultants'  Immedlate  supervisors  and  counterparts,  top  management,
and  policymakers.  Securlng  their  commitment  requires  involving  them  In
drawling-up  terms  of  reference  and/or  in  selecting  consultants  [from  a
Yemen  case  study  In  R.B.  Sunshine  and  Assoc.,  1985,  para.  2.08].
C,verambltlous  Scope  and  Tlming  of  TA
16.  Overdesign  of  TA  Is  often  cited  as  a  major  contributor  to
problematic  Implenentatlon  and  continued  TA  dependence  [CODOP,  1987;
OED, Dec.  1982;  Wright  and  Risen,  1986].  It  has  contributed  to
overestimation  within  the  Bank  of  the  speed  at  which  ID  can  occur.
This  problem  appears  to  be  especially  acute  with  freestanding  TA
projects  and,  In  particular,  freestanding  TA  In  support  of  structural
adjustment  arid  sectoral  lending.  Because  technical  assistance  loans  In
support  of  structural  or  sectoral  reforms  aim at  addressing  problems
at  a  macroeconomic  or  sectoral  level,  these  projects  encompass  TA
activitles  that  cut  across  sectors  and  Institutional  terrain  and
therefore  engage  more  recipients,  Interest  groups,  and  resources  than
other  types  of  TA,  all  of  which  strain  the  borrower's  operationail
capacity  and  the  Bank's  supervision  capacity.  Ambitious  design  of
technical  assistance  projects  Is  perhaps  a  reflectlon  of  this  complex
proJect  environment,  and  high  degrees  oF srectflcity  are  perhaps  a- 47  - ANNEX  I
reflection  of conditlonalIty  requirements,  given  that  structural
adjustment  loan tranche  releases  are conditional  upon  the
performances  of  specialIsts  completing  short-term  studies  and  other
SAL-related  activities.
17.  However,  the pace  of structural  adjustment  loans  In terms
of starc-up  and  disbursement  rates  Is unusually  rapid, creating  speclal
problems  for  technical  assistance  loans.  Lessons  from  technical
assistance  loans  In support  of structural  adjustment  loan In Jamaica
suggest  that  the  ambitlousness  of  such  projects  be  restricted  tR.B.
Sunshine  Assoc.,  1985).  This study  stressed  the  Importance  of avolding
unreallstic  TA  deadlines  tied to structural  adjustment  loan
conaitlonality  and  found  that  Intense  time pressures  attrlbutable  to
structural  adjustment  loan llnkage were  counterproductive.
Furthermore,  limiting  the  number  of activitles  better  facilltates
government  coordination  and  Bank  supervision.  Project  staff  Involved
with technical  assistance  loans  In support  of structural  adjustment
loans  In Kenya  felt that  they  should  not  Include pollcy conditlonailties
but  should  concentrate  Instead  on  the  long-term  development  of  local
technical  skills [OED, Mar.  1989].  Despite  these  special  difficulties,
one  review  concluded  that,  In  Sub-Saharan  Africa  at  least, technical
assistance  loans are  not  recelving  the  care  and  detailed  attention  to
preparation  and  design  that  they  warrant  [AFTPS,  1989].
18.  On  the other  hand, technical  assistance  loans  almed  at
developing  a pipeline of feasible  projects  are  often  very  loosely
designed,  with  a high degree  of flexibillty  and minimal specificity.  The
advantages  of  ttils  flexibillty lie In the abillty to move  qulckly and  to
furd  needs  which  have  not  been  anticipated,  although  this  Is
accompanied  by  a certain  degree  of  risk.  Indonesia,  the  first
recipient  of  Bank-fInanced  freestanding  TA credits,  received  a series
of  these  so-called  "slush funds" from  1968 to  1979.  In Its review  of
freestand,ng  TA  to  Indonesla,  CED  noted  that  there  were  no  provislons
In  these  technica!  assistance  loans  for  pre-identificatlon  of  the  use
of  funcs;  this  degree  of  flexibliity  was  found  to  be  excessive  [OED,
Mar.  1988,  OED  concluded  that  this  "extreme"  flexiblIIty  of  design
resu,ted  !n  a  divergence  between  alms  and  objectives  realized,  an
absence  of  strategy  which  inhlbited  responsiveness  to  needs,  and
lengthy  aelays  In  Implementation  due  to  the  ad  hoc  Identification  of
suo-proJects  and  selectlon  of  consultants.  The  First  Technical
Assistance  Project  in  Somalla  (Credit  851-SO)  Is  another  example  of
th:s sort.  The  Project  Completion  Report  for  this project  observed
that  "the  exact  roles  of  the  different  entities  Involved  in  project
implementatlon  were  not  clearly  defined.  There  was  also  considerable
flexibillty  In the  use  of  p.roject  funds,  which  In  turn  required  a  high
level  of  cocrdirnatk  on...  Its  oiJectives  were  never  clearly  spelled  out."
19.  Lessons
a.  In  most  cases,  a  single  project  can  only  make  a  partial
contribution  to  institutional  development;  ID  cannot  be
cl.ymmi.-e<d  Ir,- n:he  oisbursement  Perlod  of  a  Bank  loan  or- 48  - ANNEX  1
credit.  Time  limitatlons  of  the  "plecemeal"  approach  might
be  overcome  by  developing  a  series  of  projects  COED,  May
1984).
b.  Assistance  should  not  be  given  In  the  form  of  completely
freestanding,  multi-sectoral  "umbrella"  agreements.  It  Is
better  to  organize  assistarice  sector-wise,  with  one  major
partner  Institution  Involved  both  administratively  and
professionally  [OED (Malawi),  Mar.  1989).
c.  Where  objectives  and  outputs  are  clearly  defIned  and
measurable,  they  are  more  likely  to  be  achleved.  Where
they  are  too  broad  to  be  operatlonal  and  expressed  in
terms  of  work  programs,  the  results  are  usually  lers  than
successful  [Makharita,  1983).
d.  Failure  to  Impose sub-project  plans  wlth  freestanding  TA
can  lead  to  a  divergence  between  the  alms  and  actual
objectives  of  sub-project  Implementatlon  [OED,  Mar.  1988).
e.  TA  proJects  should  not  lnclude  policy  conditlonalltles.
Rather  they  should  emphasize  the  development  of  longer-
term  technical  skills,  concentrating  the  more  sensitive
policy  Issues  In  the  sector  adjustment  operation  [views  of
project  staff--OED  (Kenya),  Mar.  1989,  para.  4.03].
20.  Recommendatlons
a.  Projects  should  be  less  sophisticated  and  more  closely
tallored  to  the  absorptive  capacity  of  the  recipient
(Storrar,  1982,  para.  6.4).
b.  There  Is  a  need  for  more  pre-identificatlon  of  end  uses  of
outputs  on  freestanding  projects  --  although  some
flexibillty  In  design  Is  desirable  [OED,  March  1988).
c.  Focus  on  a  few  manageable  and  achievable  objectives,  and
articulate  them  to  leave  - room  for  ambiguity  [Makharita,
1983,  para.  6.4).
d.  Project  briefs  and  staff  appralsal  reports  could  be
required  to  explicitly  demonstrate  that  the  design  of  the
project  takes  Into  account:  more  realism,  frankness,  and
modesty  In  project  objectives;  more  simplicity  In  design  and
less  dependence  on  long-term  TA; and  more  analysis  of  the
possIbilltles  for  tapping  or  hetping  develop  nongovernmental
organizations  (NGOs)  or  local  governments  (Wright  and  Risen,
1986,  paras.  21-22).- 49 - ANNEX  1
Inadequate  Diagnosis  of TA  Needs
21.  Many  of the  projects  reviewed  suffered  from  Insufficient or
imprecise  assessment  of  the borrower's  TA  needs.  Numerous  revlews
concluded  that  the  TA provided  often  did not correspond  to the  actual
needs  of  the  recipient  or  that  projects  were  overdesigned  due  to
unreallstlc  assessment  of the borrower's  capabilltles  [for example: OED,
March  1982,  March  1989;  Wright  and  Risen,  1986].  Furthermore,  local
staff  requirements  are  often  superficlally  estimated,  or  not
considered  at  all.  These  problems  stem  largely  from  the  absence  of
any  comprehensive  TA  planning  framework  wlth which  the  Bank  could
assist  borrowers  In Identifying and  planning  for  thelr  TA needs  and
from  the  lack of manpower  budgeting  on  the  part  of borrnwers.  They
are  also  partly  due  to a  lack of Involvement  of the borrower  In the
project  design  and  preparation  stages.
22.  Recipient  TA  needs  are  usually  assessed  on  a project-by-
project  basis,  rather  than  for a sector  or  the  economy  as  a whole.
Because  this "plecemeal"  approach  defines  TA  needs  within  the
boundaries  of specific projects,  the  Bank  often  falls to grasp  the
complete  scope  and  dimenslons  of recipient  needs.  The  lack of
comprehensive  TA planning  and  recipient  participation  In design  and
preparation  of  TA, combined  wlth  a  lack of  Institutional analysis,
commonly  lead to the  design  of TA projects  and  components  that  are
either  Inapproprlately  packaged,  poorly  targeted,  excessively  lavish,
or  Insufficlent for actual  needs.
2  3.  Botswana  provides  a positive  example  of how  comprehensive
and  coherent  planning  and  assessment  of  TA  requirements  can  lay the
groundwork  for more  effective  results.  TA  needs  are  assessed
primarily  through  manpower  budgeting  by ministry  and  sector,  combined
with  early  planning  for  the  allocatlon  of  TA  supply  through  bl-annual
and  annual  joint  revlews  between  donors  and  the  government.
Furthermore,  Botswana's  TA  requirements  are  assessed  for  the  economy
as  a  whole  rather  than  project  by  project.  This  rationalization  of  the
capacity-bullding  process  seems  to have  reduced  the conflict  between
the  need  to develop  Immedlate  project  Implementation  capacity
alongside  attempts  to strengthen  localizatlon of skills for the  long-
term; both  objectives  are  pursued  through  parallel but  separate
channels  [see  Raphaell,  et  al.,  et  al.,  1984].
24.  Training  activitles,  often  the  backbone  of  ID  efforts,  are
especially  prone  to  poor  needs  assessment.  An  OED  review  [Mar.  1982]
of  training  components  In  Bank-financed  projects  Identifled  the
following  deficlencies  In  diagnosing  tralning  needs:
(I)  Insufficlent  or  Imprecise  knowledge  of  needs;
(II)  Incorrect  assumptions  as  to  the  Importance  of  training  In
remedying  problems  of performance;
(III)  insufficient  clarificat,on  of  training  needs;- 50  - ANNEX 1
(Iv)  failure  to  recognize  and  provide  for  an  urgent  tralning  need
(as  distinct  from  a  TA  need);  and
(v)  deferring  the  determination  of  tralning  needs  to  the
Implementation  stage.
25.  OED found  the  most  persistent  problem  In  this  regard  was
that  "specificity  In  the  dlagnosis  of  a  tralning  need  tended  to  be  lost
once  TA  expertise  was  Included  In  the  proposed  project  compositlon  to
perform  an  executive  role  In  project  Implementatlon  --  Ironically,
especially  in  the  TA projects"  Cop.  cit.,  para.  2.24).  It  concluded  that
those  components  where  diagnosis,  deslgn,  and  preparatlon  were  of  a
high  standard  achieved  more  during  the  Implementatlon  stage.
26.  Recommendatlons
a.  The  Regions  need  to  undertake  Institutional  analysis  at
both  the  micro  and  macro  levels.  At  the  micro  level  this
should  Include  a  review  of  the  organization,  staffing  and
operations  of  target  Institutlons,  an  assessment  of  their
capacity;  and  a  diagnosis  of  their  most  serious  constraints.
At  the  macro  level,  this  should  Include  an  understanding  of
the  external  Institutlonal  and  policy  environments  In which
the  institutlon  operates,  especially  the  planning,  budgeting,
and  decision-making  mechanisms,  linkages  with  other
Institutions,  and  resource  constraints  facing  the  country
COED, May  1984,  para.  4.04).
b.  Borrowers  should  establIsh  a  TA  planning  framework  within  a
national  manpower  plan  tR.B.  Sunshine  Assoclates,  1985,  para.
2.52).
c.  The  Bank  should  make policy  changes  to  revlew  needs  for
continued  TA  at  the  end  of  the  project  construction  perlod
tStorrar,  1982).
Poor  Design  of  Training  Activities
27.  Tralning  Is  a  major  aspect  of  the  Bank's  TA activities.  A
study  of  TA  In  Sub-Saharan  Africa  found  that  when  nationals  are  not
available  to  fill  a  technical  need,  borrowers  place  a  great  deal  of
Importance  on  training  through  TA and  commitment  to  training
components  Is  likely  to  be  stronger  for  this  reason  [Storrar,  1982].
However,  there  appears  to  be  considerable  room  for  making  the  design
and  preparatlon  of  tralning  activitles  more  systematic  and  thorough.
An OED revlew  of  Bank-supported  TA to  Bangladesh  found  that  tralning
was  more  subject  to  deficlencies  of  design  than  any  other  aspect  of
TA [OED, Dec.  1982].  A  review  of  Bank-fInanced  project-related  training
observed  that  the  quality  of  preparation  and  design  of  tralning
components  Improved  slightly  In  FY87  over  the  previous  three  years- 51  - ANNEX  1
but  declined  sharply  In  FY88  [PHREE,  Feb.  1989];l  the  Asla  region  showed
the  strongest  decline,  and  Africa  achleved  the  best  overall  average
rating.
28.  What  are  the  elements  of  a  well-designed  training
component?  The  OED  revlew  of  TA to Bangladesh  [Mar.  1982)  concluded
that  the well designed  tralning components  shared  comnon
characteristics:  reasonably  close  attentlon  was  paid to  the  relevant
agency's  manpower  needs,  and  In Integrating  the  training component  Into
the  agency's  overall  development  Intentions; care  was  taken  In
Identifying the  sources  of prospective  tralnees  or  the  trainees
themselves;  the kind of tralning  required  was  carefully  determined;  and
local  training  resources  explored  [op.  cit.,  para.  3.07).
29.  OED  [Mar.  1982)  also  reviewed  several  tralning  components  of
projects  that  were  expected  to  lead to future  lending and  increased
absorptive  capacity.  ExplorIng  the  Bank's approach  to  Integrating
tralning wlth  TA, OED  discovered  that  often  the  Bank  assumed  that
each  project  would  be  the  last In the  serles  that  would  require
consultant  services to perform operatlonal tasks --  but each
successive  project  again  was  forced  to  rely  on  expatriate  services.
oED concludec  that this  continued  rellance  was due to the fact that
provislon  for  tralning  was often  only  an afterthought  at best.
Experience  also  suggests that  tralning  Is  often  placed  In  a context
where the real  thrust  of TA Is  at achievement  of rapid  Implementation
and short-term  productlon  objectives.  OED found  that in  those
projects  where the  Bank  knew In  advance  of Institutional  weaknesses
that  would  affect  project  Implementation,  It  was faced  with  two
cholces:
"One  was to proceed  with  a smaller,  predominantly  institutlon
buliding  tralning  project,  addressing  the defIciencies  In
preparation  for  future  larger-scale  lending,  and the other was to
proceed  with  tne original  ideas  of substantial  development
lending,  wlth,  however,  large  Injectlons  of TA as a  support  for,
or guarantee  of,  good project  Implementation.  The Bank  chose the
latter  course,  which  was more In  keeping  with  the tempo and
volume  of Its  already  determined  lending  program. Although
substantlal  tralning  components  were Included,  the  overall
proJect  orientation  was toward  rapid  achievements  in  the non-
tralning  areas,  which  placed  the tralning  components at a severe
disadvantage.  in  these  cases the eventual  outcomes suggest that
the first alternative --  that of a mainly training  project --
would  have been  more effective  In  the long  run;  Instead,  the
serious  manpower and institutional  difficulties  have remained  to
affect  subsequent  projects'  [op.  cit.,  para.  6.04).
One review  noted that,  typically,  "training  Is  simply  expected  to occur
automatically  as a by-product  of other TA activitles"  [Lethem  and
1 The criteria  used  for  assessment  of  preparatlon  and  design  quality
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Cooper,  1983,.  Indeed, OED  lamented  that what  ts of most  concern
regarding  training  Is not  that  It  Is  so  poorly  deslgned,  but  that  so
few  projects  make  any  provision  for  It  at  all  [CED  (Bangladesh),  Dec.
1982].
30.  Recommendatlons
a.  The  Bank  should  make  policy  changes  In  order  to  Increase
emphasis  on  tralning (especlally wlthin :-oJects).
Furthermore,  the  training fuictlon  should  be  separate  from
the development  function  [Storrar,  1982, para.  11.2).
b.  There  Is a need  to better  define  training activIties  at  the
deslgn  stage.  Bank  staff  need  to  be more  c;osely  Involved
with  relevant  agencles  In  identifying  their key manpower
needs  [OED,  Dec.  1982,  para.  5.30).
C.  Detailed  design  or  tralning  programs  should  be prepared
before  Board  presentation,  wlth  emphasis  on  short-term,  In-
country  training with  follow-up  and  refresher  sessions
[AFTPS,  1989,  p. 18].
d.  The  Bank  should  establIsh  limits  on  fellowshlis  and  overseas
training  In  those  areas  where  adequate  regional  and  local
tralning  Institutions  exist  Clb!c.j.
Vague  and  Imprecise  Terms  of  Reference
31.  One  of  the most  common  problems  relatec  to  desgn  of TA
projects/components  Is  imprecise  and  vague  terms  of  reference,
especlally  in  relation  to training  activlttes.  Training  activitles  are
often  left  up  to  the  consultant,  the  perscrnel  to  be  tra'ned  are  not
always Identifled,  and the  'ans  for  future Luse  of  trained pe-sonnel
are  not  always  clear.  Many  TA  assignments  are  overambiticus  In  scope,
function,  and timing. Often the  Inputs,  outnuts,  and  method  of
Implementatlon  are  not spelled  out  Ir  the  consultant's  terms  of
reference.  In  one project the president's  report stated Simply,
wlthout any further elaboratIor,  that the relevant agency "snou!d
initlate  a staff tralning  program'  B6anq!adesh,  Flrst Dacca  Water
Supply Project, Credit 368].  Ir  ano.her-, the terms of re,erence
proposed  In  the staff appralsa, report expected consultants  to
"provide cn-the-Job  training  to  the  technical  and  professional  staff"
without Indicating  the type of training  and what was  expected as  an
output  [Bangladesh,  Karnafull  IrrigatIon  Project,  Credit  6056.
32.  RecommendatIons
a.  Specific  outputs  and  objectIves  (with  bencnmarks  of
measurable  performance) should be Included  In  consultants'
terms  of  reference  [recommended  In  all  case  studles
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b.  More  precise  terms  of  reference  for  staff  are  required
[Storrar,  1982,  para.  6.4).
Inability  to  Measure  Objectives  and  Outputs/Conflicting  Objectives
33.  The  problem  of measuring  objectives  and  outputs  Is  likely  to
be more  prevalent  wlth  ID-related  TA  than  with  engineering-related  TA.
(in  the  latter case,  tne  outputs  are  usually capital  goods,  and  a
measure  of  the effectiveness  of  TA can  generally  be  a  plied.)  The
effectiveness  of training outPuts,  however,  and  especlally  other
measures  aimed  at  strengthening  Institutlonal capacity,  are  less
subject  to measurement,  and  as  of yet, no agreed-upon  methodology  has
been  developed  within the  Bank.  In a survey  of project-related  TA  In
five West  African  countrles  (involving 41 projects),  It  was  found  that
In  all cases  TA  objectives  were  unmeasurable  and  vague;  the objectives
could  be used  to determine  whether  the  TA had  been  delivered  as
planned,  but  not whether  It  was  effective  [Robinson,  1984].  An OED
review  of Bank  ID work  in Africa concluded  that  the  llmited Impact  of
ID components  was  often  attributable  to  the absence  of a systematic
approach  to  formulation  of objectives  and  found  that  objectives  were
often  Inconsistent  with  the  pollcy and  Institutional environment  of the
borrower,  "virtually assuring  disappointing  results"  [OED, May  1984].
34.  Another  maJor  pronlem  related  to TA  project  objectives
Involves  the  conflict  that  often  arises  between  the  need  for  quick
results  In the  short-term  ana  the  longer-term  objectives  of
strengthening  local cafacity.  The  eviews  exhibit a pattern  that
Indlcates  that  long-term  objectives  most  often  suffer  when  TA
projects  attermpt to ach!eve  totr  within a single project  cycle.  One
survey  noted  that  wnen  Investment  components  and  ID measures  are
"Inextricably bound  together'  (as is  usually  the  case  with proJect-
related  ID),  the  result  is often  Incompatibility of objectives;  In  the
end, the  ID measures  commoriy  receive  secondary  prlority  COED, May
1984].  Furthermore,  there  Is the Qossibillty  that  the  Bank may
exacerbate  ID problems  in  sucri  cases  by overloading  the  recipient  with
overly  ambitious  projects.
35.  Recommendaticn.  LOng-term  objectives  should  be  separated
from  short-term  objectives  and  training  should  be  separated  from
advisory  functions  and  f'-or  strictly consultancy  services  (AFTPS,  1989,
P. 18).
Excessive  Reliance  on  Lon_JTerm  Expatriates
36.  Many  TA  projects  and  components  rely  excessively  upon
expatriates  to Drodce  the  desired  outputs.  This approach  was
undoubtedly  viewed  as  the most  efficlent means  of "getting  the  job
done", particuiarly  before  the  1980s, when  TA was  oriented  more  toward
engineering-related  projects.  As  TA  Increasingly  plays  a role  In
policy formulatlon  for structural  reform  and  ID, the preferred
Instrument  of  delivery  has  remained  reliance on  long-term  expatrlate
vervIces.  This approacn  may  no  longer be  the  most  appropriate
Instrument for the tranc¢;-  rcc  S  P!5  and  allevIatIon  of the types of- 54  - ANNEX  1
problems  to which  the Bank  Is now  addressing  Itself.  There  are  two
primary  reasons  for  this: (1)  high costs  and  (2)  poor  transfer  effects.
37.  Compared  to  local salaries, expatriates  are  extremely
expensive,  and  the  results  of thelr work  are  not  always  tangible.
(Excessive  costs  are  often  cited  as one  reason  for  low borrower
commitment  to  TA  tLethem  and  Cooper,  1983;  OED  (Malawi),  1989].)  One
common  suggestion  for addressing  the problem  of overdependence  on
expatriates  Is to make  greater  use  of  local consultants.  The most
obvious  advantage  of this approach  Is reduced  costs.  A  revlew  of TA
projects  In Sub-Saharan  Africa  found  that  the  projects  with  the  lowest
appralsed  cost/month  Incorporated  substantial  use  of  local consultants
or tralning  lecturers  Into the  project  design.  This review  suggested
that  greater  use  of  local consultants  could  reduce  project  costs  by
as much  as  30  to 50  percent  overall  EAFTPS,  April 1989, p. 10].
However,  experience  demonstrates  that  care  must  be taken  In reliance
upon  local consultants.  In some  cases,  former  government  staff  have
been  employed  as  project  consultants  performing  tasks  that  should
have  been  performed  by  government  personnel,  whereby  TA  becomes  a
means  of  financing  the  government's  r--~rrert  costs  tBuyck, 1987).
38.  Recommendat  Ions
a.  The  Bank  should make  policy  changes  In order  to make
greater  use  of  visiting  agents  [Storrar,  1982,  para. 6.4].
b.  The  Bank  should  encourage  and  assist  in greater  use  of
local consultants.  This might  Involve  breaking  down  the
required  task  Into Its  component  actlvitles  and  then
assessing  which  activities  can  be undertaKen  by the
implementing  agency  within  Its present  capacity,  which  could
be  earmarked  for  local consultants,  and  which  would  require
the  services  of  foreign  consultants  tOED,  Dec.  1982,  para.
5.22].
c.  The  Bank  should:  (1)  assess  local consulting  capacities  and
Incorporate  explicit  mechanisms  for  using  and  developing  the
local  consultant  Industry  and  for  repatriating  quallfied
natlonals;  and (2)  formulate  human  resource  development
strategies  for all sectors  in which  substantial  TA  Is
financed  by  the Bank  [AFTPS,  1989, p. 18).
d.  Compilations  (country-by-country)  of quailtative  Inventories
of  local consultants  should  be made  [Wright  and  Rlsen, 1988,
para. 20).
e.  One  suggestion  discussed  by  an OED  mission  was  to make
more  use  of  the  system  of deputation  --  whereby  an
experlenced  officlal Is  given  a  leave  of  absence  from  normal
duties  to  join a project  team  where  he or  she  serves
essentlally  as  a local consultant.  During  this secondment,
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earned  by  local consultants,  paid  from  project  funds  [OED,
Dec.  1982, para. 5.24].
f.  The  Bank  should  develop  projects  that  focus  on  human
resource  development  Issues  In  a  country  or  sector  In  an
Integrated  fashion,  incorporating  supply  and  demand  factors
(especlally projects  that  focus  on  the development  of
higher-level  training  institutions  that  can  both  train  staff
and  sell consulting  services  to government  [ibid.].
9.  The  Bank  should  Improve  national  planning  of  TA  by  Improving
the  use  of  market  mechanisms  to  search  for  local  talent,
establishing  an  Inventory  of  sources  for  TA  for  cost-
effective  purposes,  and  making  efforts  to  repatrlate
nationals  who  have  left  the  country  [CODOP,  1987,  para.
3.15].
II.  IMPLEMENTATION-RELATED  PROBLEMS
Recrultment  Delays
39.  In  a  majority  of  the  projects  considered  in  the  reviews,
recruitment  problems  were  responsible  for  Implementation  delays.  A
review  of TA  In  the  Western  Africa  Region  found  that  the  average
estimated  duration  of  TA  projects  was  three  years;  this  was  shown  to
be  too  optimistic,  prlmerily  because  of  delays  In  recrulting  experts
and consultants  (Makharlta,  1983].  A review  ot  TA  In Bangladesh
observed  average  recruitment  delays  of 6-12 months  --  sometimes
several  years  [OED, Dec. 1982].  Delays  In  many  Instances  produced  much
higher  project  costs.  For  one  TA  project  In  Bangladesh,  project
costs  Increased  fourfold  over  the  appralsal  due  to  recruitment  delays.
In  others  tne  TA  component  was  never  Implemented  because  the  Bank
and central  government  ministrles  could  not  reach  agreement  on  TA
personnel.
40.  Recrultment  delays  may  be due  to the  failure to plan
carefully  In  the  design  and  preparation  stages,  or  because  the
recipient  agency  did not  feel a  strong  enough  need  for  the  TA and
dragged  its feet  on  recruitment,  or  simply because  of  time constraints
Imposed  by  the  phasing  of the  project  to which  the  TA  is related.  One
report  noted  that  borrower  governments  usually  take  longer  than  Is
estimated  In the  appralsals  to gear  up for  recruitment  of consultants
for  ID-related  TA, possibly  because  they  face  shortages  of qualifled
consultants  for  ID work  [OED, May  1984].  ;, an  Indoneslan  freestanding
TA project,  recruitment  was  delayed  because  of a  lack of pre-
ldentificatlon of  sub-projects.
41.  Recruitment  of  TA  oersonnel  under  Bank-financed  TA
projects  Is especlally  acute  for borrowers  because  all consultants  are
retained  by  the government  Itself, as opposed  to  the  financing agerncy.
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policy work  Is another  special problem  due  to the  unusually  rapid pace
of start-up  and  disbursement  operatlons  which  forces  borrowers  to
qulckly search  for talent  with expertise  In flelds where  the borrower
has  no prlor  experience:  He may  know  where  to find consultants  for
engineering-related  TA work, but  not  for economic  pollcy work.
42.  Recommendation.  Recruitment  delays  could  be  avoided  by
helping the  borrower  both  identify sources  of recruitment  and  brief
experts  and  consultants  on  the  project  and  the country  [ibid.,  para.
72).
Lack  of Counterparts  and  Problems  of  Training  Implementation
43.  Another  major  problem  contrlbuting  to  Implementatlon  delays
Is the  regular  shortage  of adequate  counterparts.  This may  result
elther  from  an  InsuffIclent  supply  of  appropriate  staff  or  from  an
unwillingness  on  the  part  of  the  reciplent  to  assign  counterpart  staff
due  to  a lack of commitment  to the  relevant  TA  project  or component.
44.  Training  activities  are  of course  usually  fundamental  to
successful,  sustainable  TA  results  (at  least  where  the  development
activity  requirlng  tralning  Is  expected  to  continue  for  the  medium  to
long  term).  However,  it  was  found  that  during  project  Implementatlon,
tralning  activities  are  commonly  given  lower  priority  than  technical
activitles, especially  In  engineerlng-related  TA.  Many  consultants
commented  that  they  were  evaluated  on the  basis  of their  technical
output,  not  their  success  with  training  activities, and  therefore  felt
InclIned to concentrate  thelr  energies  on technical  performance.
Others  complained  that  they  achieved  little  wlth  respect  to  training
because  counterparts  were  often  selected  not  on  the  basis  of their
technical  competence  but  on  polltical  or  family  grounds.
45.  Recommendatlons
a.  The  avallability of counterpart  staff  should  be ensured,
specific agreements  on this matter  should  be made  during
negotiatlons,  and  strict  control  measures  should  be  built
Into  the  legal  covenants.  The  Bank  should  adopt  a  much
firmer  attitude  toward  the  release  of  funds  where  adequate
counterparts  are  not  provided  [Makharita,  1983,  para. 70).
b.  The  Bank  should  make  pollcy  changes  In  order  to  apply
sanctlons  where  recipients  fall to provide  agreed-upon
project  services  and  resources.  Where  local funding  Is
Inadequate  and  adequate  counterparts  have  not  been
provided,  the  Bank  should  not  release  project  funds
[Storrar,  1982, para. 11.2).
Consultant  Performance  and  the Nature  of Assignments
46.  Numerous  revlews  cited  either  poor  selection  or
perfor.mance  of expatrlates  and/or  an  unwillilngness  to work  closely
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averslon  to  tralning  activitles)  [OED:  (Bangladesh),  Dec.  1982;  (Malawi),
Mar.  1S89;  Robinson,  1984].  The  OED  review  of  TA  to  Bangladesh  found
that  poor  selection  and/or  performance  of  expatriates  was  a  prlmary
or  contributing  factor  to  Implementatlon  problems  In  23%  of  the  cases
where  Implementation  problems  were  observed.  Most  often,  consultants
are  selected  solely on  the  basis  of their technical  expertise,  not
their tralning  skills.  Thus,  the criteria  used  for selecting
expatriates  may  not  take  Into account  motivational  factors  or  the
ability of the  expatriate  to communlcate  effectively  to counterparts.
47.  Often  consultants  become  abaorbed  wlth  llne dutles
(regardless  of what  thelr  terms  of reference  may  be) and  wlth  "putting
out  fIres." (This appears  to be typical of many  freestanding  TA
projects.)  In a case  study  of freestanding  TA  In Togo  It was  found
that  some  consultants  located  In  ministries  without  specific terms  of
reference  were  occupied  by day-to-day  operatlonal  tasks  and
essentlally  served  to  respond  to the dally priorities  of the Minister
[KJellstrom  and  d'Aimelda, 1987].  The  report  concluded  that  In this
type  of environment  "the contrlbutlon  of such  technical  assistance  to
policy  formulation  and  ID can  be  very  limited....  Such  ad  hoc  technical
assistance  tends  to disorganize  existing structures  and  discourages
natlonal  staff  by  the  prominent  role played  by  such  technical
assistants  In  dally operatlonal  matters"  Cop.  cit.,  para. 85].  A review
of TA  to Bangladesh  surmised  that, out  of 85  TA components,  at  least
four  provided  support  activitles, when  a more  direct  ID approach  would
have  been  preferable  [OED, Dec. 1982].  While such  roles  may  be
occasionally  required  of TA  personnel  simply In order  to fulfill  the
functions  required  of an agency  on a short-term  basis, the  authors  of
the  Togo  study  urge  the  Bank  to avold  situations  where  "operational
expedlency...take[s] precedence  over  the  longer-term  objective  of
bullding up a natlonal  capability  for the management  of economic
affalrs" Cop.  cit.,  para.  55].  !t was  further  observed  that  "if  technical
assistants  are  not working  themselves  out  of existence  by  fI!ling  a
training  role, [government]  staff  see  llttle justificatlon  for  their
irritating presence"  [para. 86].
48.  Another  problem  related  to consultant  services  Is the
nature  of the  relationship  between  consultants  and  thelr counterparts.
Explanations  of this relatlonship  are  frequently  neglected  In the
design  stage,  and  problems  are  more  likely to occur  durIng
Implementatlon  when  the  terms  of reference  do  not  dellneate  the
division of responsibillty  between  the  two.  Too  often,  the counterpart
serves  merely  as  an  observer  to the consultant  and  has  llttle
opportunity  to apply  new  skills supposedly  developed  during  training.
In the  Togo  case  study  cited  earlier, counterparts  came  to be
considered  support  staff  for  expatriates  when  the  expatriates  were
busy  meeting  wlth  the Mlnister.  This  led to  friction between
expatriates  and  counterparts  and  had  a deleterlous  effect  on  the
morale  of national  staff  and  the  transfer  of skills.
49.  An OED  review  of freestanding  TA  In  Kenya  noted  that
consultants  played  a critical role by  establishing  "their role as  a
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take  decislons.  The  advisors  concentrated  on  putting  a  mechanism  In
pla:e...not  on  doing  the  work"  [OED (Kenya),  Mar.  1989,  para.  5.07).  This
Is  an  example  of  how  consultants  can  help  transfer  technical  skills  --
an  approprlate  role  for  consultants  and  experts,  especially  In  ID work.
50.  Lesson.  TA  will  be  most  effective  when  a  project  Is  strong
In  counterpart  Involvement  and  staff  performancs  [Robinson,  1984).
51.  RecommendatIons
a.  Exoerts  should  be  selected  not  only  on  the  basis  of  thelr
technical  expertise  but  also  on  the  basis  of  their  tralning
capability  [Storrar,  Aug.  1982,  para.  6.4).
b.  The  Bank  should  make  policy  changes  In  order  to  make
available  job  descriptlons  to  governments  at  a  date  early
enough  to  allow  them  time  to  consider  these  before
negotlatlons  [Ibid.,  para.  11.2).
c.  The  Bank  needs  to  take  more  careful  preparatlon  In  defining
the  line  of  responsibillty  of  consultants  and  their
relationships  wlth  local  counterparts  [Wright  and  Risen,
1986,  para.  5.30).
d.  The  Bank  should  focus  more  on  performanc  .n  the  deslgn  of
tasks  and  In  the  selection  and  evaluation  of  consultants,
as  well  as  make  more  use  of  consultants  from  other
developing  countries  [ibid.].
Management  and  Supervislon
52.  Intensive  management  and  supervision  of  TA  has  proven  to
be  Indispensable  to  successful  implementatlon  and  achlevement  of  TA
objectives.  In  one  West  African  survey  Involving  a  forty-project
sample  (both  project-related  and  freestanding  TA),  It  was  found  that
what  most  frequently  contributed  to  TA  strength  or  weakness  was
micro-level  management  [R.B.  Sunshine  and  Assoc.,  Apr.  1985).  Case
studies  abound  where  vigilant,  attentive  supervision  of  TA  activitles
proved  to  be  the  saving  factor  In  successful  TA  components/projects
COED  (Kenya),  Mar.  1989;  Buyck,  Oct.  1987;  Makharita,  Apr.  1983).
However,  In  practice,  these  cases  are  the  exceptlons  that  prove  the
rule;  It  appears  that  a  great  number  of  Bank  TA  projects  suffer  simply
(and  unnecessarily)  from  management's  neglect  or  from  supervision
misslons  focussing  on  procedural  problems,  rather  than  on  the  guidance
of  ID work.
53.  Intensive  suoervision  and  management  of  TA  related  to
structural  adjustmen*  loans  Is  particularly  Important.  TA  projects  In
support  of  structural  adjustment  loars  are  typically  very  broad  in
scope,  polltically  sensitive,  and  temporally  constralned.  One  survey
[R.B.  Sunshine  and  Assoc.,  1985]  observed  that  these  factors  create
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replacement  of  three  different  Ministers  of Planning  during  the
project's  three-year  period.  In Somalla  (Credit 821-SO), the Director
of the  Technical  Department  o' the Mlnistry  associated  with  the
project  was  replaced  three  times  In the  first two  years  of
Implementatlon.  Such  changes  of senior  staff often  are  accompanied  by
changes  In polIcles, and  In the case  of Togo,  this proved  to  be
detrimental  to medium-term  project  objectives.  In another  case,  an
engineering-relai.ed  TA  project  that  was  already  being  imolemented  was
terminated  when  a  Minlster  was  replaced  by one  less  inclined  to
co,.tlilue  support  for  the  project  [OED, Dec. 1982].
60.  Finally, there  is the  possibIllity  that  the  reciplent  will be
unable  to use  the  consultants'  output.  Indeed,  In  many  cases  It Is
likely that  the proposals  and  recommendatlons  of a consultant  are  as
highly  technical  and  skill-demanding  as  his  or  her  services,  and
therefore  require  his  or  her  guldance.  Typically,  however,  TA
personnel  leave  the  country  or,ce they  have  presented  thelr proposals.
In such  circumstances,  the  recipient  may  be  left  to  grapple  wlth
technical  work  beyond  available  capacity  (especlally  If  tralning  has  not
been  provided  for).  Regardless  of  the quality of the  consultant's  work,
the  entire  exercise  might  be  made  futile  by  a  lack  of  administrative
capacity  to  act  upon  the  consuitant's  recommendations.
61.  Rccornrendations
a.  To  st-engthen  the  capacity  of  Implementing  agencies,  the
task  o, managing  complex  technical  assignments  might  be
undertaken  by  the  imDlementing  agency  itself  - and  not  by
overseas  consulting  firms  [OED,  Dec.  1982,  para.  5.24].
b.  It is  important  triat  Reglonal  Senior  Management  stress  the
prlority  attached  to  developing  the  capabilltles  of  local
Institutions  ir,  our  assistance  strategy  [Wright  and  Risen,
1986,  para  19J.
c.  It  Is  necessary  to  create  an  environment  for  simpler  and
more  performance-ortented  government  Institutions  by
helping governmerts  assess  reallstically their bureaucratic
capacities.  Where  the  fosterlng  of this environment  is not
feasible,  the  T3nk  should  focus  on  building  up  non-
governmental  in.tltutlons  [Ibid.,  para.  20].
d.  The  Bank  should  make  the  development  of  local  policy  deslgn
and  Implementation  institutions  a  major  goal  of  country
strategies  and  snould  develop  projects  that  aim  at  this
over  the  long run [Ibid.].
e.  It  may  be  advisable  for  the Bank  to assist  governments  to
revlew  the  final  oroposals  of  consultants  and  to provide
assistance  In  putting  them  Into  action  [OED,  Dec.  1982].
f.  Debriefing  repc  ts  the  end  of  a  misslon,  either  In  the
form  of  ml3s!0ro  roCm.  'O  reports  or  a  memorandum  to  the- 62  - ANNEX  1
government  will  be  required.  Borrowers  should  be  asked  not
to  release  the  balance  due  to  the  Individual  expert  or
contractor  until  after  a  debriefing  Is  done  In  a  manner
acceptable  to  both  the  Bank  and  the  borrower  [Makharita,
1983,  para.  74].
Coordinatlon
62.  Thus  far,  borrowers  and  donors  have  taken  little  action  to
coordinate  TA.  Coordination  must  take  place  at  several  levels:  within
a  project  (as  with the  sub-proJects  of  freestanding  TA),  sectorally,
country-wide,  and  among  donors.  Lack  of  coordination  results  In
dissipatlon  of  resources,  duplication,  poor  allocatlon  of  priorities,  and
contradictory  advice  from  different  groups  In  the  fleld.  At  present,
there  appears  to  be  signifIcant  potential  to  Improve  the  efficiency  of
TA  delivery  through  greater  coordinatlon,  especially  among  donors.
(One  survey  of  TA  In  Sub-Saharan  Africa  observed  that  the  percentages
co-flnanced  and  the  shares  provided  by  bor-rowers  were  considerably
higher  for  project-related  TA  than  freestanding  TA.  This  could  Imply
that  g-eater  coordination  among  donors  occurs  with  project-related  TA
because  of  famillarity  wlth  this  mechanism,  or  because  of  a  lack  of
Interest  in  pollcy-orlented,  freestanding  TA  fAFTPS,  1989,  pg.  10-11].)
63.  As  mentioned,  coordination  Is  especially  diffIcult  under
freestanding  TA,  due  to  the  often  multi-institutional  and  multl-
sectoral  nature  of  this  lending.  Structural  adjustment  loans,  for
example,  are  managed  by  central  government  agencies,  which  are  also
responsible  for  back-stopping  the  various  ministries  charged  with  the
manage,ment  of  the  accompanying  TA  activitles.  Central  agencies
therefore  face  the  difficult  task  of  coordinating  and  supporting
Implementation  of  SAL-related  TA  projects  wlttiout  asserting  control
over  the  Implementing  ministries.  The  decentrailzed  nature  of  such  TA
loans  requires  critical  coordination  between  what  are  often  polltlcally
competitive  entities.  If  this  coordination  Is  not  forthcoming,  the  TA
proJect  can  be  seriously  compromised.
64.  Recommendat Ions
a.  The  Bank  should  enlarge  cont  'cts  with  governments,  donors,
and  agencies  to:  register  all  on-going  TA,  maintain  this
register,  and  make  It  available  -o  donors  at  all  times;  and,
initlate  discussion  wlth  major  suppliers  o.  TA  to  arrange
Interchange  of  Information  on  suitable  staff  [Storrar,  1982,
para.  11.2].
b.  Coordination  has  been  too  Informal  anid  ad  hoc.  It  would
seern  desirable  for  donors  to  agree  on:  (I)  a  singie
publication  to  be  published  regularly  either  by  UNDP or  the
Bank;  (Ii)  a  common  definition  of  TA;  (III)  a  common
categorization  of  TA  by  sector;  (Iv)  a  method  for  calculating
the  value  for  TA;  and,  (v)  some  method  for  allocating
commitments  to  an  agreed  time  frame  COED, Dec.  1982,  para.
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c.  For  better  management  of TA, Programs  Dlvislons  should
become  the  focal point  for coordinating  TA at  the country
level  [Wright  and  Risen,  1986, para. 20J.
d.  To  Improve  coordinatlon  It  Is  suggested  that  the  Bank
Increase  staff-time  allocations  for  ,upervislon of TA,
formalize  ground  rules  for  supervision  of  freestanding  TA  in
support  of  structural  adjustment  loan and collaboratlon
between  programs  and  projects  departments,  and  strengthen
In-house  TA management  [from a Jamaican  study  In R.B.
Sunshine  Assoc.,  1985,  para.  2.50).
e.  The  Bank  should  undertake  an  Inventory  of  existing  TA  and
should  assist  borrowers  In  managing,  coordinating,  and
evaluating  TA  from  all  sources  tAFTPS,  1989,  p.  18).
f.  It  will  be  necessary  to  assist  governments  In  developing  an
Information  system  regarding  TA.  A  register  of  all  on-
golng  TA  will  be  maintained  and  systematically  updated  for
the  benefIt  of  the government  and  aid agencles  [planned  for
West  Africa  Reglon  --  Makharlta,  Apr.  1983,  para.  79).
g.  The  Bank  should  make  pollcy  changes  In  order  to  Improve
exploitation  of  on-going  TA.  Toward  this  end  the  Bank
should  require  all missions,  especially  project  preparatlon
missions,  to examine  how  TA already  belng provided  may  be
exploited  before  recommending  additlonal  provisions
[Storrar,  1982, para. 11.2].
Sustainablilty:  Retention  of  Trainees
55.  In  the  vast  majority  of  cases  reviewed,  It  was  observed
that  the  relevant  agencles  were  unable  to  retain  a  significant
proportion  of  the  staff  tralned  under  TA  projects  COED  (Kenya  and
Malawl),  Mar.  1989;  Storrar,  1982).  This  obviously  has  serious
Implicatlons  for  the  sustalnability  of  TA  results.  This  problem  arises
under  two  sets  of  conditions:  (1)  when  the  trainee  Is  sent  overseas  on
a  fellowship  he  or  she  may  not return;  or (2)  when  the  trainee  leaves
public  service  after  receiving  tralning  to  seek  a  higher  salary  and/or
better  working  conditions  In the  private  sector.  In  one  Kenyan  case
study,  fallure to anticipate  In the design  stage  the  exogenous  problem
of poor  salary  Incentives  for nationals  (especially when  they  were  to
acquire  skills In high demand)  proved  fatal  for a major  TA component:
economists  trained  overseas  either  did not  return  or chose  not  to
enter  the civil service  upon  return  to Kenya  COED (Kenya), Mar.  1989).
One  study  found  that  the more  Institution-specific  the  skills acquired
by  tralnee:,  the more  likely  the  Institution will retaln  the  trained
personnel  COEO,  May  1984).
66.  Attempts  have  been  made  In  West  Africa  to deal  with hlgh
turnover  of personnel  by  occaslonally  making  provislons  for  salary
supplements  In the project  deslgn.  The  disadvantages  of  this approach- 64  - ANNEX  I
are: reduced  mot  ation  of those  not  receiving  salary  supplements;
bureaucratic  rivalries; and  upward  pressures  on civil service  wages
across  the  board.  Nevertheless,  despite  the potential  harm  this
practice  may  have  on  sustalnability,  one  review  found  that  Bank  staff
often  feel this  Is the only way  (gIven  low salaries  and  low morale)  to
motivate  local staff  to  the  level of conunitment  required  by  the  tasks
at  hand  (AFTPS,  1989J.- 65  - ANNEX 1
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LIST  OF  FREE-STANDING  TA  PROJECTS
APPROVED  IN  THE  FY82-88  PERIOLD
Country  Project  Title  Approval  Loan  Amt.
Date  (US*mIl)
AFRICA  REGION
Malawl  Lilongwe  Water  Supply  Engin.  6/82  4.0
Rwanda  TA  ProJect  2/82  5.0
Madag.  Agric.  Instits.  TA  4/82  5.7
Ben/Togo  Power  Eng.  &  TA  4/82  3.8
DJibouti  TA  ProJect  4/82  3.0
Tanzanla  Third  TA  Project  1/82  12.0
Togo  Second  TA  Project  5/82  3.5
Sierra  L.  Pow.  Sector  Eng.  &  TAP  4/82  5.0
Ivory  C.  TA  Project  12/81  16.0
Zalre  Ag,  TAP  4/82  5.0
Mall  ODIPAC  TAP  7/81  6.5
Kenya  Petro.  Exploration  Promo.  11/81  4.0
Uganda  Phosphate  Engineerlng  3/82  4.0
Benin  Petro.  Sector  1/82  8.0
Maurita.  Petro.  Exploration  Promotlon  8/81  3.0
Zambia  Indenl  RefInery  Modif.  Engineerlng  4/82  5.1
Cameroon  Post  &  Telecommunicatlons  TAP  11/81  7.5
Zambla  Petro.  ExploraLlon  Promotion  4/82  6.6
Kenya  Agric.  TA  6/82  6.0
Congo  TA  Project  5/83  11.0
Mall  Econ.  Mgmt.  and  Tralning  11/82  10.4
Zaire  Petro.  Sector  TAP  4/83  4.5
Zaire  GECAMINES  TAP  3/83  7.0
Zimbabwe  Rural  Afforestation  4/83  7.3
Ghana  Energy  Project  5/83  11.0
Maurita.  Second  TAP  9/82  4.6
Niger  Water  Supply  11/82  6.5
Ethiopia  Petro.  Explor.  Promo.  &  Geoth.  5/83  7.0
Senegal  Phosphate  Ind.  Devlpt  Engineerlng  4/83  7.7
Zambia  Maamba  Coal  Engin.  2/83  4.3
Tanzania  Coal  Engineering  5/83  6.3
Equat.  G.  Petro  Sector  TAP  11/82  2.4
Zimbabwe  Petro.  Fuels  Supply  TAP  9/82  1.2
Nlger  Econ.  and  Fin.  Mgmt.  improvement  5/84  11.7
Senegal  Second  Parapublic  TAP  6/83  11.0
Uganda  Second  TA  Project  12/83  15.0
Burundi  Third  TA  Project  3/84  5.1
Ghana  Export  Rehab.  TA  12/83  17.1
Mauritlus  TA  Project  11/83  5.0
Eq.  Guln.  TA  Project  5/84  8.0
Senegal  Urban  Mgmt.  and  Rehab.  TAP  3/84  8.0
Nigerla  Gas  TAP  2/84  25.0
Malawi  Second  TAP  11/83  1.5-68  - ANNEX  2
Maurita.  Second  Rural  Sector  TAP  9/83  8.1
Country  Project  Title  Approval  Loan  Amt.
Date  (USSmiI)
Zlmbabwe  Rallway  Developmnert  7/83  40.0
Guinea  Petro.  Exploratlon  Promotlon  12/83  8.0
Ghana  Petro.  RefInery  Rehab  TAP  2/84  3.9
Burkina  F.  Perkoa  Mining  Explor.  and  TAP  5/84  7.4
GuInea  Conarky  Urban  Development  4/84  10.7
Rwanda  Improv.  of  Pub.  Fin.  Mgmt.  3/85  4.8
Gulnea  B.  TA  ProJect  8/84  6.0
Nigeria  TA  ProJect  11/84  13.0
Benin  TAP  for  Planning  and  Econ.  Mgmt.  11/84  5.0
Ethlopla  TAP  8/84  4.0
Sudan  Petroleum  TAP  6/84  12.0
Liberia  Second  Petro.  Sector  TAP  3/85  2.6
Tanzania  Fourth  TAP  8/84  10  0
Zaire  Educatlon  TA  and  Training  8/84  9.0
Guinea  TAP  for  Econ.  Mgmt.  2/85  9.5
Kenya  Nalrobi  Third  Water  Supply  3/85  6.0
CAR  Second  TAP  3/85  8.0
Tanzania  Petroleum  Sector  TAP  5/85  8.0
Uganda  Petroleum  Exploration  Promo.  2/85  5.1
Guinea  Second  Power  Ergin.  &  TAP  4/85  6.0
Nigeria  Transport  Parastatals  6/86  20.9
Somalia  Livestock  Healtn  Services  12/85  4.3
Kenya  Petro.  Explorat;on  TAP  2/86  6.0
Nlgeria  Industry  TAP  8/85  5.0
Togo  'hird  TAP  6/85  6.2
Madagas.  Second  Ag.  Instits.  DeveloDr,ent  5/86  10.0
Zambia  Second  TAP  3/86  8.0
Botswana  Selebi-Prlkwe  TAP  4/86  7.6
Senegal  irrigation  TAP  10/85  4.9
Madagas.  Accounting  &  Mgmt.  Training  1/86  10.3
Rwanda  Sectoral  &  Preinvest.  Studies  4/87  7.4
Kenya  Agric.  Sector  Mgmt.  6/86  11.5
Ghana  Structural  Aai  Instit.  Support  3/87  10.8
Lesotho  Lesotho  Highlands  Water  Engin.  ,1/86  9.8
Guinea-B.  Ag.  Services  4/87  3.7
Congo  Second  TAP  8/86  4.0
Burundi  Econ.  &  Public  Enterprlse  Mgmt.  4/87  7.5
Sudan  Public  Enterprise  &  Econ.  Mgmt.  4/87  9.0
Chad  Agricultural  Rehabilltation  3/87  17.4
Gulnea-B.  Second  TAP  6/88  9.7
Mall  Public  Enterprise  Instit.  Devlpt.  5/88  9.5
Zalre  Econ.  Mgmt.  &  ID  ProJect  6/87  12.0
Chad  Econ.  &  FIn.  Mgmt.  12/87  12.8
Maurita.  Development  Management  11/87  10.0
Congo  Pubilc  EnterDr!se  ID  6/87  15.2- 69  - ANNEX  2
SomalIa  TA  for  Baardhere  Project  11/87  5.8
Zaire  Higher  Educ.  Rationalization  6/87  11.0
Country  Project  Title  Approval  Loan  Amt.
Date  (US$mIl)
Niger  Public  Enterprise  ID  6/87  5.5
Senegal  Development  Mgmt.  4/88  17.0
Ghana  Public  Enterprises  8/87  10.8
ASIA  REGION
Indonesia  Sixteenth  irrig.  3/82  37.0
India  Andhra  Pradesh  Ag.  Ext.  3/82  8.0
Nepal  Petro.  Exploration  Promotion  5/82  f  2
Phillip.  Urban  EngIneerlng  11/81  8.0
Sri  Lanka  Forest  Resources  Devipt.  12/82  9.0
Bangla.  Business  Mgmt  Educ.  &  Training  12/82  7.8
Indonesia  Central  Java  Pulp  &  Pa,per  Engin.  8/82  5.5
Pap.  N.G.  Petro.  Exploratlon  -AP  6/82  3.0
Nepal  Second  TAP  5/83  8.0
Bangla.  Fifth  TAP  1/84  25.0
Bangla.  Petro.  Exploratlon  Promotion  6/83  23.0
Bhutan  TAP  9/83  3.0
China  Technical  Cooperatlon  Proj.  8/83  10.0
Nepal  Karnali  Perparation  Project-Phs  I  3/84  11.0
Phililp.  Telecommunlcations  TAP  1/85  4.0
China  Welyuan  Gas  Field  TAP  5/85  25.0
Malaysia  Sabah  Forestry  TAP  5/85  6.5
Sri  Lanka  Municipal  Mgmt.  4/86  13.0
China  Second  Tech.  Coop.  Project  2/86  20.0
China  Llaodong  Bay  Petro  Appralsal  5/86  30.0
China  Planning  Support  &  Spec.  Studies  6/87  20.7
PhilIlp.  Economic  Recovery  TAP  2/87  10.0
Indonesia  Tele.  TAP  9/86  14.5
Indonesia  Railway  TAP  10/87  28.0
EMENA  REGION
Pakistan  TA  Project  5/82  7.0
YAR  Petro.  &  Geo.  Explor.  Promo.  2/82  2.0
Tunisia  TA  Project  8/82  4.5
Pakistan  RefInery  Eng.  &  Egy.  Effic.  11/82  12.0
Pakistan  Coal  Engineering  4/83  7.0
Portugal  Ag.  Services  5/84  7.4
Egypt  Water  Supply  &  Sewer.  Eng.  10/83  4.0
Tunisia  Mlning  TA  8/83  13.4
Turkey  TA  Proj.  for  SEEs  3/84  7.8
Paklistan  Second  TAP  5/84  7.0
Turkey  Cukurova  Region  Urb.  Eng.  4/85  9.2
YAR  TA  Proj.  to  Central  Planning  Org.  2/85  4.7- 70  - ANNEX  2
YAR  TA  Proj.  to  Petro.  Sector  4/88  12.0
Counr  Project  Title  Approval  Loan  Amt.
Date  (US$miW)
Pakistan  Third  TA  12/86  7.0
Tunisia  Energy  Conserv.  Demonstratlon  6/86  4.0
Algeria  Irrigation  Engineerlng  5/88  14.0
LAC  REGION
Jamalca  TA  Project  2/82  8.1
Peru  Petro.  Refinerles  Engin.  3/82  5.3
Guyana  Petro.  Exploratlon  Promotlon  1/82  2.0
Barbados  TAP  2/8.'  2.7
Dom.  Rep.  Santo  Dom.  Munic.  TAP  5/83  7.1
Peru  PSM  Project  12/82  10.2
Brazil  Prep.  of  Metropolitai,  nev.  Progs.  7/82  8.9
Mexico  Prep.  of  Deconcentration  PHog.  6/82  9.2
Jamalca  Public  Admin.  Reform  5/84  4.5
Panama  TA  Project  10/83  5.0
Colombla  Coal  Exploratlon  9/83  9.5
Dom.  Rep.  Itabo  Coal  Terminal  &  Pow.  Eng.  11/83  3.8
Jamalca  Second  TAP  2/85  9.0
Ecuador  PSM  Project  3/85  8.0
Costa  R.  TA  Project  3/85  3.5
Chile  PSM  TAP  2/85  11.0
Peru  Industrial  Egy  Conserv.  &  Rational.  4/85  4.0
Uruguay  Power  Engineering  12/84  4.0
Brazil  PSM  Project  5/86  29.0
Ecuador  Power  Sector  Improvement  5/86  8.5
Argentina  PSM  TAP  5/86  18.5
Peru  Power  Engineering  II  6/85  13.5
BolIva  Power  Rehab.  5/87  6.8
Guatemala  Water  Supply  Rehab.  8/86  23.0
Bolivia  Public  Fln.  Mgmt.  5/87  11.5
Haiti  TA  Project  4/87  3.0
Guyana  TAP  for  Bauxite  Industry  7/86  7.0
Honduras  Rural  Prim.  Educ.  Mgmt.  4/87  4.4
Uruguay  TA  Project  5/87  1.0
Argentina  Power  Engineerlng  8/86  14.0
SUMMARY  (Number  of  Projects  by  Region  and  Year)
REGION  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  Total
Africa  18  15  16  15  10  9  11  94
Asla  4  5  5  3  3  3  1  24
EMENA  2  3  5  2  1  2  1  16
LAC  4  4  4  6  4  8  0  30ANNEX 3
FYS2-88  TRENDS:  STATISTICAL  APPENDIX- 71  - ANNEX  3
GENERAL TRENDS
Table  1:  Total  TA  Activitles  as  a  Percentage  of  Total
Lending,  FY82-88  (USS  million)
Table  2:  ID-Related  TA  Activities  as  a  Percentage  of
Total  Lending,  FY82-88  (USS million)
Figure  1A:  Reglonal  Dlstrlbutlon  of  nk  Lending  for  TA,
FY82-88  Average  (%)
Figure  IB:  TA  as  a  Proportion  of  Total  Regional  Lending,
FY82-88  (%)
Figure  2:  Regional  Distrlbution  of  Bank  Lending  for
ID-Related  TA.  FY82-88  Average  (%)
SECTORAL TRENDS
Figure  3:  Sectoral  Dlstributlon  of  Bank  Lending  for  TA,
FY82-88  Average  (%)
Table  3:  Sectoral  Distribution  of  Bank  Lending  for  TA,
FY82-88  (USS million)
Figure  4:  Sectoral  Distribution  of  Bank  Lending  for
ID-Related  TA,  FY82-88  Average  (%)
Table  4:  Sectoral  Distribution  of  Bank-Lending  for  ID-
Related  TA,  FY82-88  (USS  million)
Flgure  TA  Lending  by  Sector:  ID-Related  vs.  Other  TA,
5E-L:  FY82-88  (USS  million)
Figure  6A:  Sectoral  Distribution  of  Bank  Lending  for TA,
by  Region:  Africa,  FY82-88  Average  (%)
Table  5A:  Sectoral  Distribution  of  Bank  Lending  for  TA  for
Region:  Africa,  FY82-88  (USS million)
Flgure  8B:  Sectoral  Distrlbution  of  Bank  Lending  for  TA
by  Region:  Asia,  FY82-83  Average  (%)
Table  58:  Sectoral  Distribution  of  Bank  Lending  for  TA by
Region:  Asla,  FY82-88  (USS  million)
Figure  SC: Sectoral  Distribution  of  Bank  Lending  for  TA by
uy  Reglon:  EMENA, FY82-88  Average  (%)
Table  5C:  Sectoral  Distribution  of  sank  Lending  for  TA  by
Region:  EMENA, FY82-88  (USS Mi!lo"i)- 72  - ANNEX  3
Figure  SD: Sectoral  Dlstributlon  of  Bank  Lending  for  TA
by  Reglon:  LAC, FY82-88  Average  (%)
Table  SD:  Sectoral  Distribution  of  Bank  Lending  for  TA  by
Reglon:  LAC,  FY82-88  (in  USS millilon)
FREE-STANDING  AND  PROJECT-RELATED  TA
Table  6:  Total  Bank  Lending  for  TA  by  Reglon  and  Delivery
Mode,  FY82-88  (USS mlilon)
Table  7:  Total  ID-Related  TA  Activitles  by Region  and
DelIvery  Mechanism,  FY82-88  (In  USS  m  IlIon)
Table  8:  Total  ID-Related  TA  Activitles  by  Delivery
Mectianism,  FY82-88  (In  USS mlllon)
Flgure  7:  Volume  of  Project-Related  TA,  FY82-88
(USS  mllilon)
Figure 8:  Volume  of  Free-Standing  TA,  FY82-88  (USS million)
Figure  9:  Volume  of  ID-Related  TA  by  DelIvery  Mechanism,
FY82-88  (USS  mlillon)
Flgure  10:  ID-Related  TA  as  a  Proportlon  of  Total  Project-
Related  TA,  FY82-88  (%).
Figure  11:  ID-Related  TA  as  a  Proportion  of  Total
Freestanding  TA (FY82-88)  (%)
Figure  12:  Regional  Distributlon  of  PSM Projects,  FY82-88
Average  (X)
TRAINING
Table  9:  Training  and  Expert/Consultant  Components  of
Freestanding  TA  Activitles,  FY82-88  (in
US$  million)
Table  10:  Training  and  Expert/Consultant  Components  of
Project-Related  TA  Activitles,  FY82-88  (In
USS  million)
Flgure  13:  Regional  Dlstributlon  of  Total  Volume  of  Training,
FY82-88  Average  (%)
Figure  14:  Percentage  Change  of  Total  TA  Resources  Devoted
to  TraInIng,  FY83-88  (%)- 73  - ANNEX  3
TabLe 1
TOTAL  TA ACTIVITIIS
AS  A PIECINYArA  OF  TOTAL  LENDING,  FY82-06
(in  US$ million
....................................................................................................
FY82  FY83  FY54  FY85  FY806  FY87  FY88  TOTAL  AVERAGE
..............
Totat  TA  1175.4  1315.5  1153.0  1216.7  1224.2  1070.2  1196.3  8353.3  1193.3
Totot  Lending  13015.9  14477.0  15522.3  14378.6  1651  1895.4  19333.3  11176.6  15953.8
Percent  9.03  9.1%  7.43  8.5X  7.33  5.93  6.23  7.5X  7.53
Notes:  Total  Lending figures  for  FY36, FY87  an  FY36  incruLA African  Facility
Credits  of  5535.4,  121.4,  "  5112.6  repctively;  don  not  imeluo  sALS.
TabLe 2
io1RELATEO  TA ACTIVITIES
AS A PERCENTAGE  OF TOTAL  LEINOIN,  FY82-86
(in  USS nillion  )
....................................................................................................
FY12  FY3  FY8U  FY85  FY36  fY67  FYN  TOTAL AVERAGE
IORetated  TA  611.9  568.5  6.35  616.5  80.9  614.5  86.5  4793.3  684.8
Total  LendiMg  117'M.2  13082.3  14220.4  14215.8  18031.1  17430.4  18236.3  105000.5  15000.1
.............................................................................  ........................................................ 
Percent  5.2X  4.3X  4.5X  4.83  5.03  3.53  4.73  4.63  '.6%
Note:  Total  Lending  figures  for  FY&6, FY87  "  FYN  inctude  African  Facility
Credits  of  1612.4,  421.4,  end  1112.6 repectively._74  - ANNEX  3
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SCTORAL DSTRIiUTION  OF WNK  LIN4CNG  FOR  TA
FY62J4  AVERAGE  (%)
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TabLe-3
SECTORAL DISTRIBU710N OF BAuK LENDING FOR TA
FY82-88 (in USS m  ion)
SECTOR  FY82  rY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  i OTAL
........................  ..........................................  ........................................................  ......................................
Ag-icutture  & RuraL Development  287.5  277.0  221.3  388.7  261.6  262.0  228.9  1926.9
Education  89.7  143.1  120.8  223.4  251.0  67.4  276.8  1172.1
Energy  88.0  247.6  115.3  94.8  37.0  52.1  18.4  653.1
Industriat Development  &  Fi.-4nce  40.3  36.8  41.4  15.0  52.0  26.1  42.5  253.9
Industry  206.5  75.3  40.0  71.5  51.6  28.1  73.3  546.4
Population,  HeaLth &  Nutrition  2.7  23.2  41.6  34.3  68.6  13.8  31.8  215.9
Power  109.4  187.0  132.1  67.0  139.°  95.5  59.3  790.3
Pubtic  Sector  Managewent  29.9  30.6  85.7  57.2  41.5  72.3  67.1  384.4
Telecommunications  14.5  5.4  3.3  9.6  2.3  24.8  3.3  63.1
Transportation  155.4  136.7  190.3  141.0  134.0  237.6  205.3  1200.2
urben Devetopim  nt  103.5  61.8  86.6  25.9  96.4  56.5  111.6  542.4
water Supply and  Sewerage  48.0  90.4  63.3  74.8  54.5  115.4  46.5  492.7
TOTAL  11  h.4  1314.9  1141.4  1203.1  1190./  1051.6  1164.8  8241.4
Source:  C!CPS  CODOP.
Note:  Do"  not  include  non-project  lending;  coiumna  or  rows  may  not  eqiaL  totaLs  due  to  rounding.- 76  - ANNEX  3
Fiqure  4_ 
- SECTORAL  DeSTPJBUTION  OF BANK LENDING  FOR
1D-RELATED  TA
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Ta3ble  __
SECTORAL OISTRIBUTION OF SANK LENDING  FOR ID-RELATED TA
FY82-88 (in  uSS million)
SECTOR  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  TOTAL
............................................................................................................
AgricuLture A  RuriL Development  68.8  127.5  158.4  188.1  160.3  195.0  168.4  1166.5
Education  57.6  119.3  109.6  208.6  243.8  64.2  264.8  1067.8
Energy  33.6  38.4  10.5  24.8  7.3  24.9  8.5  147.9
Industrial  Development  &  Finance  28.2  27.0  37.9  12.6  47.1  14.3  40.7  207.7
Industry  122.9  36.3  ~5.8  24.7  21.5  22.2  41.6  295.1
PopuLation,  Health  &  Nutrition  2.5  19.7  24.4  30.3  63.8  11.9  29.8  132.4
Power  38.2  45.0  34.8  29.A  55.2  33.9  27.4  263.6
Public Sector  Management  16.0  26.2  64.0  43.8  38.9  58.8  54.2  301.8
TeLeconmumnications  12.8  5.2  3.3  9.3  2.1  23.6  3.3  59.5
Transportation  56.0  63.8  88  0  67.4  73.3  85.8  117.1  551.3
Urban  Development  63.8  27.1  59.9  13.2  56.5  31.4  63.8  315.6
Water Supply  nd  Sewe.age  11.6  32.5  21.,.  24.7  27.7  35.6  1*.5  172.4
TOTAL  611.9  V  638.4  676.6  797.3  601.4  838.0  4731.5
Source: CECPS,  CODOP.
Note: Does not include non-project  Lending;  colurns  or  rows may ncw equal  totals due to rounding.-17  - ANNEXJ
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Figure_  5I  Figure  5J
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RYCTOPAL  OITS4J'UTON  OF  lANK  L9114NG  P0  TA
BY REOi: APECA
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Table  5A
AFRiCA
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION  OF BANK LENDING FOR TA
FY82-88 (in  USS million)
SECYOR  FY82  FY83  FY8.4  FY85  FY8  FYr87  FY08  TOTAL
............................................................................................................
AgricuLture  &  RuraL DevoLopm nt  87.9  54.7  94.5  76.2  70.4  126.3  72.4  584.4
EducatIon  13.9  29.1  8.4  21.9  27.9  24.8  54.8  180.7
Energy  52.9  59.5  32.8  14.2  6.3  17.6  6.8  190.1
Indu4try/tDF  24.2  33.0  20.0  7.4  27.3  6.1  27.0  145.0
PopuLatior,  HeaLth & Nutrition  1.6  5.7  8.5  12.1  19.0  6.0  18.0  70.9
Power  28.0  44.7  63.7  21.8  42,9  10.9  11.0  223.0
PubLic  Sector  Management  20.3  20.1  51.3  33.7  10.6  32.6  67.1  235.6
Tleocanm.afcations  11.1  4.6  0.0  5.1  2.3  4.5  0.0  27.5
Transportatfon  46.2  53.6  65.9  67.4  44.4  49.2  93.0  419.6
Urban  Doevolopn  t  11.0  11.4  24.4  9.0  32.5  8.2  39.6  136.1
Water  SuPPLy  anid Woerase  29.5  27.2  6.9  28.3  6.6  20.7  9.1  128.2
...........................................  .......................................................................................
TOTAL  326.5  345.5  376.3  297.1  290.3  306.r  398.9  2341.1
Source:  CICPU,  CXOP.
Note: Colunno or rows may not equaL totaLs due to rounding.
Ome not  fnelude  Non-project  l  nding.- 80  - ANNEX  3
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Table  58
I  s  -
ASIA
SECT0QAL DISTRIBUTICi1  OF BANK LENDING FCt TA
FY82.88 (inr  USS  miliion)
..  . ..  . . ..  . . ..............  ..............................  ............................................
SECTOR  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  TOTAL
......  ...........  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Agriculture  & Rural  Devetopm  t  92.5  165.4  76.7  240  3  63.5  65.7  85.5  789.5
Education  57  0  83.2  84.6  166.0  181.3  0.0  154.3  726.2
Energy  32.l  127.8  71.0  47.4  19.2  11.3  7.6  316.7
Irustry/IDF  160.3  53.S  3,&,2  54.5  55.4  11.7  40.8  412.3
Populatiom,  HNetth  &  Nutritiom  f.0  9.9  2t2  18.5  27.8  0.0  10.3  87.6
Power  35.6  116.6  29.4  17.7  43.0  57.3  27.4  327,1
Public  Sector  Naneennt  0.0  0.0  18.5  0.0  0.0  23.3  0.0  41.9
Teleco.wicstiom  3.3  0.9  0.0  3.5  0.0  15.8  0.0  23.4
Transportation  52.2  63.5  93.2  36.7  b3.9  54.5  84.5  448.3
Urbon  DlvoeLntuf  6.7  30.8  24.8  5.8  27.1  33.5  34.2  162.8
Water  &4pIy  and  Sewerae  9.4  22.7  23.7  2.5  25.8  28.1  0.0  112.3
.........  .......................  .......................  ........................................................................
TOTAL  449.3  674.2  479.2  592.7  507.0  301.2  444.4  3447.9
Source:  C2CPS, COW.
Mot*:  Col%w  or  row  my  not ecal  totals  due  to  rourdirg.
Does  not include  Mon-project  lending.- 81  - ANNEX  3
SECTOPAL  aI STRUSUrON  OF  SAM  LENoNG  FOR TA
BY REGION:  EMP4
"82S80  AVERAGE  (%)
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Table  5C
EENA
SECTORAL  DISTRIBUTION  OF BANK  LrbDNDING  FOR  TA
FY82-88  (in  USS  miLLion)
SECTOR  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  TOTAL
....................  ...........................................  ............  ...........  ....................  ..  ..............................................
Agriculture  & Rural  Development  33.7  25.6  29.8  30.5  17.1  16.4  37.7  190.7
Education  15.1  11.4  21.3  7.5  39.3  13.8  15.2  123.7
Energy  9.3  55.3  7.1  11.2  8.0  15.9  4.0  110.8
Industry/lDf  53.8  5.9  22.1  22.1  14.4  13.3  13.0  144.7
PopuLation,  Health  & Nutrition  0.0  4.7  0.0  3.7  0.0  4.8  0.0  '3.2
Power  1.4  18.4  20.4  1.5  27.3  10.9  10.9  90.8
Public  Sector  M"  agement  4.5  3.1  9.1  2.3  0.0  4.9  0.0  23.9
Teleconm.nications  0.1  0.0  2.3  1.0  0.0  4.5  3.3  11.1
Transportation  10.7  5.6  7.4  18.5  9.6  51.1  18.8  121.7
Urban  Development  19.9  4.0  6.9  8.1  0.0  14.8  24.7  78.3
Water  Supply  an  Sewerage  7.1  9.4  23.5  18.6  7.6  58.0  11.5  135.6
...........................  ............................................................  ..........  ................  ............................  .....
TOTAL  155.6  143.3  149.9  124.9  123.4  208.5  139.1  1044.6
Source:  CECPS, CODOP.
Note:  CoLuLw  or  rows  may not  equal  totals  due  to  rounding.
Does  not  incltue  Non-project  Lending.-82  - ANNEX  3
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SECTORAL  DISTRIBUTfON  OF BANK LENNO#4 FOR TA
BY RiOON:  LAC
FY&248 AVEPAQE (%)
Eo0catmVHN  10 5%
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TabLe  5D
LAC
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION  OF BANK LENDING  FOR TA
FY82-88  (in  USS  miltion)
SECTOR  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  TOTAL
....  ......  ..  ...............................  ................................................................
Agriculture  &  Rural  Development  73.4  29.4  20.2  41.8  110.6  53.6  33.3  362.2
Education  3.8  19.4  6.5  28.1  2.5  24.4  20.5  105.2
Energy  '8.3  18.6  4.4  22.0  3.5  7.3  0.0  74.0
Industry/IDF  8.5  19.6  3.1  2.5  6.6  23.0  35.0  98.2
Population,  Health  &  Nutrition  1.1  3.0  12.0  0.0  21.7  3.0  3.5  44.3
Power  51.6  7.2  18.6  26.1  26.7  16.4  10.0  156.7
Public  Sector  Management  5.1  7.5  6.8  21.2  30.9  11.5  0.0  83.0
Teleconnunications  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0
Transportation  46.4  14.0  23.9  18.4  16.1  83.0  23.1  224.8
Urban  Development  65.9  15.8  30.5  3.0  36.8  0.0  13.2  165.2
Water  SuppLy  and  Sewerage  2.0  31.0  9.1  25.4  14.4  8.6  25.9  116.3
.........................  ......................................................  ..............  ...................... 
TOTAL  276.0  165.4  136.1  188.5  269.7  230.8  164.5  1430.8
Source:  CECPS,  CXOP.
Note:  Columrw  _.  rows  may  not  equal  totaLs  due  to  rounding.
Dots  not  include  Won-project  terding.-83  - ANNEX  3
Table  6
TOTAL  BANK  LENDING  FOR  TA
BY REGION  AND  DELIVERY  NDE,  FYB2-88
(in  USS  million)
...............................................................................................
REGION  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  TOTAL
...............................................................................................
Africa
Project-related  225.9  272.0  282.2  236.7  244.4  256.6  310.4  1828.1
Free-standing  75.8  60.6  94.1  71.3  49.1  60.2  78.3  489.3
Total  301.7  332.6  376.3  308.0  293.5  316.7  388.7  2317.4
% of total  lank  TA  25.7%  25.3%  32.6%  25.3%  24.0%  29.6%  32.4%  27.7%
ASia
Project-related  427.9  657.5  437.3  574.1  483.2  267.0  449.0  3296.0
Free-standing  21.5  16.7  53.5  20.4  42.4  36.9  10.0  201.3
Total  449.3  674.2  490.8  594.4  525.6  303.9  459.0  3497.3
%  of total  Bank  TA  38.2%  51.2%  42.6%  48.9%  42.9%  28.4%  38.3%  41.9%
EMENA
Project-re:!ted  150.2  132.7  125.2  115.5  115.4  208.4  160.2  1007.6
Free-stnding  5.4  10.6  24.7  9.3  8.0  6.3  12.1  76.4
Total  155.6  143.3  149.9  124.9  123.4  214.7  172.3  1084.1
%  of  total  Bank  TA  13.2%  10.9%  13.0%  10.3%  10.1%  20.1%  14.4%  13.0%
LAC
Project-related  258.6  144.1  124.9  165.6  242.0  213.5  178.3  1327.0
Free-standing  10.1  21.3  11.2  23.9  39.8  21.4  0.0  127.7
Total  268.8  165.4  136.1  189.5  281.7  234.9  178.3  1454.6
% of total  Bank  TA  22.9%  12.6%  11.8%  15.6%  23.0%  21.9%  14.9%  17.4%
...............................................  .....................................................................................................
TOTAL  PROJECT-RELATED  1062.6  1206.3  969.6  1091.8  1084.9  945.4  1098.0  7458.6
TOTAL  FREE-STANDING  112.8  109.2  183.4  124.9  139.3  124.8  100.4  /
GRAND  TOTAL  1175.4  1315.5  1153.0  1216.7  1224.2  1070.2  1198.3  8353.3
Source:  CECPS,  CODOP.
Note:  Colunss  or rows  may  not equal  totals  due to rounding.- 84  - ANNEX 3
Table  7
TOTAL I1R-1LATEO TA ACTIVITIES
IL  IY  REGION ANO  OELIVERY  MECHANISM,  FY82-88
(in  USS  miliors)
...........................................................................................................
REGION  FY82  FY83  FYU4  FY85  FY86  fY8t  FYr8  TOTAL  AVERAGE
...............  ................................................  ............................................................................
Africa
Proj.ct-retated  141.0  166.0  176.3  154,9  167.0  179.2  226.5  1210.9  173.0
Frvst"Vdif  42.2  24.3  68.9  39.4  42.1  30.7  64.5  312.0  44.6
Asia
Proj.ct-retatsd  215.7  214.2  230.3  311.9  351.3  142.4  328.2  1794.0  256.3
Free-standinm  4.8  5.7  8.1  5.4  12.8  36.9  10.0  83.7  12.0
EM!  MA
Project  retated  70.5  51.8  76.1  56.8  78.0  WS5  108.9  528.6  75.5
Freo-sta  ding  0.9  0.9  8.7  4.7  4.0  6.3  0.0  25.5  3.6
LAC
Proj*ct-retated  133.1  89.9  64.5  92.7  121.9  115.0  126.4  743.4  106.2
Fr*wstaiing  3.7  15.8  5.6  20.8  31.8  17.5  0  0  95.2  13.6
.............................  ..............................................................................
TOTAL  611.9  568.5  638.5  686.5  808.9  614.5  864.5  4793.3  6&'.8
wot.:  Colku  or  rows  mwy not  equaL  totals  du  to  rounding.
Table 
TOTAL ID-RELATEO  TA ACTIVITIES
BY DELIVERY  MECHANISM,  FY82-88
(in  USS  uiLlion)
...........................................................................................................
DELIVERY  MECHANISM  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  TOTAL  AVERAGE
...........................................................................................................
Proj*ct-related  560.3  521.7  547.2  616.3  718.2  523.1  790.0  4276.9  611.0
Free-st  ding  51.6  46.7  91.2  70.3  90.6  91.4  74.5  516.4  73.8
...........................................................................................................
TOTAL  611.9  568.5  638.5  686.5  808.9  614.5  864.5  '793.3  6U4.8
Not#:  Colu  or  rows  Rwy not  eqa  totas  due  to  rowdimg.MJS  MUoon 
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TabLe 9
TRAINING  ANO  EXPERT/CONSULTANT  COMPONENTS
OF FREE-STANOIWG  TA  ACTIVITIES,  FYS2-88
(in  USS  millions)
...........................  .............................................................  . . . .
REGION  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88  TOTAL
..................................................................................................
Africa
Training  7.9  5.5  10.6  11.7  8.2  4.1  15.3  63.4
Experts/Corsultants  25.4  16.5  34.1  24.6  23.5  26.0  49.2  199.3
Asia
Troining  3.8  3.3  1.3  4.4  7.0  4.0  5.0  28.8
Experts/Consultants  1.0  4.7  6.8  1.1  5.7  32.9  5.0  57.1
ENEMA
Trsining  0.2  0.3  3.5  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.0  6.3
Experts/ConsuLtants  0.7  0.4  5.2  1.4  3.2  5.7  0.0  16.6
LAC
Training  1.6  0.8  0.1  0.8  3.8  1.3  0.0  8.3
Experts/Consultants  2.2  7.8  2.3  10.6  28.0  12.6  0.0  63.5
..................................................................................................
TOTAL  42.8  39.3  63.9  55.3  80.3  87.2  74.5  443.3
Motes:(1)  Totat  may  not  equal  total  ID-related  free-standing  TA diu t'  aggregation  of training  and
expert/consuLtant  costs  in  certairi  project  docuients;  aggregated  costs  were  not  incLuded
in  t0e  above  calculations.
(2)  Calurrns  or  rows  may  not  equaL  totals  due to rounding.
TabLe  10
TRAINING  AND  EXPERT/CONSULTANT  COMPONENTS
OF PROJECT-RELATED  TA ACTIVITIES,  FY82-8J
(in  USS miLLions)
REG'JM  FY82  FY83  FY84  FY85  FY86  FY87  FY86  TOTAL
..................................................................................................
Africa
Training  28.8  50.4  53.9  45.4  62.3  61.9  66.4  369.1
Experts/Consultants  112.2  115.6  122.4  109.5  104.7  117.4  160.0  841.8
Asia
Training  68.5  120.3  128.9  208.4  230.5  82.0  183.7  1022.4
Experts/Consultants  '47.3  93.8  101.4  103.4  120.8  60.4  144.5  771.7
EMEWA
Training  23.5  19.8  46.4  24.6  54.8  45.6  53.9  268.6
Experts/Consultants  46.9  31.9  29.7  32.3  23.2  40.9  55.0  259.9
LAC
Training  49.7  30.0  18.3  43.9  69.1  64.9  57.5  333.4
Experts/Consuitants  83.4  59.9  46.2  48.7  52.9  50.0  68.9  410.0
..................................................................................................
TOTAL  560.3  521.7  547.2  616.3  718.2  523.1  790.0  4276.9
Note:  Colurms  or rows  may not  equaL  totals  due  to rounding.-89  - ANNEX  3
REGIONAL  OISTRIBUTION
OF  TOTAL  VOLUME  OF TRAINING
M2416 AVERAGE  (%)
AFRICA  19  0%
ASIA 52.7% 
7\ L,AC  14 7%
EMENA  13.6%
SoutS  CECPS COOOP  M4IS
Figure  14
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A CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK  FOR  TWINNING
1.  Twinning  Involves  the establishment  of an  inst!tutlonal
relatlonship  between  an  organizational  entity  In  a developing  country
(the  "recipient")  and  a  similar  but  more  mature  entity  In  another
country  (the  "suppiler").  Twinnirg  Is  mainly  almed  at,  and  best  sulted
for, the transfer  of managerlal,  financial, and  technical  skills and
systems  that  Involve many  or all of  the  numerous  functional  aspects  of
the  recipient  entity.  "Transfer"  of skills Is to be distinguished  froni
the  'development"  of skills,  In the  sense  that  the  primary  reason  for
selecting  twinning  as  a mode  of TA delivery  Is  to  br!ng  to  the
reciplent  proven  and  successful  ways  of  Improving  organizatlonal
efficlency  and  effectiveness  through  the  selectlon  of  a  supplier  of
similar structure.  In short,  twinning  Is about  transferring  directly
relevant  operatlonal  knowledge  between  two  !nstitutlons  as  similar In
function  and  structure  as  possible.  When  reciplent  conditions  are  not
sufficlently common  to those  of an  Identifiable supplier  (and thus
there  Is a need  to develop  Institution-specIfic  solutions), more
standard  TA approaches  are  likely  to be approprlate.
2.  This annex  assesses  the  potential  for  making  greater  use  of
"twinning" arrangements  In Bank-fInanced  technical  assistance  projects
and components.  It Is not  Intended  to provide  a comprehensive  review
of twinning arrangements,  or  a thorough  overview  of  the Bank's
activitles  In this area.  Given  that  Information  on  the use  of twinning
is not  centralized  In any  of the  Bank's operational  units, It  has  not
been  possible  to ascertaln  the  extent  of  the Bank's use  of  this mode
of TA delivery.  Information  for  the paper  was  derived  from  Bank  and
non-Bank  technical  papers,  staff  appraisal  reports,  project  files, and
Interviews  with  Bank  staff  Involved  directly  with  the preparation  and
supervislon  of Bank  projects  in which  twinning arrangements  are
Included.  A  list  of selected  Bank  projects  Involving twinning may  be
found  at  the end  of this report.
HOW  DOES  TWINNING  DIFFER  FROM  OTHER  FORMS  OF  TA?
3.  What  differentiates  twinning from  standard  TA  approaches
are  the  scope  and  quallty of  Interaction.  Wlth  regard  to scope,
twinning typically  affords  the  recipient  a much  broader  range  of
technical  services  than  more  standard  modes  of TA delivery.  Because
the supplier  Is already  accustomed  to managing  an organizatlon  wlth  a
similar scope  of functions  and  tackling similar operational  problems,
the  supplier  Is able  to tap  Into a  reservoir  of operatlonal  experience
and  in-house  resources  to address  recipient  problems  In a manner  that
Is rarely  possIble  among  consulting  fIrms or  Individual consultants.
For  the  twinning  supplier, the set  of TA tools  that  can  be  appiled  to
recdolent  needs  Is defined  by the  institutlon's experience  because  the
TA  services  are  provided  by an  Interactive  team  of managers  and
specialists  drawing  upon  the historical  experience  of their
organization.  This enables  the  twinning  suppiler  to bring a more
comprehensive  perspective  to  the problems  at  hand.  Such  experlence-91  - ANNEX  4
can  lend the  suppile- a greater  degree  of credibility and  rellabillity  In
the eyes  of the  reciplent  and  thus  foster  a more  productive,
committed  relationship  In  which  ID  measures  are  more  successfully
Implemented.  Alternatively,  consulting  firms and  Individual consultants
(as  organizational  "outsiders")  often  lack  direct  operatlonal  exoerlence;
thais,  thC  tools  that  they  can  apply  to recipient  problems  may  be
i;mited.
4.  As  a result, the qualIty  of  a  supplier's  services  are  often
seen  to  be  superior  to  that  of  othet  modes  of  TA  deilvery.  The
manager  or  technical  specialist  from  the  supplier  Is  more  likely  to  be
capable  of  Identifying  the  sources  of  problems,  rather  than  simply the
problems  themselves.  And  because  staff  from  the  supplier  serve  In
operational  capacities  or  work  closelv  wlt'.  the management  of  the
reciplent  as  advisors  for  longer perlods  of time, tney  develop  a
keener  sense  of the  constralnts  (both Internal  and  external)  facing  the
reciplent.  Thus,  the  supplier's recommendatlons  and  advice  for
addressing  identifled problems  might  be more  feasible  than  those  of
the TA consultant.  Additlonally, twinning suppliers  are  usually
available  for back-stopping  and  follow-up  on  Implementatlon  of
recommendations,  thus  ensuring  that  the  results  of  assistance  are
frultful.
i.  One  Bank  Task  Manager  observed,  "twinning is a more
cohesive  approach  than  using  Individual  consultants."  The  supplier
serves  the  recipient  as  an established  and  Integrated  team  interacting
with  another  team  of similar compositlon.  This relationship  tends  to
bind the  two  parties  together  wlth a greater  degree  of commitment  and
Interest  than  found  under  other  modes  of TA delivery  and  promotes  a
more  productive  and  successful  exchange.  This  cohesiveness  thus
makes  twinning a very  attractive  mechanism  for delivery  of TA  aimed  at
ID.
TYPES  OF  TWINNING  ARRANGEMENTS
B.  Broadly  defined, twinning  arrangements  can  take  the  form  of
consultancy  services,  management  contracts,  or  joint  ventures.  The
cholce  of  contractual  arrangement  will  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the
recipient's activitles, the  reciplent's desire  to malntaln  a given
degree  of managerial  and  financial control  over  the  ontity, how  weak
or strong  the  reciplent  entity  Is (and thus  the  range  of services
required), and  the pool of potentlal  suppliers.  Typically, twinning
arrangements  In Bank-financed  projects  fall under  the categories  of
consultancy  and management  contracts.- 92  - .'NNEX  4
ADVANTAGES  OF TWINNING
7.  TwinningIdiffers  from  traditional  TA  delIvery  systems  in  the
following  respects:
(a)  the supplier  has operatlonal experience In  the
same or similar  functions required of the
recipient;
(b)  twinning  provides opportunities to integrate
training  with TA;
(c)  twinning  arrangements  typically  allow for greater
flexibillty  to alter  work programs  as needs and
conditions  change;
(d)  twinning  provides  possibillties  for  cooperet:on;
(e)  twinning  Is  usually  a  less  expensive  mechanism
for  TA delIvery;  and
(f)  twinning  can serve to encourage  developingj
country consulting capacity through the use of
developing  country  suppliers.
Item  (a)  has already  been discussed  above. The other Items  are
examined In  more  detail  below.
Integration  of TA and Traln'ng
8.  In  most cases TA and training  needs can be Integrated
through  twinning  arrangements,  resulting  both In  greater  relevance  and
continuity  of tralning  activitles.  The supplier's  staff  may serve in
the reciplent's  Institution  as advisors  or In  line  positions  and  provide
on-the-Job  training,  or the reciplent's  staff  may visit  the supplier's
institution  to receive  training.  Formal  tralning  activitles  can be
tailored  to precede  or follow  specific  on-the-Job  tralning  In  a
coordinated  fashion.
Flexibility  During  Implementatlon
9.  Twinning  usually  affords  the reciplent  a greater  degree  of
flexibility  In  defining  the work program  throughout  the project's
Implementation.  This  Is  because there  are usually  no terms of
reference  drawn-up  for Individuals  under  twinning  arranlements  (the
alteration  of  which  would  require  renegotiation  when a consulting  firm
or Individual  consultant  Is  employed).  Rather,  twinning  arrangements
Involve  contractual  agreements  between two institutions  that  may
1  Parts of this  section  are derived  substantlally  from Lauren
Cooper,  The Twinning  of Institutlons:  Its  Use as a Technical  Assistance
Delivery  System,  World  Bank Technical  Paper No.  23,  1984.- 93 - ANNEX  4
I:iclude  spe  fic or general  terms.  Looser  contractual  arrangements
are  practical  when  the  relationship  Is envisloned  to be of a  long-
term, operatlonal  nature  where  the  reciplent's needs  change  over  time.
Potential  for  Long-Term  Cooperation
10.  Institutlonal development  Is of course  a  long-term  process.
Iaeally,  mechanisms  for the  delIvery  of  TA for  ID should  be  selected
wlth this  in  mind.  Tw!nning  can  be  an especlally  appropriate  (and cost-
effective) means  of providing  contlnulty  of TA  services  over  the  long
haui.  Typically  the  initlal  twinningi  contract  Is of a  relatively  short
time  span  (2-3 years)  in  order  to allow the  parties  to assess  one
another's  strengths,  weaknesses,  performance,  and  overall
compatibility.  Task  managers  and  those  Involved  In project  preparation
usually  expressed  an expectation  that  the  relatlonship  would  continue
beyond  the completlon  of the  project  (either with  follow-up  Bank
financing or with  the  recipient  absorbing  the costs).  Whether  or  not
the  relationship  continues  depends  on  need, the  recipient's
satisfactlon  wlth  the  services,  the  suppiler's benefit,  a comrfortable
relationship, costs  and  the  future  capacity  of the  recipient  to  absorb
some  or  all  of  th-se,  and  the  Bank's  financial,  technical,  and
coordinative  support.
Costs  of Twinning
11.  The  services  of the  suppller  In a twinning  arrangement  can
be  provided  free, at cost,  at cost  plus  some  marginal  fee, or  at
liternational  market  rates.  Most  of the  suppliers  In the case  studies
considered  were  obtained  through  competitive  bidding and  were  selected
primarily on  the  basis  of the quality  of the  services  they  offered.
However,  It  appears  that  cost  plays  a major  role  In the  Initial  choice
of  twinning  as  the  TA delIvery  mode.  Bank  staff  estimated  in several
cases  that  the  savings  associated  with TA  delivered  through  twinning
were  as much  as  40-50  percent  of the cost  of  the delivered  through  a
consulting  fIrm or  Individual consultants.  Glven  the  low degree  of
comm;tment  to  TA on  the  part  of some  borrowers,  due  In  many  cases  to
high costs,  twinning may  be more  than  an attractive  alternative  to
high cost  consu!ting  services  --  It  may  also be  a means  of bullding
greater  borrower  Interest  and commitment  to provide  required  Inputs
and  financial support  for  TA projects  and  components.
Potential  for Estabiishment  of Developing  Country  Consulting  Capacity
12.  When  Involving a developing  country  supplier, twinning can
be  a  useful  means  of  fosterlng  the  development  of  local  consulting
capacities  among  the  Bank's  borrowers.  Task  managers  felt  that
developing  country  suppliers  benefited  directly  or  indirectly  from
their experiences  through  revenue  enhancement,  diversification  of
operations,  exposure  to Bank  procedures  (International  Competitive
Bldding for example), travel  and career  advancement  for  supplIer  staff
(in  some  cases  supplier  staff  were  given  bonuses  for participation),
and  the  International  prestige  associated  with  involvement  In Bank-
funded  projects.  The  attraction  of tnese  benefits  can  play  an-94  - ANNEX  4
Inportant  role  In the  encouragement  of consulting  capacity  on  the part
of  suppliers, the  desirability  of which  has  been  enumerated  In sections
of the maln  paper.  (Indee)d,  some  suppliers  develooed  full-fledged
consulting  divisions.)
13.  Bank  supervislon  of suppliers' activitles  (such as  the
development  of  work  programs)  and  compliance  with  Bank  procedures  Is
akin  to  providing  TA  to  the  supplier;  In  this  sense,  twinning  can  be  a
means  for the  Bank  tc address  multiple objectives  simultaneously.
Such  "doubling-up"  of borrowers'  Institutions  could play  a significant
role  In the  development  of a TA network  among  borrowers.  In additlon,
"doubling-up" would  most  likely  produce  a more  positive  perceptlon  of
TA  among  borrowers,  as  such  arrangements  would  be  less  threatening.
Several  Task  Managers  Indicated that  twinning was  selected  because
borrowers  preferred  a TA  supplier  from  a similar culture  and  this
similarity fostered  greater  enthuslasm  and  commitment  on  thelr part
(see the case  on  Bolivla  In the  box below).
POTENTIAL  DISADVANTAGES
14.  One  potential  problem  wlth twinning  Is that  the  supplier  may
lack  developing  country  experience.  When  present,  this  problem
typically  manifests  Itself  as  an  inabillity  or unwillingness  of  some
supplier  staff  to functlon  effectively  in  the recdolent's  country  due to
physical  conditions  and/or  the soclo-cultural  environment.  This  can be
a  particularly  difficult  problem  wlth  suppilers  from  developed  countrles
(see  the  case on Ghana in  the  box below).
15.  In addition, although  n  twinning arrangement  might  be
functionally  or  technically  the most  appropriate  means  of TA  delivery
and the  chosen supplier  mlght  appear to be nerfectly  matched to the
reciplent;  the 3uppiler  may lack  consultlng  e-  -rlence. The supplier
may be Inexperienced  In  setting  fee  schedule: r  negotlating
contracts,  or may be IncaPable  of developing  a realistic  work program
wlthout  irnitial  assistance  from  Bank staff. Under these circumstances,
the TA component  will  most likely  require  a greater Investment  In  Bank
supervision  than  might  otherwise  be the  case,  especially  In  the Initlal
stages  of  the  project  cycle.- 95  - ANNEX 4
Municipal  Development  In  La  Paz  (Credit  1842)
This  municipal  development  project  Includes  a  solid  waste
management  component  aimed  at  designing  and  Implementing  a
garbage collection  and disposal system  through a consultancy
twinning  arrangement.  The topographical constraints of La Paz
posed  a  number  of  proolems  for  efficlent  collectlon  of  solid
wastes  within  the  city.  The  city  center  Is  hlghly  congested  and
virtually Inaccessible  to collection  vehicles,  and outlying areas
are  largely  characterized by steep slopes and eroded  streets,
making vehicular access difficult.  Of the 500 tons of solid  waste
generated  dally in the city only 26 percent was  regularly
collected.
The Bank's  project preparatlon team recognized that the
constraints present  In  La Paz posed  a number of problems for the
TA component.  First,  few (if  any) consulting firms had the
operatlonal experience and repertoire of skills  required for
managing solid  wastes.  Second, the adoption of modern  solid  waste
collectlon  technology was  Inappropriate for the conditions In  La
Paz and finding  a  consulting firm  with knowledge of and experience
with  alternative collection  systems  appeared  unlikely. For these
reasons, the project preparation team decided to twin La Paz, with
another municipality  that had successfully  overcome  similar
problems.  After  having  considered  a  number  of possible suppliers
In  consultation  wlth  La  Paz  officlals,  the  Bank  decidecd  that  the
Municipal  Enterprise for Urban Services (EEVV)  --  a privately held
firm suDplying  urban services to the city of Medellin,  Columbla --
would be an appropriate twin.
EEVV was  selected because of the topographical similarity
of Medellin  and La Paz, EEVV's twenty-year  history of efficlent
and  self-financing  urban  services,  Its  cultural similarity  with La
Paz, Its  experience in  a city at a similar  level  of development as
La Paz.  The Bank paid EEVV US$90,000  for Its  services --  an
estimated 50 percent savings over the costs of standard
consulting firms. A member  of the Bank's  appraisal team noted
that EEVV was motivated by financial  considerations, the career
advancement  of Its  younger staff,  and the prestige of working on
an International  contract for the Bank.  EEVV also -eveloped an
understanding of the Bank's  bidding  procedures  and 's gaining
valuable experience in Its  new consulting  capacity, both of which
put the organization In  a much better position to comp(te  for Bank
and other donor contracts  In the future,  which It  Is  expected  to
do.-98  - ANNEX 4
SELECTED CASES  OF  BANK-FINANCED  TWINNING
16.  Twinning  Is  msost successful  when  suppilers  and  recip.oents
face  similar conditions  (managerial, technical, and  environmental).  In
certain  sectors,  organizatlons  tend  to operate  under  ver-  similar sets
of  conditions.  In  water  supply  (and  other  municipal  servlees,  for
example,  technological  requirements  and  management  systems  are  similar
in  both  developed  and  developing  couritrIes--that  Is,  the  problems  are
relatively  straightforward,  and  system  scales  are  subject  to
adaptatIon.  This  Is  one  of  the  primary  reasons  why  twinning  has  been
adopted  rather  extensively  In  this  and  otrner  municipal  service  sectors.
For  example,  In  Guatemala  city,  the  municipal  water  authority  (EMPAGUA)
Is  twinned  under  an  initlal  four-year  contract  wlth  a consortium
Including a Frazlilan water  agency  (SANEPAR)  and  an  Israeli consulting
firm  (TAHAL)  speclalIzed  In  management  and  financing.
17.  Twinning  In  the  educatlo:i  and  Industrlal  finance  sectors  and
between  training  Institutes  and  ,esearch  organizatlons  Is also  fairly
extensive.  For  example,  the  Paris  Chamber  of Commerce  and  Industry.
supported  by  one  of  the Grandes  Ecoles,  Is twinned  under  IDA  financing
with the  Natlonal  Institute  of Accounting  and Management  In
Madagascar.  And  In the  Industrial finance  sector,  the  Indian
Development  Bank  (IDB)  Is  twinned  with  the  Nlgerlan  Bank  for  Commerce
and  industry  (NBCI)  to  provide  management  advice  and  training  both  on
the  job  and  at  IDB (Nigerla  - "Small  and  Medium  Scale  Industry
Project").  Other  examples  Include the  Seventh  Educatlon  Project  In
Ethiopia  and  the  Third and  Fourth  Educatlon  Projects  In Yemen,  P.D.R.
Twinning  In  the  Education  Sector
Malawl  - "Institutional Development  Project"  (Credit 2038)
The Malawi  Institute  of Management  (MIM)  has  recently
twinned  with  a Canadian  consortium  comprised  of the  Human
Resources  Secretariat  of Ontario  Province,  the Niagara  lr,stitute,
aid  the Ontario  Internationa'  ,orporation.  This consortium  has
signed  an  initlal  one-year  centract  to manage  MIM and  to provide
eight management  tralners.  MIM will review  the consortium's
performance  after  the first vear  to determine  whether  to extend
the contract.  If  extended,  the consortium  will tailor a two-year
program  of  In-house  and  external  tralning  for  the  local staff  to
prepare  them  for assuming  operatlonal  control  of MIM.  Beginning  In
the  third year,  local staff will begin  replacing  the  external
managers  and  tralners,  and  the  consortium's  role would  shift to
back-stopping  through  perlodic  visits and  exchange  programs.- 97  - ANNEX  4
18.  There  appears  to  be  a  good  deal  of  growth  In  the  use  of
twinning  for  Bank  financed  publIc  sector  management  projects,
especially  In  the  last  two  years.  Twinning  In  public  sector  management
Is  ,jrlmarily  orlented  towards  financial  management.  ADETEF,  the
development  branch  of  the  French  Ministry  of  Flnance,  Is  an  active
twinning  supplier  throughout  Africa  and  EMENA.  ADETEF  was  Involved  In
a  project  In  Nlger  (Economic  and  F Inanclal  Mane.gement  Improvement
Project)  to  strengthen  the  Mnistry  of  Flnance's  Financial  Plannirg
Department.  The  success  of  this  relationsh;o  led  to  ADETEF's Inclusion
In  a  public  sector  management  project  In  Rwanda (improvement  of  PublIc
Finance  Management  Project)  aimed  at  Improving  budgetary  and
accounting  procedures  In  the  Mlnistry  of  Finance  and Econox.;y.
Implementation  of  this  project,  however,  was  reportedly  unsatisfactory
due  to  conflIcts  between  ADETEF  and  recipient  staff.  ADETEF  is  also
twinned  with  the  Mauritanian  Mlnistry  of  Economy  and  Flnance
(Development  Management  Project,.  ADETEF Is  often  used  In  francophone
Africa  public  sector  managemen'  ,rojects  for  two  reasons:  (1)  It  has
lIttle  competition  due  to  the  fact  that  It  does  not  charge  for  the
services  of  Its  personnel,  and  (2)  financlal  iystems  In  francophone
Africa  are  derived  from  the  French  model  - thus  ensuring  compatibillty
of  suppller  and  recipient.
19.  Other  sectors  are  Iess.  suIted  to  twinning.  Agriculture  Is  a
sector  In  which  local  soclo-economic  conditions  and  technical
constralnts  are  qulte  distinct  from  country  to  country,  and  as
requirements  are  more  specific,  the  search  for  an  approprlate  twin  can
be  time  consuming.  It  was  possible  to  ltentify  only  two  recent  Bank-
financed  projects  In  agriculture:  the  Office  du  Nlger  Consolidation
project  In  Mall,  and  the  Agricultural  Services  Rehabilitation  project  In
Ghana.  The latter  project  Involves  a  twinning  arrangement  between
Ghana's  Irrigatlon  Development  Authority  (GIDA) and  the  government-
operated  South  Korean  Agricultural  Development  CorDoration  (ADC) which
alms  at  strengthening  GIDA's  capacity  to  plan,  manage,  and  maintain
Irrigation  schemes.  ADC will  provide  seconded  staff  to  work  wlth  the
management  and  technicai  staff  of  GIDA and  will  assign  GIDA staff  to
ADC projects  where  operations  are  relevant  to  the  responsibilities  of
GIDA.  Training  wll take  place  both  on  the  job  and  In  South  Korea.  The
task  manager  of  this  project  Indicated  that  ADC was  selected  because
of  Its  experience  wIth  small-scale  IrrIgatIon  technologies,  although
Identifying  and  securing  the  right  supplier  for  GIDA required  a
substantial  amount  of  project  preparation  time.
CONCLUS  IONS
20.  Twinning  can  be  a  highly  effective  method  for  dellvering
technical  assistance  aimed  at  institutional  development.  It  Is
operationally  orlented  and  useful  for  provisiorn  of  a  broader  range  of
services  than  standard  consulting  firms  typlcally  offer,  It  is  often
relatively  inexpensive,  and  It  provides  opportunitles  to  integrate
training  with  TA.  Most  Important,  It  Is  an  Ideal  means  of  attacking  ID
problems  over  a  longer  time  frame  than  is  usually  allowed  by  a  specific
project  and  is  well  suited  to  provide  TA continulty  throughout  a
project  series.- 98 - ANNEX  4
21.  Of course,  It  Is  Important  to first  determine  If  twinning  Is
the  most approprlate  means of deliverlng  TA;  In  most cases,  Individual
consultanrts  or consulting firms are sufficient. Other  cases mlght
require a combinatlon of twinning  with other consultancy  services.  As
the  cases cited In  this  paper Indicate,  care should  be taken in  the
selection  of the suppiler.  It  Is  Important  that all  of  the various
aspects  of supplier-reciplent  compatibillty  be considered  and  carefully
weighed  before  a  selectlon  is  made.  These  Include:
a.  What  are  the  recipient's  TA heeds  (operational  or
consultancy)?
b.  What  are  the  reciplent's  training  needs?
c.  Is  the  supplier  able  to  provide  the specific  mode of
tralning  required,  I.e.,  on  the  Job,  at  the  supplier's
headquarters,  formal  training  programs?
d.  Are the reci'ient's  and the suppiler's  operating  conditions
simliar  (technical,  scope,  etc.)?
e.  Are  the  recipient's  and  the  supplier's  language,  culture  and
environment  similar?
f.  How extonsive  are  the  supplier's  operatlonal,  consulting  and
international  experiences?
g.  What  are  the  likely  supervision  requirements?
h.  How willing  Is  the  supplier  to  cor.imit  to  a  long-term
relationship  If  desired  and needed?
i.  What are the f'nanclal  requirements  of the supplier  (cost  of
TA,  trainlnri,  equipment  contracts)?
J.  What are the supplier's  contractual  requirements
(consultancy,  management  contract,  equity  sharing,  Joint
venture)?
22.  The  most  frequently  cited  problems  bt  task  managers  were:
1)  difficulty  In  locating  an  approprlate  supplier;  2) pOOr  selection  of
supplier;  and  3)  greater  supervislon  demands  --  especially  when  the
supplier  has  little  or  no  experience  with  consulting  or Bank
proceoures.  These  problems  are  not  Insurmountable.  And given  the
generally  disappolnting  record  of  ID results  obtained  with  other  modes
of  TA delivery,  twinning  might  be  an  alternative.
2  Task  managers  generally  agreed  that  there  Is  a  need  wlthin  the
Bank to establish  a registry  of potential  twinning  suppilers  and
suggested  that this  be provided  at a reglonal  level,  perhaps  within  the
technical  departments  of the  Bank.- 99  - ANNEX  4
Sele  _ng  a  Supplier:  The  Importance  of  Compat!patj
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attrib-i.able  to  the  econcmic  ancl  policy  environment  In  which SGMC  j
operated.  However, Bank staff apparently recognized thelr and the
Ghanians' mistake In  the selectlon of  CGM as a twinning  supplier.
At  that  polnt,  Bank  staff  located  and  promoted  an  Indian  mining
firm that operated  under  similar  geological  and  technological
conditions as SGMC.  This suggestlon was  rejected  by  SGMC on  the
grounds that the technology the Indian  firm  would transfer was
outdated  and less sophisticated than that which a developed
country  suppiler  could provide.  The follow-up project ("Mlning
Sector Rehabilitation")  will  prov de TA  through  a  joint  venture.- 100  - ANNEX  4
SELECTEr  BANK  PROJECTS  INVOLVING  TWINNING  ARRANGEMENTS
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